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What of the Future?

By MAJOR GENERAL JOHN K. HERR

Chief of Cavalry

In view of the present world situation it appears that we are about to arm. Where will our Cavalry fit into the picture? Let us discuss some of the factors which bear upon that situation. There can be no doubt that in any war of magnitude the bone and sinew of armies will continue to be the mobile ground troops—the Infantry, Field Artillery and Cavalry. This is particularly true in our case because with the advent of mechanization each arm or service is charged with developing it as far as practicable and desirable in the execution of the rôle of the particular arm. Thus in our Army, mechanization is an integral part of each arm and is not separate. However powerful any other forces may be, in the last analysis, they must be considered as auxiliary to the mobile ground combat team. The future of our Cavalry will then depend to a great measure upon the wisdom of those who will plan our rearming. In such planning it must be remembered that our viewpoint should be radically different from that of many European nations. A great part of the military thought of Europe has been dominated by the problems of the western front during the last war, that is, secure flanks, defensive systems of great depth, limited terrain, and the fine network of roads. Our problem is a radically different one. Where may we fight? In case it should be on this continent or on this hemisphere or in any other wide reaches and open spaces, it appears to be a certainty that the war will be one of movement.

In this connection it must be recalled that even in the last war on the western front whenever there was movement there was a vital need for cavalry in large masses.

Witness the vital need for the British Cavalry Corps in the early retreat to the Marne where, by protecting the rear and left flank of the British II Corps, it saved that element from destruction. The enemy was thus prevented from pushing all of the allied forces off their line of retreat.

Study also the "Race to the Sea," when from September to November, 1914, two French Cavalry Corps augmented by the British Cavalry Corps established a mobile curtain from the Aisne to the Lys thereby covering successively the deployment of the French Second and Tenth Armies, the British Army, and the French Eighth Army, thereby balking the Germans in their attempt to seize the vital channel ports.

Observe again the use of the two German Cavalry Corps connecting the First and Second German Armies at the critical situation of the Marne.

Investigate, also, the use of the allied Cavalry in the spring of 1918 when it was rushed here, there, and everywhere to threatened points of rupture to hold back overwhelming enemy forces until reinforcements could be brought up.

It may be remarked also that the lack of Cavalry prevented the Germans from any adequate exploitation of their successes, whereas the allies were possessed of the very great advantage in the possession of considerable bodies of horsemen.

This point cannot be too strongly emphasized; that is, whenever there is movement, there is a great need for Cavalry in large masses. When there is *no* movement we have a war largely of futility.

The next point to be considered is that throughout history there have rarely been decisive victories except by the help of Cavalry. This agency has served to follow up or encircle and destroy the defeated enemy, or else, by swift movement in large masses, has been able to contribute to decisive results by surprise action at vital points. Notable examples of the use of Cavalry in this manner in the last war may be found. I will mention only two instances.

One—when the allied Cavalry crossed a difficult mountain range with pack transportation only, moved in September, 1918, into the Bulgarian theater and seized the key city of Uskub, thereby initially blocking the retreat of the German Eleventh Army through a defile which resulted in the capture of 90,000 men.

Again, the great victory of General Allenby in the battle of Megiddo. This was a notable use of Cavalry in a war of movement. Thrusting his Cavalry legions through the mountain passes near the coast, Allenby was able to cut off, capture and destroy practically the entire Turkish Army of more than 100,000 men.

It seems certain that we must be prepared for a war of movement. It is, therefore, logical that Cavalry may look forward with confidence to its rightful place as an important member of the ground combat team. The relative proportion of the different elements in the Army is something to be decided only after profound consideration of the entire problem which confronts America.

Fortunately this country is in a highly favorable position to produce the best Cavalry in the world. It will be recalled that at the outbreak of the European War there was no European Cavalry trained in the methods of the American Cavalry except the British which had taken to heart the lessons of the American Civil War and their own Boer War. Cavalry of most other nations had been trained for habitual mounted action. Some continued to carry the lance and were otherwise inadequately armed, equipped, and prepared to meet the conditions of the modern battlefield. This is not the case with American Cavalry. Since the time of our Civil War, it has been the best in the world. We are also in a very favorable position as regards our national resources. We have in this country more than twelve million horses, more than four and one-half million mules and the greatest motor industry on the globe. We have, therefore, the resources both in horses and in motor equipment to sustain our entire Cavalry, horse and mechanized, in its dominate effectiveness. Such Cavalry would be a fast moving force of great fire power. We must not look to Europe for any leadership of thought with respect to Cavalry; it would be a tragic error. I stress again the fact that, although many of the nations of Europe have gone more to mechanization in their Cavalry than to the horse, they are for the most part confronted with special situations. They face combat on fixed fronts in western Europe as well as economic conditions which preclude available supplies of forage, foodstuffs and animals. France, largely agricultural, maintains a very strong force of Cavalry, the bulk of which is horse. Poland and Russia have great masses of Cavalry to be used in major rôles. None of the Polish Cavalry is mechanized and only a fraction of the Russian. The average strength of the European Cavalry, even including those nations with a small amount, is much greater than that of the United States.

In our favorable position both geographically and economically, and looking forward to a war of movement, there appears to be no question that we should have a very great increase immediately in the strength of our Cavalry. It may be remembered in this connection that our best post-war military thought embodied in the National Defense Act provided for a balanced army. The cavalry quota envisaged under that program was in proportion to the importance and value of the arm under conditions peculiar to this country. In order to expand other elements for which no adequate means of personnel were provided, it was necessary to alter the balance established under the foregoing conception of our national defense needs. The same requirements have effected the infantry in a similar manner. It would now appear reasonable to restore to both their balanced proportions. There is, of course, no question but that the Infantry is the most important member of the ground combat team and that the ultimate strength of our Cavalry must be considered in proportion to that of our Infantry.

In any event there are certain minimum needs which should be satisfied. It must be remembered that Cavalry cannot be improvised. It should be immediately ready and highly trained. Let us consider then our Cavalry problem. We have both horse and mechanized Cavalry. It must be remembered that the entire Cavalry, both horse and mechanized, is dedicated to the execution of Cavalry rôles. How then will it be used in war? It will be used to accomplish all the historic rôles of Cavalry, that is, participation in combat, reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, as a connecting group between separated masses of infantry, delaying action, pursuit, seizing important positions or areas, in large masses against enemy's sensitive points such as flanks or rears. *It will be prepared to fight at all times* and will be used by the high command to meet any situation or crisis *where rapidity of movement or surprise is essential*. It will be used in smaller groups attached to commands such as independent divisions or corps. One of the most important duties for such smaller bodies will be that of reconnaissance. In this connection I wish to say that any independent body of troops that expects to rely solely upon vehicles of any kind for an adequate ground reconnaissance under all conditions is courting disaster. The use of horse and mechanized cavalry combines all of the features of complete ground reconnaissance and it is believed that the cavalry groups attached to independent armies or corps should include both in order to be most effective.

The bulk of Cavalry, however, should be used in large masses and perform major rôles, as may be determined by the high command. This means the welding of Cavalry Divisions into corps to be used as Army or GHQ Cavalry.

Thus, we should have an adequate amount of Cavalry both for attachments in smaller units such as regiments in addition to that required to constitute initially a minimum of one highly trained Cavalry corps. How should this corps be constituted and trained? What should be the proportion of horse Cavalry and of mechanized Cavalry? Let us consider for a moment, as bearing on this situation, the rôle and characteristics of the two, our horse and mechanized Cavalry. Our mechanized Cavalry under the wise policy of development for Cavalry action has accomplished a step by step progression wherein most of the mechanical difficulties have been eradicated and it is now capable of great marches and increased tactical capabilities.

Strategic mobility is perhaps its greatest asset. It has extraordinary fire volume and its shock action is consider-

able. Its tactical speed is very great on average terrain. It is difficult to control in large masses. It may find it difficult to protect itself in independent action when unsupported. It has not yet the capacity for sustained action that is inherent in horse Cavalry.

Horse Cavalry has great strategic mobility when transported by train or by motor. It can move under its own power by forced marches 150 miles in 48 hours or 100 miles in 24 hours. Through its individual riflemen it has great fluidity and flexibility of fire power. In the combat area in a war of movement our cavalry has greater tactical mobility considering all conditions of terrain and weather than has any other ground arm. When need be horse cavalry can cut loose from its wheeled elements and can be supplied by air or pack or live off the country. Our present horse cavalry is entirely motorized as to trains, and all regiments have their allotted quota of scout cars. The division has a squadron of armored cars and all special troops are motorized or mechanized.

It is evident that these cavalries supplement each other. It is apparent that while each might execute certain missions better alone, used in conjunction they will accomplish a majority of the major rôles with greater effectiveness than when used alone. Let us imagine for instance a Cavalry Corps of several horse divisions with one mechanized division. Such a force, if thrown out as Army or GHQ Cavalry to contact an opposing enemy, probably through use of the mechanized reconnaissance elements of both the horse and the mechanized divisions and in communication with our air forces will contact his leading ground elements. Following these reconnaissance vehicles there will probably be small groups of horse cavalry in support, perhaps portéed. These would be followed by one or more main bodies of horse Cavalry while the mechanized division would be held in hand ready to seize or to strike or, if need be, to make a special reconnaissance of some distant area.

Participation in Battle

In a war of movement when it becomes necessary to attack an enemy who has hastily taken a position, it can readily be seen that the mechanized Cavalry will enlarge the scope and effectiveness of the Cavalry attack. An attack of succeeding waves of these swift moving combat cars would fix the enemy in his position, riveting his attention upon the urgent threat. A mounted attack either immediately following or striking the enemy with successive waves of the horseman from a different angle would again rivet the attention of the enemy and further demoralize him. Meanwhile the dismounted force of Cavalry or Infantry approaching under cover of the previous attacks should be able to arrive at the position and seize it with minimum loss.

Delaying Action. In delaying action the mechanized division could be used for that part of the terrain where the roads were more favorable while the horse Cavalry operated in the remaining sector or sectors. They might even be interspersed according to the terrain features and road net. Withdrawing to successive positions, the mechanized Cavalry could cover the withdrawal of the horse Cavalry in certain contingencies. More advisable, perhaps, the great speed of the mechanized division would enable it to move to a flank and by surprise strike the pursuing enemy either alone or in conjunction with horse Cavalry.

Pursuit. It is in the pursuit that we visualize a really decisive blow against the enemy. Hit first by the air, then by the fast moving mechanized Cavalry, then by the horse Cavalry and, perhaps, followed up by Infantry in trucks, there appears to be little chance that the disorganized foe could be able to organize any effective rear guards. Such a pursuit should result in a victory of destruction—a battle with decisive results.

Thus it will be seen that the development of our mechanized Cavalry has infused strength into the Cavalry as a whole and that a Cavalry Corps comprising these elements should be a tremendously effective fighting force. Considering the motorized and mechanized elements of the horse Cavalry, a Cavalry Corps of three horse divisions, of three regiments each, and one mechanized division would be approximately half motor, half horse. It is believed that such a corps should be constituted and trained in the immediate future. There are no insuperable obstacles to the execution of this plan. Even if there were any great difficulties, they would be well worth overcoming. It is highly essential that troops should be trained in the way they are to be used. If we are to use large masses of Cavalry, it is not reasonable to suppose that they can be thrown together and function adequately at the outbreak of war. By concentrating such a corps on a wide and free area and in a suitable climate, we would be able to solve many important problems. We would be able to determine the most suitable organization for the division and corps by actually using this corps in all the exercises which might confront it in time of war such as participation in battle, reconnaissance, pursuit, delaying action. We would determine in each instance the best methods of combining the horse and mechanized divisions; we would ascertain what the relative proportion of each should be in the cavalry of the future; we would weld a fighting body of troops that would be worth its weght in gold to those who know how to use it. We would develop leaders who would know how to command. It is highly important that a leader of troops should have the opportunity to take his organization out constantly and practice it in all the exercises which may confront him in war. It is just the same as a captain of a polo team or a football team—he develops a powerful, smooth running outfit that is entirely responsive to his will. He has complete confidence in his ability to handle his command and they in turn have faith in his ability to lead them. The elements of such a command exist at the present and could be concentrated in the southwest which appears to be the most suitable section as to climate and which has the additional advantage of having the bulk of our cavalry located there now. In any reshuffling of troops due to rearmament, this should be taken into consideration.

Training Areas. It is also highly essential that there should be wide and free training area for the exercise of such a command. Our Navy may concentrate on the sea, our aviation in the air, but our land forces have no comparable areas available. However, such a training area exists in the southwest and the Chief of Cavalry has already had tentative studies made concerning it which have progressed to the point where it is apparent that such an area is suitable and possible of procurement at very reasonable figures. It would consist of a semicircular area with a radius of approximately 100 miles. This is considered a highly important feature because only in such an area without artificial restrictions can one find a real field laboratory in which to get the answers to our problems. It seems singular that in all the United States there is available no such extensive terrain. Within our vast country it is entirely possible to set up a number of such areas whereas in western Europe with its dense population such a scheme is not feasible.

Carrying out the above plan, it is believed to be necessary and desirable that the present mechanized brigade should be increased to a division. It has reached the stage of development where this is entirely in line with progress. It will then possess the proper headquarters and special troops which must be part of any integral fighting unit.

In any reassignment it will be necessary also to increase the number of Cavalry regiments and to augment the strength of each by at least an additional squadron. It is estimated that, in order to supply the proper quota of Cavalry for any effective Infantry-Field Artillery-Cavalry combat team of the Regular Army initially ready for instant action, the minimum strength should total somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 cavalrymen.

Thus summarizing, we confront an American situation which is different from the problems of European countries and which looks forward in case of hostilities to war of movement; that in any such war the principal element is the Infantry-Field Artillery-Cavalry ground combat team; that such a force is the bone and sinew of any real fighting Army or armies; that at least a reasonable nucleus should be highly trained and ready to fight at once; and that all our thoughts and preparations, including our industrial preparation, should be geared toward a war of movement rather than one of static defense by means chiefly of matériel. Although matériel is highly important it must be remembered that personnel is equally important and that no war will be won solely by machines. In my opinion it is needful that all cavalrymen make some effort to demonstrate to the people of this country the truth concerning the efficiency and worth of American Cavalry. There appears to be a vast ignorance on this subject which is but natural in view of the isolated posts occupied by our Cavalry. Many of our people still envisage Cavalry charging boot to boot with drawn sabers. We should endeavor to disseminate the facts. It would be well, whenever possible, to ask those of our citizens who are interested actually to witness the maneuvers and demonstrations of our Cavalry. There are none so blind as those who will not see. As Chief of Cavalry I have an abiding faith in the future of modern Cavalry and I believe it is high time that our Cavalry should be increased, organized, and developed along the lines indicated by me in this article.

Minesweeper Cars

HAIFA, PALESTINE.—(AP) Piloted by the minesweeper cars, I bumped over mile after mile of highways gashed every few feet by deep trenches which appeared to have been hacked out by hydraulic drills. The trenches were intended to impede the progress of British mechanized units.

Royal Air Force planes flew overhead and kept in constant touch with the mechanized units, giving the latter rebel positions.

—JAMES A. MILLS, Associated Press,
October 27, 1938.

What Does Palestine Prove?

BY CAPTAIN THE BARON GEORGE MAROCHETTI

*Editor's Note: Captain, The Baron George Marochetti served during the war on the staff and with the 11th Prince Albert's Own Hussars and held several staff appointments after the war, since when he has always kept in touch with the Army. He is now closely associated with the antiaircraft defence of London and is still a keen horseman being in daily contact with cavalry officers belonging to mounted and mechanised regiments. His former regiment, the 11th Hussars, is now serving in Palestine.

Captain, The Baron George Marochetti is also widely travelled and has visited most parts of the British Empire.

On the 10th March, 1928, the 11th Prince Albert's Own Hussars were mechanised. That one of the most famous cavalry regiments, the Colonel of which was the then Duke of York, now King George VI, should be the first to sacrifice its horses on the altar of modern progress, came as a shock to the Army but the choice was probably deliberate. The authorities knew that mechanisation was certain to prove unpopular. A crack regiment was selected to set an example which other regiments would have to follow. The "Glorious Cherrypickers"[1] were on this account the first to exchange their horses for armoured cars.

In due course all other cavalry regiments in England met with the same sad fate, with the exception of the Royal Household Cavalry[2] and two regiments of Dragoons —the "Royals" and the "Scots Greys." The latter owe their salvation to the political outcry the rumour of the impending mechanisation of the "Greys"[3] raised in Scotland where the regiment is regarded as Household Cavalry to the King when His Majesty is over the Border.

Today the War Office are probably thankful that these two regiments, once destined for mechanisation were kept mounted. Time has already proved that occasions may arise when cavalry is indispensable and mechanised units comparatively ineffective. The "Scots Greys" and the "Royals" are both in Palestine at the present moment and the possibility of sending the Royal Horse Guards there has even been discussed, though the Royal Household Cavalry have never before been sent overseas in peace time. We realize now that though in civilized countries, with well laid-out roads and with petrol stations conveniently placed a few miles distant from each other, armoured cars and tanks are of supreme importance, they cannot altogether replace the mounted regiments in such countries as Palestine or India.

The records of the Great War immortalize many magnificent cavalry campaigns, one of which I myself remember well. It opened shortly after dawn on a misty August morning in 1918 when after the successful attack by the Australian and Canadian Corps, the British Cavalry received the long awaited order to advance. It is interesting to remember now how soon we overtook not only the Infantry but the Tanks and embarked on the triumphant pursuit of the German Army which was to lead us, though we did not realize it then, to the Rhine. The campaign began on the morning of the 8th of August, and on that day alone the First Cavalry Brigade, composed of the Queen's Bays, the Fifth Dragoon Guards, and the 11th Hussars, took over 1,100 prisoners, innumerable guns and machine guns, while a squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards even captured a train full of soldiers who were returning from leave.

We bivouacked after much skirmishing and fighting, ten miles from our jumping-off base, having disorganized the German Army completely and played havoc with the order of their retreat. In the days that followed our work was real cavalry work—the advance guard of an attacking army—and we remained the advance guard until the Armistice. We reconquered numerous villages in France and Belgium and we kept on the move till the Rhine was reached.

The 8th of August was a red letter day for the British Cavalry. Ludendorf refers to it in his *Memoirs* as "the Black Day of the German Army in the history of the war," and its disasters led him to advise the Kaiser to instruct his Foreign Secretary to open the negotiations which eventually brought about the peace. This Black Day was a glorious justification of the British Cavalry.

The Tanks were undoubtedly a great factor in that final march to victory which opened on August 8th, and I do not want to underestimate the greatness of their achievement. During the early hours of the battle they reduced the enemy ranks to chaos and supported the attacking Australians and Canadians as no other weapon could have done. By 10 AM, however, most of them had been put out of action. I remember distinctly the number of broken tanks, both heavy and light we saw lying about the country as we passed through the trenches that had been bridged over, and what splendid targets they presented for enemy fire.

On the other hand the cavalry casualties seemed incredibly small. If my recollection serves me rightly we did not lose more than three or four men and a few horses from my own Squadron. On the 8th of August and during the days that followed we not only reached our objectives but kept them against many counter attacks although the Brigade Mechanised Transport was unable to bring out the rations. Men can, when necessary, live on a few biscuits and though the country had been laid waste

[1]The 11th Hussars have been nicknamed "Cherrypickers" because they are the only regiment in the British Army entitled to wear crimson overalls and breeches. This dates back from Balaclava.

[2]The Royal Household Cavalry comprises two regiments, the Life Guards and the Royal Horse Guards. The Life Guards are known as the "Tins" and the Horse Guards as the "Blues." The Household Cavalry is responsible for the Royal escorts. One of the regiments is billeted at Hyde Park Barracks in London and the other at Windsor.

[3]The "Greys" are so named because the whole regiment is mounted on grey horses.

Present day British Cavalry operating in Palestine

by the Germans, the horses themselves found enough grass and foliage to keep them going with the help of iron rations which were very judiciously used.

Tanks and armoured cars cannot live on vegetation. Had we been mechanised in 1918 a miracle would have been required during the August Campaign to supply enough petrol and oil to keep us going. Not only does a tank or armoured car without fuel become useless but it is too heavy to be manhandled. It cannot even be hidden from view and must therefore be exposed to the risk of complete destruction by gunfire or enemy aircraft.

A cavalry unit advancing in open formation in suitable country can take advantage of the configuration of the ground to avoid the great danger of "enfilade" fire, as when aimed at from the front only, a horse at a gallop is difficult to bring down. Horses' legs offer such a small target—much smaller indeed than a man's leg—and they are therefore very hard to hit when advancing at 12 m.p.h., if a gunner has to alter his sights all the time. If not actually hit in the leg it is extraordinary how long a horse can carry a bullet without suffering from the wound. A horse's heart is protected by over a foot's thickness of flesh, as well as by the saddle and breast plate, and is never an easy target. Furthermore the man himself is well protected when riding a horse. The riding position is one which reduces his height and therefore his vulnerability and part of his body is further protected by the neck of his horse. Thus a mounted man is ten times less vulnerable than an infantryman, whose advance must in the nature of things be so much slower. It takes first-class and well-trained troops to resist a cavalry charge and a retreating army is generally a demoralized army. I know of very few cases where infantry or even machine gunners have successfully withstood a cavalry charge. Incidentally, as can be gathered from what I have just said, cavalry is far less vulnerable than is generally supposed and it has the great advantage of being able to live on the land.

In 1918, of course Tanks were in their infancy, but even in modern warfare I do not think they can replace the cavalry altogether. In twenty years Tanks have improved out of all recognition, and the Army has been reconstructed to embrace this new and all important branch of it. The Royal Army Service Corps[4] allots fifty per cent of its numbers to the business of serving Tanks and Armoured Cars with petrol and oil so that some of the disabilities from which the Armoured Car wing suffered in 1918 no longer exist. But even nowadays, I am told by brother officers, a direct hit can put a tank out of action and probably all its men as well. It is certainly an easier target for enemy fire than a mounted body extended in open formation.

In Spain at the battle of Guadalajara nearly two years ago, the biggest tank battle in history was fought. Hundreds of tanks were used and they should have swept into Madrid, but they were routed by ragged militiamen using a new type of anti-tank gun.

Even in Palestine where the rebels do not possess such modern weapons as anti-tank guns, they have invented land-mines which can put armoured cars out of action quite effectively. It is curious to notice that what serves as a defence against tanks—anti-tank guns or land-mines—is no defence against cavalry. On the other hand the greatest enemy of cavalry—"Barbed wire" and possibly machine guns fired from machine gun pits—are useless when used against tanks or armoured cars. This fact alone suggests that it is almost as impossible for tanks and armoured cars wholly to replace the cavalry as it is for the cavalry to do the work of tanks or armoured cars.

The terrain in the Middle East is particularly suited to

[4]The Royal Army Service Corps is the Corps of the British Army which deals with the Commissariat and is responsible for bringing food and supplies to the troops.

British Cavalry returning from the front, Amiens Area, 1918

cavalry work. It is rideable country and the orange groves and olive trees in Palestine offer easy screen for mounted troops. Ground so ideally suitable for cavalry is not best suited for mechanised warfare. A spinney or a copse, which means cover for cavalry, becomes an obstacle for a tank; walls and barricades which can easily be jumped by horsemen, may become deadly obstructions to a crew in an armoured car. Many men have been killed in Palestine, trying to remove the stones placed on the roads by rebels to bar the progress of armoured cars. The rebels wait in ambush and snipe while the crew of the car is in process of removing the obstruction. In the ravines or on the slopes broken by terraces which are outstanding features of the landscape in Palestine, armoured cars cannot be used, and tanks have to slow down to a walking pace. In swampy ground where a lane can be made for horses, tanks can be lost for ever.

When recent disturbances rendered it necessary to draft additional troops to Palestine to maintain order there, the High Command fully appreciating the advantages of mounted troops over machines, made a point of asking for cavalry regiments. Our "mighty Empire," so justly famous in the past for its horses and horsemen could produce no more than two mounted regiments. Both are now in Palestine and may yet be reinforced by the Royal Household Cavalry. That the unprecedented step of sending the Royal Household Cavalry abroad in peace time was even contemplated makes us wonder whether we weren't too drastic when we mechanised so much of our cavalry and left so few regiments their horses.

For in Palestine there is no nice line of demarcation separating friend from foe. In ordinary warfare there is as a rule an enemy line beyond which, with the exception of the civilian population, the enemy is ranged wearing uniforms recognisably those of opponents. This is not the case in Palestine where the enemy is everywhere—and nowhere. The main body of the Arabs is friendly but rebels have to be dealt with and they do not wear distinctive uniforms. It would be fatal in an attack to mistake friend for foe. In such a situation the cavalry can render service impossible to mechanised troops. If you sight a group of five or ten men while you are riding in an armoured car, you cannot open fire without investigation. Investigation necessitates leaving your armoured car. If the approaching party are friends all is well; if they are foes they fire and disappear, as if by magic, into the surrounding country. In an encounter of this kind a cavalry detachment has no such difficulty as their mechanised brothers. A mounted man has an advantage over an unmounted one. If necessary a body of horsemen can always surround an enemy which it is impossible for a single tank or armoured car to do.

It is not only in Palestine but also in India and Africa—in all countries indeed which are not highly developed—that cavalry can render service where armoured cars and tanks are ineffective. Wherever there is a question of pursuit of a man or a group of men across country the most powerful car in the world is useless compared to the cavalry. On this account it seems a pity to some of us that the army of today can put so few cavalry regiments in the field, for though we still have some fine Indian Cavalry regiments there are occasions when these cannot take the place of British cavalry. There was recently some discussion on the subject of sending Indian Cavalry troops to Palestine but the project presented difficulties. Many of the Indian regiments are composed of Mohammedans and it would be unfair to use them to oppose Arabs professing their own creed. Other regiments composed of Hindus might be unduly prejudiced against Mohammedans. Furthermore the Indian Army no longer, strictly speaking, comes under the head of Imperial troops. They belong to India proper; are paid by the Indian Budget and consist of Indian soldiers, commanded it is true by a few British officers who are, however, themselves under the jurisdiction



British Cavalry advancing through artillery fire, Amiens Area

of the Indian Government. Except in very special circumstances, and with the consent of the Indian Government, the Indian Army is not to be used outside India itself. The High Command there has never been unaware of the necessity for cavalry, and on this account very few Indian Cavalry regiments have been mechanised.

I have referred already to some of the work accomplished by the First Cavalry Brigade during the Great War in 1918. The German Army of today has not forgotten the lesson our cavalry taught them at such cost to their numbers. When over a year ago I spent a few weeks in Germany I was astonished to find that they had not gone in for wholesale mechanisation on the scale one might have expected from such a completely modern army. On the contrary they had bought many horses from Great Britain and Ireland. I have seen them making great use of these horses for their transport and for some of their light artillery. They may be aware that had they had a cavalry corps to push through the broken lines of the Fifth in March, 1918, they would undoubtedly have captured Amiens, and possibly Paris and the history of the world might have been written differently. But in 1918 they had no cavalry. Owing to our naval blockade they were so short of food that their horses had to be slaughtered to feed the hungry population and without their horses they were unable to take full advantage of their successes in the spring of 1918. I understand now that Germany has not mechanised its cavalry but, that except for two regiments which are entirely mounted on horses, all the other German cavalry regiments are combined mechanised and mounted units in equal proportions.

Most of the Continental Armies have in fact also retained a fair proportion of cavalry. France still has some 40[5] cavalry regiments. Hungary has been one of Ireland's largest customers for horses during recent years.

What will happen to our mechanised armies of the future? Germany could not have foreseen in 1914 that they would be forced to destroy their horses on account of the Blockade. Can we, even with the mastery of the seas to our credit, be absolutely certain that we will always have an adequate supply of petrol? From 1914 to 1918 we had with America for our ally, the undisputed control of the seas of the world—and of the world's supply of petrol. Will fortune favour us equally in the future when our requirements will be far, far greater than they were then? Our own Royal Air Force will be much larger in the next war than it was in the last and the present type of supercharged engine uses three or four times the amount of petrol used in the old war type of engine. Most of our ships are now oil-burners. The mechanised army will require twenty times the amount of petrol we needed in 1918 when we were very short of fuel. Such problems are not likely to have been overlooked by our General Staffs and our Government. One feels they can be relied upon to deal with them effectively. One can only hope that we may never have cause to regret the extensive mechanisation of our army.

In my opinion the ideal army would be one in which all arms were properly balanced. Tanks and armoured cars are very wonderful inventions but they should be used in conjunction with cavalry and infantry and should not be

[5]Of these 40 Cavalry regiments 20 are Metropolitan Regiments, while the other 20 are African Regiments raised in Algeria and Morocco, but many of these African regiments are actually serving in France. These numbers do not include the French Native regiments used in Indo-China, Syria, et cetera.

expected to replace cavalry altogether. There are, as recent events in Palestine have proved, forms of warfare in which nothing can satisfactorily replace the cavalry which is now out of all proportion to other branches of the Service. Its deficiency seems occasionally to be felt. One hopes that some at least of the regiments who were among the first to be dismounted may be given back their horses before it is too late. For horsemen cannot be improvised. To become horsemaster necessitates years of training and only highly trained troops can stand the hardships of campaigning. If in a future conflict the remounting of the dismounted regiments should be deemed advisable, few men would know how to ride the horses restored to them. Chargers would be difficult to procure, since few horses are bred now in England. But these are difficulties that could be surmounted successfully. The old cavalry regiments may have been mechanised but the old spirit still survives.

Change in Membership Dues Voted at Annual Meeting of United States Cavalry Association

The Executive Council of the Cavalry Association on June 10, 1936, in order to encourage membership, authorized the reduction in annual dues to $2.50 per year when five or more individuals forwarded applications for membership or reimbursement of dues as a group.

The above authorization, as originally intended, has found more widespread application in the personnel of the National Guard and the Cavalry Reserve. It served the purpose for which it was intended, and the membership in the Association has been increased by a material figure. After almost three years of trial it has been found that once a membership was enrolled at the reduced rate of $2.50 per year the member has been rebilled at that figure for subsequent years even though his dues were returned individually rather than in a lump sum covering five or more members. Thus, we find that approximately 3/5 of all cavalrymen in the Army of the United States are receiving the JOURNAL at $2.50 per year, while the remaining 2/5 are billed at $3.00 per year. Manifestly there is little equity to all concerned in such a condition.

As far back as 1931 the records of the Association indicate that efforts were made to place dues in the Cavalry Association on the comparable basis of all other service associations. The Cavalry Association for the past several years has been the only one which has carried dues at less than $3.00 per annum. In fact, there are two services whose annual dues are $4.50 per year, and the majority of all others receive $4.00 per year from all subscriptions other than individual. It is believed that The CAVALRY JOURNAL is commensurate in size, contents and makeup with most of the other service journals. It would appear that if other arms and services evaluate their periodicals at $3.00 per year the same should hold for the Cavalry Association.

In accordance with the above reasoning this subject was brought up for discussion at the annual meeting held in Washington on January 16, 1939. Representatives of all three components of the army were emphatic in their indorsement and recommendation of placing dues in the Cavalry Association on the same basis as all other associations. In view of this concensus of opinion, the subject was placed before the meeting of the Executive Council, held immediately after the adjournment of the Annual Meeting. By unanimous vote it was directed that, effective January 17, 1939, dues in the Association and all subscriptions to The CAVALRY JOURNAL shall be confined strictly to the basis of $3.00 per year.

For those members whose annual dues became effective prior to January 17, 1939, and who have received statements for the ensuing year, dues for that period will remain at the same figure at which they were initially billed. However, new subscriptions and membership dues which will become due from that date forward will be billed at $3.00.

CAVALRY OPERATIONS IN SPAIN

By Major E. M. Benitez, Coast Artillery Corps

The echoes of cannon on the battlefields of Europe had scarcely died away when military experts commenced a discussion concerning the aspects of future wars.

Some of the self-appointed commentators maintain that motorization and mechanization have transformed the art of war thus rendering the old principles inapplicable. Others believe that neither tanks, gases nor airplanes will make any material difference because these weapons will be counterbalanced by protective measures. The close students of recent conflicts are willing to accept the tank and the airplane as valuable auxiliaries; but to the man on the ground, the infantry which holds the terrain, they still bow to as the probable deciding factor. "The next war," they say, "may start in the air, but like the last one it will wind up in the mud."

The Spanish Civil War started on July 18, 1936, and since its very beginning has been used as the experimental laboratory wherein new weapons and their tactical employment are given the crucial test of combat. While many lessons have been learned, the special characteristics of this struggle have left unanswered many controversial questions. So the discussions continue.

"Quousque tandem?"[1] is the irritated question of Lieutenant General Marx, German Army, retired, "Are we going to continue this monotony of thought by going back to the World War and continue repeating the eternal song of the 1914-1918 campaign?"

It is well known that cavalry was effectively used by both Allies and Germans during the early days of the World War on the western front and by the Germans, Russians and Austrians on the eastern front; by the Germans during the Rumanian Campaign and by the British in Palestine. However, with two wars now going on, there are many military leaders who rightly believe that it is time to forget the past and discuss new problems under modern conditions.

Much has been disclosed concerning airplanes and tanks, but the limited information concerning cavalry has led many officers to believe that this arm has been nonexistent in the Spanish War. In fact, Spain has furnished an excellent example of the important rôle of the cavalry arm in modern warfare.

The Spanish Army underwent some radical changes after the overthrow of the Monarchy in 1931. Before the outbreak of the revolution in 1936, the Spanish cavalry consisted of one cavalry division of three brigades of two regiments each—a total of about 3,800 sabres—two machine-gun squadrons (480 men), one regiment of horse artillery, one rifle cyclist company, one machine gun cyclist company, one company of engineers (sappers), a signal detachment, one service company, one aviation flight (reconnaissance) and various units of the medical and veterinary services. In addition, there was one cavalry squadron with one machine gun section attached to each of the eight organic infantry divisions. The headquarters of the cavalry division was in Madrid, but the division itself was scattered practically all over the eight territorial military areas of Spain. The cavalry in Morocco consisted of two cavalry sections (196 men) plus two cavalry "tabores" of native troops, making a total of approximately 2,000 sabres. These Moroccan troops were all veterans of many campaigns in Northern Africa, and possessed great experience and skill in mountain warfare.

When the Revolution broke out in 1936, over ninety per cent of the regular army officers and a very large majority of the noncommissioned officers joined the Insurgent ranks. Many of these men were transferred to other branches of the service as circumstances required in order to form the skeleton of the Revolutionary Army. The Moroccan squadrons which had followed Franco's cause, were utilized as the nucleus of the Insurgent cavalry force

[1] Until when.

Cavalry in Modern War



General Jose Monasterio
Commanding Insurgent Cavalry Division



Insurgent Cavalry Advancing on the Aragon Front

and with the available cavalrymen that could be gathered together, were organized in October, 1936, into a cavalry brigade under the command of General José Monasterio. Initially it consisted of from five to six cavalry squadrons and one or two batteries of field artillery.

General Monasterio is an old soldier, a veteran who campaigned for years in Morocco, whose main ambition twenty-five years ago was to become an aviator. He gave up aviation after having been seriously injured in an accident near the Madrid airport at Cuatro Vientos, and when he had recovered, he joined the cavalry. He fought side by side with Franco in Morocco and later on became an instructor in the Military Academy at Zaragoza—the West Point of Spain—at the time that Franco was Commandant. He joined the revolution right from the beginning and received a leg wound in one of the first skirmishes of the war. Experienced, brave and resourceful is this leader who was selected to organize the first Insurgent cavalry force, which during the early days of the war had to fight afoot for lack of horses.

Cavalry, reinforced by motorized infantry, machine guns and a battalion of field artillery, participated in the siege of Madrid in 1936, covering effectively the right flank of the Insurgent Army; in the Jarama Valley in 1937, and in the Aragón campaign in Northern Spain, where it rendered valuable service in coöperation with friendly aviation. However, it was not until the Insurgent counteroffensive at Teruel on February 5, 1938, that cavalry proved itself to be invaluable to the Insurgent cause, and thereupon its operations will be followed in detail from that date.

The Battle of Alfambra

On December 21, 1937, the Government forces caught the Insurgents off guard and launched a surprise offensive capturing Teruel and practically annihilating the weak Insurgent garrison, just at the moment when General Franco was making intensive preparations for a drive to the sea. This operation was hailed by Government Spain as the greatest victory of Loyalist arms in eighteen months of war and was believed, at that time, to have marked the turning tide of the civil war.

The city of Teruel, capital of the province of the same name, with a population of 9,600 had been in Franco's possession since the beginning of the war. It is situated at the junction of two river vallevs, formed by the confluence of the Guadalaviar and the Alfambra rivers and is about sixty miles northwest of Valencia. Teruel has been called the "City of Rock," because its location makes it a natural fortress built on a mountain shelf, protected on the south and southwest by a deep ravine which is traversed by an aqueduct, and on the southeast by the Guadalaviar River. This old and picturesque city was once destroyed by the Roman Legions in reprisal, to punish Hannibal for the wiping out of Sargento (Sargentum).

Teruel itself was of no great military importance or strategic value to General Franco; but, in view of the heavy Government concentration in that sector, the Insurgent command decided to recapture the city at all costs and thus accept the apparent challenge for a real test of strength.

The Insurgent High Command calls the scheme of maneuver employed at the Alfambra the "Bolsa" or pocket maneuver. It is simply a penetration, with a force engaging the enemy's attention with a vigorous frontal attack, while two other forces work around each end of the enemy's position to meet behind the hostile lines and close the mouth of the "pocket" or salient.

This battle is an almost exact replica of the St. Mihiel offensive with the difference that at St. Mihiel the heaviest



The government artillery scores a direct hit on the Insurgent seminary, Teruel, Spain

blow came from the south while at Alfambra the main drive was launched from the north.

The operations were carefully planned and well conducted, in fact, it was considered as "the most perfectly conceived and most brilliantly executed battle of the Civil War up to that time," *by* no less an authority than General Weygand, Foch's famous Chief of Staff during the World War. "For the first time," he says, "have I seen something that reminds me of the Great War. The concentration, disposition, advance, and maneuvering tactics were perfect. The Insurgent offensive in Northern Spain suffers by comparison, because the Government forces at that time lacked training and equipment. On the other hand, the Government divisions at Montalbán and Teruel were well provided with modern equipment, had plenty of artillery, machine guns and munitions, while foreign advisers had whipped the Government militia into well disciplined units, reinforced by brave International Brigades."

The Insurgent Headquarters' official account of the Teruel counteroffensive mentions that "a spectacular part was played by Monasterio's cavalry which contributed greatly to the victory by the speed and decision of its movements."

The first attempt to recover Teruel early in January took the Insurgents to the edge of the town, but arctic weather then brought operations to a standstill. In the middle of January, the Insurgents broadened their front near Teruel and captured El Muletón Hill, about four miles north of the town. Unfavorable weather continued throughout January, almost completely paralyzing military operations.

The battle of the Alfambra opened at dawn on February 5th. At that time the front lines, as indicated on the map, extended along the general line: Vivel del Rio—Singra—thence parallel to the Zaragoza—Teruel highway—Celadas heights—Muletón Hill—thence southwest. The key to this position was the strategically important Palomera mountain range, which dominates the mountainous country to the east and the main Teruel—Zaragoza highway to the west. The position had been greatly strengthened with pill boxes and machine gun nests making it practically a field fortress; it had however, the characteristic weakness of almost all salients in that it could be attacked from both flanks in converging operations.

On February 5th, the Insurgents made a feint at Montalbán and then launched a vigorous attack on a front of some twenty-seven miles, extending from Portalrubio to Celadas, with Sánchez Division making the frontal attack from the vicinity of Cindra and the Corps of Yagüe and Aranda striking at the shoulders of the salient. Further south, Varela's Corps was pinning down the Government forces southwest of Teruel. All these Insurgent units were under the supreme command of General Fidel Dávila, newly appointed Insurgent Minister of Defense.

The attack was preceded by an artillery and an aerial preparation unparalleled in intensity in the Spanish War. Four hostile points were subjected to a devastating fire; Vivel del Rio, Portalrubio, Rubielos and Celadas, and by noon the main fortifications on the fronts of the main effort had been destroyed. Then the shock troops advance, tanks leading, in coördination with the infantry, artillery and aviation. Wave after wave of fresh troops advanced under cover of an artillery barrage, comparable to a World War effort. The Government lines gave way. On the north, Yagüe's Corps composed of crack Moroccan and Foreign Legion troops captured the villages of Rubielos, Cervera del Rincón, and Portalrubio, piercing the front at A—B as shown on the map. Through this gap came, with lightning-like speed, the *mass of maneuver*—Monasterio's Cavalry Division—which up to this time had



ST. MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 12 SEPT 1918
PLAN OF ATTACK OF FIRST ARMY

Map 1



Map 2

been carefully held in reserve. This cavalry command cut diagonally across the hostile position, reached the rear of the Government forces and captured the town of Camanas, routing the partially formed enemy reserves. The sudden appearance of the cavalry behind Sierra Palomera caused the evacuation of this key position, where two enemy brigades surrendered and two battalions which tried to escape were almost completely annihilated. Then, while Aranda's


ANDORRA
1 DEC. 1938
BARCELONA
CAVALRY OPERATIONS
DRIVE TO THE SEA 9 MARCH-15 APRIL, 1938. VALENCIA OFFENSIVE, 24-26 JUNE, 1938.
① Goes through gap north of Herrera, 9 March.
② Reaches Escatrón, 13 March.
③ Covers Yague's advance to Caspe.
④ Reaches Quinto, 15 March, and covers Ebro River crossing by Yague's Corps, 20-22 March.
⑤ Mopping-up operations near Bujaraloz, 27 March.
⑥ Fills gap between Yague's and Aranda's Corps, 31 March.
⑦ Covers flank of salient.
⑧ Engaged in the Valencia Drive, June, 1938.
0 10 20 30 40 50 miles
VALENCIA

Map 3

Corps driving northeast and Yagüe's Corps advancing south and southeast were executing the converging movement, the cavalry captured the towns of Perales and Alfambra to the east and then made a wide turning movement to the south driving enemy detachments from the Alfambra River Valley. Sweeping down on the east side of the Alfambra River, the Cavalry Division reached, on the third day of the battle (February 7th) the Teruel—Sagunto highway and railway about one mile west of the city, cutting off the main supply link of Teruel. In addition to inflicting heavy casualties, Monasterio's Cavalry Division captured several thousand prisoners, among them several units of the Campesino Brigades.[2] Throughout the three day engagement, the cavalry was particularly valuable in isolating detachments that were trying to join the retreating main bodies and in intercepting supplies intended for the Government forces.

By February 10th, the Insurgent forces had crossed the Alfambra River and three days later the three Insurgent corps joined forces on the Teruel—Sagunto highway, at the milestone, exactly two kilometers (1.2 miles) west of Teruel. Monasterio's Cavalry immediately advanced south, capturing the villages of Castralvo and Aldehuela, cutting off the retreat of the Government forces and assisted in forcing the surrender of Teruel, which occurred on the following day.

The rôle that cavalry played in this battle has been described by General Yagüe, Commander of the Moroccan Corps, in the following terms: "A large share of the credit for the success of this operation should go to Monasterio's Cavalry veterans, who demonstrated so well their efficiency in mountain fighting during our northern campaign and who have again repudiated the doubts some military authorities hold regarding cavalry's usefulness in modern warfare."

The Drive to the Sea

On March 9th, General Franco launched his over-

[2] Loyal Government troops organized by the Government leader, known as "El Campesino" (The Peasant).

Squadron of Insurgent Cavalry on a Reconnaissance Mission, Valencia front

whelming, spectacular offensive which with marked rapidity struck hard, swift blows on the 125-mile front extending roughly from Teruel to Huesca and on to the French frontier.

For this operation, France massed a total of 250,000 men organized into five army corps and Monasterio's Cavalry Division, with the operations of which we are largely concerned. This cavalry division had been completely reorganized after the battle of the Alfambra and now included motorized infantry and detachments of armored cars and tanks.

On March 9th, the 5th Navarrese Division broke through the enemy front near Herrera. Monasterio's Cavalry Division went through this gap, cutting off lines of communications and harassing the hostile forces in flank and rear. On March 11, it was officially commended for its "rapid and masterly advance" which had caused considerable disorder and confusion to the retreating enemy.

Continuing its advance to the east, the cavalry division reached Escatron on the 13th, advancing 60 miles in five days and capturing many prisoners and quantities of war materials, besides clearing the way for the advance of Yagüe's Corps which reached Caspe on the 15th. Its present mission was to protect the left (north) flank of Yagüe's Corps and to cover the preparations and crossings of the Ebro River by this corps at Quinto and Gelsa. The Moroccan Corps started its crossing on the morning of the 23d and by the 25th the entire corps had crossed the Ebro, a swift flowing river, which swollen by melting snows was at no place less than three hundred feet in width. Yagüe immediately advanced on Bujaraloz to cut off the Zaragoza —Lerida highway. This turning movement compelled the withdrawal of Government forces east of Zaragoza. The cavalry, forming the advance guard of Yagüe's Corps captured the town of Pina and seized many prisoners. A few days later, the cavalry was used to mop up the Monegros Hills in vicinity of Bujaraloz.

On March 27th, Yagüe's Corps made contact with the fortified line along the Cinca River, protecting the city of Lerida. This river flows in a gigantic ditch between parallel lines of steep hills. All bridges had been destroyed. Upon crossing the Cinca, a gap was created between Yagüe's Corps north of the Ebro and that of Garcia Valino on the south, in a wide bend of the Ebro River. General Yagüe immediately decided to plug this hole with cavalry. Monasterio's Division successfully accomplished this mission establishing contact with Garcia Valino's forces, and captured the villages of Fayon, Nonaspe and the surrounding heights.

On April 15th, the 4th Division of Navarre of Aranda's Corps, under General Camilo Alonso Voga, aided by flanking Moorish Cavalry, cracked the Government lines wide open sending the Government forces reeling north and south in full retreat, reaching the seacoast at Vinaroz. The Cavalry Division was then called upon to fill a salient of about 500 square miles, which it was able to accomplish because of its mobility.

On June 24, 1938, Garcia Valino's Corps shattered the Government lines in the vicinity of Onda. Monasterio's Cavalry went through this gap, then wheeled to the southeast in the direction of Nules, cutting off the enemy's retreat. Nules was captured on July 9th.

In general, Insurgent cavalry has proved extremely useful for the work of mopping up isolated enemy forces, particularly in the Alfambra Valley and the Ebro River drives, where isolated Government detachments were holding out in mountainous country in the wake of the advance.

It is reported that the Government forces have some cavalry, but it seems to lack effective organization. This can be easily explained by the fact that practically all the trained personnel joined the revolution at the outbreak of the war.

Armies are created and organized to suit the special problems that confront each nation. Any discussion as to the effectiveness and merits of any one particular arm must be based upon the conditions in the theatre of operations. In a mountainous terrain, with very few good roads available as the present conditions in Spain, unquestionably horse cavalry can render services which no other arm can perform so effectively.

In Europe today, England, France and Germany have reduced their horse cavalry and replaced many units with independent motorized and mechanized units. On the

(Continued on page 30)

Wounded Knee: A Look at the Record

By Brigadier General E. D. Scott, Retired

Editor's Note: The montage appearing on the opposite page, made up from items published in the press some months ago cast reflection upon the army—an army which, in reality, led and protected the nation's advance westward. To impugn motives to an organization, committed always to the preservation of American life and property, particularly forty years after the event, appears a thankless attitude towards those men in the service who bore, in great part, the brunt of American pioneering. In this article appears a list of eighteen individuals upon whom Congress saw fit to bestow the nation's highest award, a Congressional Medal of Honor for their conduct at Wounded Knee. It is believed that this article by General Scott covers adequately and impartially the facts pertaining to this subject. The CAVALRY JOURNAL is pleased to present concurrently with *The Field Artillery Journal* the results of General Scott's research.

Prior to the Civil War the territory of the great Sioux nation extended from the Platte to the Canadian border, and from the Mississippi on the east to the Rocky Mountains on the west. Settlers poured into the eastern part of this region; a bloody war broke out which ended in the Indians being driven to the west of the Missouri.

The Union Pacific built along the southern border of their lands; gold and silver was found in what is now southern Montana, and the nearest route thereto lay across the Sioux country from the railroad settlements in what is now Wyoming. The miners and settlers took that route; the Indians resented the encroachment, and the '50's and '60's were marked by more than fifty hostile demonstrations and much bloodshed.

In 1868 a new treaty was entered into with the Sioux, replacing that of 1851 which had fixed their limits as above described, and this moved their western limit to the east of the Big Horn Mountains, thus clearing the routes to Montana. It also guaranteed to the Sioux the country east of the Big Horns as a hunting country in perpetuity. But gold was discovered in the Black Hills and 1874 and 1875 saw another rush of settlers into the heart of the Sioux country that the Government seemed unable to prevent. In 1876 a great part of the Sioux went on the warpath, the trouble culminating in the slaughter of most of the 7th Cavalry in the Battle of the Little Big Horn, in Montana. Another treaty limited the Sioux to what is now South Dakota west of the Mississippi, and ceded to the Government the major part of the Black Hills region, which was then formally opened to settlers.

In 1887 another treaty threw open to settlement the whole region between the Big Cheyenne and White Rivers, and north of the Black Hills to the North Dakota line, reducing the Indian country by half. This was more generally resented by the Indians than anything that had gone before. It not only took away their best lands, but split them in two groups separated by sixty miles of white man's land. Moreover, it was never admitted that the Indians who participated in making this treaty had authority to do so from the tribes. The Indians were slow to vacate their lands, the settlers cautious about moving in to occupy them.

to the Great White Father to Pay
Their People for the Slaughter
That Shocked the Country
—and Which They
Survived
Indians Tell Story
of Wounded Knee
Massacre by Army
Rollin' Along
By W. A. S. Douglas
Indians Ask Cash
For Army Massacre
Sioux Leaders Describe Killings,
'Termed Custer 'Revenge'
"Wounded Knee Massacre"

The wholesale reductions of the Indians' lands were no doubt an injustice to them and occasioned many hardships. But there is another side to the picture. The day of the buffalo was over; deer, elk, and antelope were few. In other words, meat, the principal diet of the Indians, could no longer be had by hunting. And with the game went the materials for clothing, bedding, tepees. These needs would have to be met by farming and stock raising, and the lands still left were vastly more than necessary for the purpose. The Government had not been slow to recognize that the Indian must be trained to be self-supporting under a new habit of life, and the later treaties had provided for the sustenance of the Indians while they were becoming adjusted. The policy of aid was very comprehensive; lands were allotted, brood cattle, horses, and sheep supplied, farming machinery, seed grain, and the like. Farmer instructors were scattered about freely. That the policy had in time a measurable success is shown by the fact that in 1910 half the Indians in South Dakota were taxpayers.

But the transition period was a hard one. The agencies were few and far between and the Indian bands were widely scattered. In a quite eloquent statement of grievances a chief said that ninety miles was too far to go for rations. One must agree with him! Issues of clothing and bedding were quite inadequate for the climate. The Sioux actually had a farmer tradition—vegetables and corn—but that was in their old home of Minnesota and eastern Dakota, not on the 3,000-foot tableland they now occupied.

But their principal grievance was in connection with rations. Beef was supplied on the hoof; the Indians were wasteful; the days after issue were days of feasting followed by famine before the next issue. Sometimes beeves were issued to carry over for the winter; a 1,000-pound beef in November became a 600-pound beef by February—if he lived that long. The entrails of animals were always a dainty to the Indian palate, but the thought of it was repugnant to some of the authorities in Washington—a formal order was issued forbidding their use as food, and directing that they be destroyed by fire. The agents and their Indian Police did what they could to enforce what must have seemed to their charges the most whimsical of requirements. There was plenty of opportunity for [illegible] agents, contractors, and traders, and no doubt that it existed, the Indian being the loser. The Government sought to insure justice to the Indians by having an Army officer present to witness issues, in each case to make [illegible]. Some of them are remarkable indictments of conditions; few are indictments. Some state (1890), that the issue witnessed amounted to about half that of the Army ration. The years 1889 and 1890 were very dry and crops failed in consequence. But late in the fall of the latter year, the Congress had failed to make the allotment of funds for feeding the Indians that should have been available on July 1st. That meant months of [illegible], and the Indians could hardly be blamed for [illegible] and farm stock—or even for helping themselves to a few from the settlers herds. That second summer of drought and suffering must have built up in Indian psychology a condition fertile for trouble—just such a condition as found expression in the French Revolution.

The missionaries had long been active among the Indians and doubtless the latter had discussed at length the Messiah who came to earth to bring peace and goodwill to all *men*—friend of the poor and downtrodden. And then, out in the Rockies, there arose a Medicine Man, one of their own race, who proclaimed the coming of an Indian Messiah who would send the white man back whence he came, and restore the buffalo to the range and the Indians to their ancestral homes and customs. The news spread to the east and the idea took hold on the Indian imagination. Dancing was a form of worship common to all Indians—as to primitive peoples the world over—and a new dance was devised to honor the new Messiah. It was called by the whites, "The Ghost Dance." Its practice spread all over the Sioux country and caused grave apprehension to the authorities. All Indian dances are religious and for a purpose—to bring rain, to cure an epidemic, to insure good crops, to insure successful war, and so on. And every Indian has his mind on the object of the dance—quite obsessed by it, he may dance till he drops. But before that he may develop a spiritual exaltation that renders him dangerous should anyone slip him the idea of a short cut to the objective by sudden and violent action against some person or persons. Herein lay the danger, and the authorities sought to thwart it by forbidding the dance. Of course the order could not be enforced, except in the vicinity of the Agencies, where the Indian Police had some authority. It was ignored by the bands scattered over an immense territory. Some Indian agents and Army officers thought and said that the craze would soon wear itself out, but they were a minority.

* * *

On October 29, 1890, Mr. P. P. Palmer, Indian Agent at the Cheyenne River Agency, reported to the Indian Bureau on the activities of two minor chiefs, Big Foot and Hump, and again on November 10. Both reports were to the effect that these Indians were selling their cattle and buying Winchesters and ammunition with the proceeds, were doing much Ghost dancing, and that his police were powerless. Later the agent at Pine Ridge Agency, Mr. Royer, made a similar report as to his Indians, saying they "are dancing in the snow," and asked military assistance. About November 2 a petition signed by 102 Sioux Indians, setting forth their grievances, was forwarded to the "Great White Father." And from then on the wires to Washington were hot with alarming reports.

General Nelson A. Miles was then in command of the Division of the Missouri, his headquarters at Chicago. The Division comprised the Department of the Dakotas (General Ruger) at St. Paul, and the Department of the Platte (General Brooke) at Omaha. The latter comprised the Sioux country.

The Pine Ridge Indian Agency was, and is, about 20



Correct Scale: One inch = 137.5 yards, approximately.

The line of tents closest to the "Council" was that of the Indian scouts. Between it and the Cavalry Camp proper was the initial position of Troops B and K, respectively from left to right, and in line abreast.

The line of dots indicating "⅔ A and I Troops Dismounted" actually did not extend as far to the west as shown, during the engagement, although it may have done so when posted the night before. Lt. Garlington's report shows his part of the line was close to the west edge of the camp, for his troopers made an effort to prevent the Indian women from preparing for the road by throwing off saddles and packs they had made up.

miles north of Rushville, Nebraska. It is a few miles north of the southern line of South Dakota. About 90 miles east by northeast is the Rosebud Indian Agency. Each is the administrative seat of a large reservation of the same name, which were the principal scenes of the Indian troubles of 1890. Pine Ridge Reservation has an average elevation of 3,000 feet above sea level. Its main topographical feature is an east-west ridge from 3,000 to 3,500 feet elevation along its center, from which several small streams flow north, northwest, and west into the White River. The latter rises in Nebraska, flows north about 40 miles west of Pine Ridge Agency, and northeast and east to the Missouri. It is a considerable stream with occasional practicable crossings. West of it are the Bad Lands, thirty miles from east to west, more than a hundred from south to north. At their western base is the south fork of the

The Wounded Knee Battlefield

Cheyenne, roughly paralleling the White. Beyond that, [illegible] rugged country rises gradually into the Black Hills.

The Bad Lands were the nearest and about the only refuge for disaffected or criminal Indians, and the policy of the Government was to keep all Indians east of the White River, where movements could be easily watched. Pursuit of Indians in the Bad Lands was unlikely to be successful. The country is exceedingly rugged.

The reservation terrain is in general rolling, with many short ridges, grassy, with scrub pine on the ridges and brush in the ravines. The streams are generally small, with good bottoms and soft banks, passable only in places. Roads were mostly dim trails, following the lines of least resistance.

When disturbances began in the fall of 1890 troops were disposed with a view to protecting the agencies and preventing the Indians leaving their reservations. Reinforcements were sent from other Departments; Nebraska and South Dakota placed their militia where they could best protect their own settlements. Among the reinforcements were the 7th Cavalry (less 4 troops), and Light Battery E, 1st Artillery. These arrived by rail at Rushville, and on the night of November 25-26 marched to Pine Ridge Agency, where part of the 9th Cavalry and 2nd Infantry had preceded them.

Early in December the battery received six 1.65-inch Hotchkiss guns (2-pounders) with packs, mules, etc., and under the direction of Lt. Harry L. Hawthorne, quickly prepared itself for service with the cavalry.

On December 14 an attempt to arrest Sitting Bull near Standing Rock Agency on the Missouri resulted in a fight in which he was killed with several of his followers and an equal number of Indian Police. One of his followers, the Big Foot referred to above, immediately moved away from there, with his band, dog and baggage. Hump's band joined him. He was located about December 22, and surrendered to General Summer. But that night he quietly slipped away again. It was believed that he was heading for the Bad Lands. The 9th Cavalry and one platoon of Battery E, 1st Artillery (Lt. John L. Hayden) was sent from Pine Ridge Agency to the mouth of the Wounded Knee Creek to watch the crossings of the White River, and Major Whitside, 7th Cavalry, was sent with Troops A, B, I, and K, one platoon of Battery E, 1st Artillery (Lt. Harry L. Hawthorne) and Troop A, Indian Scouts, to the crossing of Wounded Knee Creek about fourteen miles northeast of Pine Ridge Agency. He established camp with heavy tentage a few hundred yards south of the crossing, and sent Indian scouts to search the country to the north and east.

On December 28 this detachment was sitting about waiting for dinner when an Indian scout, Little Bat, came in with the information that Big Foot's band was on the march west, on the Porcupine Creek, off to the northeast. The command mounted and marched at once. A rapid march of about seven miles brought the band into view. Its wagon and pack train halted at once, the warriors formed line and moved towards the troops as though to attack. Their advance was at a walk, as half the Indians were on foot, alternating in the line with the mounted ones.

Major Whitside dismounted and formed line on a low crest. Lt. Hawthorne wished to place his guns on a knoll nearby whence he could command the cavalry position, the approaching Indians, and their trains, but he was overruled; Major Whitside required him to place them in front of the center of his line of cavalrymen.

When the Indians had come within hailing distance, Major Whitside went forward a little with another officer and an interpreter. The Indian line halted and several approached the Major, one of them stating he was Big Foot's representative. The Major refused to deal with a representative, and insisted on Big Foot appearing. It seems that warrior was sick and in a wagon. He was brought, and in answer to the Major's demand as to whether he meant war or surrender, he said the latter. Meantime a party of mounted Indians started around the flank of the cavalry, and the Major demanded that he recall them, which he did. More talk ensued as to the arrangements for the march back, and Big Foot sent for his trains. While they were coming up some of the Indians left their line and crowded around the guns—something new in their experience, and with which they seemed delighted. Perhaps those guns had something to do with the friendly and reasonable spirit displayed. But the Indians were probably quite willing to be captured—they were without food of any sort, and a fight with superior numbers of soldiers did not promise to secure any.

Indians on the reservations habitually wore ordinary civilian clothing; these Indians were stripped to breech clouts and leggins, were painted, and carried Winchester

rifles with plenty of ammunition. Major Whitside would have liked to disarm them on the spot but this might have brought on a fight. He did well to induce the Indians to march back with him to his camp on Wounded Knee.

The march was uneventful. Indian scouts and part of the cavalry led, the Indians with their trains followed, the rest of the cavalry and guns brought up the rear. The Indians seemed in high good humor, talked and laughed, smoked cigarettes. They were assigned an area near the cavalry camp, counted—120 men, 230 women and children—rations were issued to them, and they proceeded to settle down in camp. They had few of the conventional tepees; most of their shelter was in the form of wickiups, a few light stakes covered with brush or pieces of old canvas. The area, as shown on the maps made at the time, was kidney-shaped, about 200 yards long and 100 wide. It must have been very crowded. They turned their ponies about 150 in number, loose to the west, but they were held in a herd by a military guard during the night. The Indians said they did not have enough shelter, and some Sibley tents were given them, but when the camp was searched the following morning there was no indication that they had been used. A wall tent was set up ot the end of the line of Scouts' tents for Big Foot, who was really sick with pneumonia. The surgeon, John van R. Hoff, gave him professional services in the night and the following morning.

Major Whitside had sent word from the scene of the surrender to Colonel Forsythe, commanding the 7th Cavalry, at Pine Ridge Agency, and that officer marched with the remainder of his command, Troops C, D, E, and G, and the remainder of Light Battery E, 1st Artillery, to the camp. The approach was made after dark and in such manner as not to advise or alarm the Indians. Between nine and midnight the operation was completed. Captain Capron had his battery together on a small knoll only 200 yards from the center of the camp area, and overlooking it.

Captain Myles Moylan, Troop A, was charged with the guard of the Indians, Troop I being added to his command. He established a line of sentinel posts, twenty in all, along the east, west, and south sides of the Indian camp area. The posts on the south side were across the ravine that limited the area in that direction. There was constant patrolling of the line during the night, and in the early morning the posts were reënforced by the men of the other reliefs. Security on the north side was provided by the camp and pocket-line guards.

There had been no snow that winter; the weather had been still and cold, but clear; the moon was at the full on December 25. The sky may have been overcast, but even then visibility would have been good for some distance, making the guard duty relatively easy.

Wounded Knee Creek, at the scene of the battle, is small, and at the time had ice an inch thick. Its direction is northwesterly. The principal trail or road from Pine Ridge Agency to Rosebud comes in from the southwest, crossing it, and then takes a more easterly direction. Near the crossing stood the trader's store, post office, and a few other buildings, and about 300 yards downstream, the church. A road passing the latter continues to the mouth of the stream. About 300 yards south of the crossing "Fast Horse Road" comes into the Agency road from the northwest. The Agency road divides a short distance south of this junction, descends by coulees into a ravine and out again, reuniting on the other side.

Between the Agency road and the stream the terrain is flat and not very high above the level of the latter. West of the road the terrain rises quickly into ridges and spurs from the ridge two to three miles west that is the divide between the Wounded Knee and the White Clay creeks. The ravine above referred to heads about two miles west of the road, runs almost due east, has numerous lateral branches, especially on the north side, and all contained much brush and scrub trees. A characteristic of the prairie coulee or ravines is their sudden beginning by a vertical drop of one or several feet, directly from the prairie. Such places were made-to-order rifle pits, and were so used by the Indians.

The creek itself had a border of fair-sized trees and brush; and hills in general carried a thinly scattered growth of scrub pine and cedar.

The ravine figured so prominently in the events of December 29, in all testimony relating thereto, and in all tales told, that it will be simply referred to in this narra-

Awards of the

CONGRESSIONAL MEDAL OF HONOR

for acts performed at

WOUNDED KNEE CREEK

December 29, 1890

William G. Austin, sergeant, Cavalry
John E. Clancy, musician, Artillery
Mosheim Feaster, private, Cavalry
Ernest A. Garlington, 1st Lt., Artillery
John C. Gresham, 1st Lt., Cavalry
Matther H. Hamilton, private, Cavalry
Joshua B. Hertzog, private, Artillery
Harry L. Hawthorne, 2nd Lt., Artillery
Marvin C. Hillock, private, Cavalry
George Hobday, private, Cavalry
George Loyd, sergeant, Cavalry
Albert W. McMillan, sergeant, Cavalry
Thomas Sullivan, private, Cavalry
Frederick E. Toy, 1st sergeant, Cavalry
Jacob Trautman, 1st sergeant, Cavalry
James Ward, sergeant, Cavalry
Paul H. Weinert, corporal, Artillery
Herman Ziegner, private, Cavalry

tive as "the ravine"—no chance of mistaken identity.

The plan for the dismounment was to assemble the bucks in the open space—scarcely a hundred yards square—between their camp and that of the cavalry, and there induce them to give up their arms peaceably. To convince them of the futility of any resistance, Troops B and K were formed up dismounted across the north side of the space; Troop G was formed up mounted, east of the space and little more than a hundred yards from it; on the south the sentinel line was in position across the ravine, with Troop A, Indian Scouts, in line, mounted, behind them, and Troops C and D still farther back, in line, mounted. West of the Indian camp the sentinel line was still in position, while about two hundred yards to the northwest, on a small knoll, the four guns of Capron's battery were in position, flanked by Troop E, mounted, on the right and one-third of Troops A and I on the left, also mounted.

All of these troops were in full view from the Indian camp, and within three hundred yards. What the Indians thought of it all will never be known; perhaps among them were some bright enough to see that if trouble started a breakthrough was not wholly impossible, fear of killing comrades across the circle might make the fire of the soldiers desultory and ineffective. Certainly the squaws worked hard and persistently up to the time the firing began, to saddle the ponies and load the pack ponies, travois and wagons—they expected to go somewhere, and soon.

The men of the guard were in a very precarious position should any fighting begin, and this was reflected in their losses: Troop A, five killed and five wounded; Troop I, four killed and six wounded.

Paralleling the south side of the cavalry camp was a line of Sibleys, the camp of Troop A, Indian Scouts. At the west end of this was the wall tent, erected by the troops for the use of Big Foot.

Just south of this tent Colonel Forsythe, Major Whitside and one or two others gathered, with two interpreters. The Indians, all in sheets or blankets, came from their camp and formed an irregular quarter-circle before them, facing east and north. The bucks so assembled numbered 106. The missing 14 were probably in camp, and would account for the firing there during and after the melee. They could hardly have escaped through the cordon of sentinels during the night. This was about eight o'clock on the morning of December 29, 1890.

Colonel Forsythe talked to the Indians at some length, through an interpreter, explaining to them that they must surrender their arms. They talked this over among themselves but appeared to arrive at no decision. At last twenty were told off to go into the camp and bring their arms. Some went part way but circled back and mingled with the crowd; most of them went to the camp, returning with two broken carbines, and said these were all the arms they had. They could not have been under the impression that only Government arms were meant, for more carbines were found in the camp when it was searched.

Colonel Forsythe and Major Whitside talked the situation over, decided nothing could be accomplished this way, and had Big Foot brought out of his tent to talk to his people. He was supported by an Indian and the hospital steward. Big Foot talked with his bucks and finally stated that they had no arms, that the latter had been destroyed on the Cheyenne, where they had been some days before. This was an astonishing statement in view of the fact that the whole band had marched into camp fully armed the evening before. The Chief was very sick; his mind may have been wandering; his bucks were obdurate and perhaps thinking of his leadership as being about at an end anyway—any answer was good enough.

Bucks were constantly passing between the council and the camp and seemed to be exciting the squaws, which may have had some connection with their efforts to get the pony herd ready for the road. It was decided to stop this circulation and to search the camp. Troop B deployed from its right on a line facing east and about half-way between the Indians and their camp; Troop K passed to the east of the gathering and deployed on the south in similar position, facing north. The men were at intervals of two yards, and there was a gap of about twenty yards between the troops. Curiously, Surgeon John van R. Hoff gave the only detailed description of this movement, and he noted that in Troop K there was an "involuntary" closing in to the left, but the men on the right maintained the frontage with wider intervals.

Captain Wallace (K) took six or eight men and began at the southeast end to search the camp; Captain Varnum (B) took a similar party and began to search from the north end. The squaws did all they could to hide weapons—in their clothing, under them as they sat on the ground; one was too sick to move, but a new Winchester was taken from under her. One of the parties took only firearms, the other took bows and arrows, knives, hatchets as well. Captain Wallace picked up a stone war-club and carried it during the search. It was found near his body after the fight and was the foundation for the story that he was killed by it. He was killed by a bullet through the stomach. Part of the arms were carried to the battery position by men sent by Captain Moylan from the "One-third A & I" shown on the map, part were carried to a wagon near the cavalry camp, placed there for the purpose by Lt. Guy Preston. He had received 29, mostly old—some of them carbines from the Custer fight—when the firing broke out.

All this must have taken up a lot of time; it is curious that no question of time was asked by the Board in its investigation, and no mention made by witnesses except as to the eight o'clock formation, and as to the attack on Troops C and D two miles west of the battlefield, at eleven o'clock. Colonel Forsythe in his formal report written December 31, states that the fighting began at 9:15, "twenty minutes hot fight," and forty minutes "skirmishing." This refers to the fighting about the camp only.

It was now decided to search the bucks, many of whom had by this time settled down on the ground. Major Whit-

side and Captain Varnum began passing them between them, one at a time. Search of the first three or four yielded one Winchester and many cartridges. The Major directed that the latter be collected; someone handed Captain Varnum an old hat; he and his first sergeant held it while it was filled; the Captain turned his head away and called to one of his men to bring a grain sack. Then, as he stated, " * * they all seemed to rise with a purpose of passing through to be searched, when I saw five or six bucks throw off their blankets and bring up their rifles. I turned to Major Whitside saying, 'By God, they have broken,' and the Indians faced my troop and began firing." Major Whitside states, "One shot was fired by an Indian, instantly followed by a volley from the others, who had jumped to their feet and thrown off their blankets." On the hillside across the ravine to the south, Lt. Charles W. Taylor, commanding the Indian Scouts, was watching the scene from a distance of about 200 yards. "A buck threw off his blanket and fired a rifle, apparently at the group where General Forsythe was standing. Other shots were fired and the Indians threw off their blankets. Then there was a lull for a second or two, and the soldiers began firing."

Surgeon John van R. Hoff was near Big Foot. "At this moment a shot was fired while I was walking toward General Forsythe, with my back toward the Indians. I turned instantly and saw these Indians breaking from their center apparently in the direction of the gap between B and K Troops, firing continuous volleys as they advanced."

Lt. James D. Mann, Troop K, assisted Captain Wallace in the search of the camp. The next day he was mortally wounded in a brush with Indians, and on his death bed dictated to his brother his story of the fight. Surely full credence should be given it. The following is an extract:

"In front of me were four bucks—three armed with rifles and one with bow and arrows. I drew my revolver and stepped through the line to my place with my detachment. The Indians raised their weapons over their heads as if in votive offering, then brought them down to bear on us, the one with the bow and arrow aiming directly at me. They seemed to wait an instant. The Medicine Man threw a handful of dust into the air, put on his war bonnet, and then I heard a gun fired near him. This seemed to be the signal they were waiting for, and the fire immediately began. I ordered my men to fire and the reports were almost simultaneous."

Lt. Mann was on the opposite side of the Indian mass from the group about Colonel Forsythe, and when the first shot was fired the Indians were already—in part at least—faced toward the troops between them and the camp.

The Medicine Man had been haranguing the Indians for some time and dancing. The interpreters said he was stirring them up, telling them they were proof against the bullets of the white men, that their own bullets would go true to the mark. One close-by witness describes the tenseness that grew up, * * "the dusky faces of the interpreters were ashy gray." There can be no doubt whatever that the firing was begun by the Indians, nor can there be any doubt that it was wholly unexpected by the troops.

One of the party with Colonel Forsythe was Father Francis M. J. Craft, a Catholic missionary priest, who had been ten years with the Indians of the Northwest. He happened to be at Pine Ridge Agency on a tour of visits to Catholic missions and schools, knew Big Foot and his band well, and went over to Wounded Knee in the hope of being helpful. "Malicious whites on and near all Agencies, during the present excitement, have by misrepresenting the intentions of the Army, caused such a state of alarm and suspicion among the Indians as to make it possible for the least excitement or misunderstanding to precipitate serious trouble."

His description of events is pretty much like that of others, and he reasoned with some of the Indians himself, noting among them some of the worst characters in the Sioux reservation. When some Indians raised their rifles he spoke to them, but "no one seemed to listen"; one, said to be a son of Big Foot, fired, and others followed his example.

Father Craft was severely wounded almost immediately—stabbed in the back by an Indian.

One of the interpreters, P. F. Wells, a half-breed, was also attacked by an Indian with a knife. He knocked the Indian over with his rifle and then shot him, but not before he had lost the end of his nose by the knife. The other interpreter, Ward, was also attacked by an Indian with a knife, and was unable to use his gun. They grappled and went down, the Indian on top. A soldier killed the Indian with his revolver.

Wounded Indians who continued firing were, of course, despatched; those who ceased firing were cared for. One such asked an interpreter just after the melee ended, the identity of a body lying near. Being told it was that of the Medicine Man he spoke as though to the corpse—"If I could be taken to you I would stab you." Then to the interpreter, "He is our murderer; only for him inciting our other young men we would all have been alive and happy." His statement was taken later in the hospital and embodied in the proceedings of the Board.

An old squaw said, "The treacherous ones are of Big Foot's band; we of Hump's band honestly wanted peace."

Apparently the Indians made the mistake of trying to shoot it out with the soldiers—they could have dashed through that thin line and reached their camp before the soldiers could have gotten in a second shot. It was less than fifty yards. Had there been no firing and the Indians simply made a dash for their camp and the shelter of the the ravine beyond, probably not a soldier would have fired a shot—there would have been no time for orders and they had none. In the space of a minute the Indians could have been in some sort of cover, ready to fight. Perhaps they were too sure of their repeating rifles; perhaps they were firmly imbued with what their medicine man had been telling them for an hour or more—that the white soldiers' bullets could not harm them. Whatever it was they paid dearly—their heaviest losses were right there.

This first phase of the fight was unique for modern times; soldiers and Indians stood on their feet and shot it out face to face. The soldiers had the advantage of position, being at intervals of two or more yards on a quarter-circle. The Indians were within that curve and closely crowded. The soldiers had the disadvantage of the single-shot carbine, the Indians the advantage of the seven-shot repeating rifle. But the latter advantage ends with the emptying of the magazine; it is difficult to use the rifle as a single loader and a soldier handy with the carbine could get in several shots in the time necessary to fill the magazine.

There is much uncertainty as to how long this first phase lasted, estimates varying from "a few minutes" to "eight or ten minutes." It would seem that the repeating rifle furnishes a fair yard-stick. The Indians were in a crowd and could not all fire at once; they expected their bullets to kill the soldiers, but most of them stayed on their feet and continued firing; they believed themselves immune to the soldiers' bullets, but found themselves being killed fast; attempts to reload their new Winchesters must have been fumbling at best; one may reasonably conclude that fighting was over for the Indians when they had emptied their magazines, perhaps in two or three minutes. Bewildered, disillusioned, the remaining Indians—more than half—rushed through the line of soldiers toward the only refuge in sight, the brushy ravine beyond their own camp. Some few wounded continued to fire from the ground until killed; one kept up a hot fire from a tepee; a soldier ran across to it with the remark that he would bring him out, slashed an opening in the tepee with a knife, and was promptly shot and killed. The battery then disposed of the Indian by two or three shells fired into the tepee. A number of Indians fired from concealment elsewhere in camp but were soon killed.

Things happened fast when this melee began. On the north, Lt. Nicholson, a staff officer, "made a break and went around in rear of E Troop, and watched the fight from the battery." Colonel Forsythe also made his way to the battery. On the east, Troop G broke in the center; the right platoon led by Lt. T. Q. Donaldson went to the rear and "around the wire fence," dismounted, and returned to the field to fight on foot. This troop was the only one in the line of fire of Troops B and K during the melee, and it did not have a single casualty. The rest of the troop went to the left rear into the ravine and also dismounted to fight on foot. On the south, flying bullets caused the sentinel line to run forward down the slopes of the ravine, the nearest shelter. The Indian Scouts scattered, part following the sentinel line into the ravine, part going farther to the right where Troop G was preparing to fight on foot, part going to the rear and left seeking shelter in the small ravines. When bullets reached the line of Troops C and D they began a rearward movement which was accelerated when a 1.65-inch shell fell close. Captain Godfrey said, "I ordered the troop to rally behind a hill to our left rear." Troop C conformed and the two formed a dismounted line on the crest of the hill. Squaws and children rushed out of camp to the west, southwest and south, seeking shelter in the ravines. Quite a number of squaws, and some bucks, managed to start the pony herd off to the northwest along the Fast Horse Road. They passed Troop E in a cloud of dust, into which that troop, now dismounted, fired in an effort to stop them. Some Indians fired back, one of them a squaw—and Lt. Sedgwick Rice prevented his men from shooting her. The battery fired a few shots ahead of the herd and it came to a halt less than a mile from where it started.

Some of the Indians who fled to the ravines hid at once, but many kept on up the big ravine and many crossed it and continued their flight up the slopes to the south through the sentinel line. Some of these groups were fired on by the battery and by Troops C and D—bucks being hardly distinguishable, and there were some of the latter.

Captain H. J. Nowlan, Troop I, had command of what was left of the sentinel line on the south side of the ravine, and his testimony gives a clear picture; "Indians rushed down in the ravine; up and down it; not a shot was fired at them but they were allowed to escape. But right behind them came the bucks and the cry went up from officers and men, 'Here come the bucks, let them have it,' and our fire was returned by the bucks." Which goes far to establish what is said above about the Indians trying to shoot it out and *then* making their dash for shelter; the women and children had got clear of the camp before they did. And certainly most of these found dead or wounded in camp must have been the victims of Indian bullets, since the Indian fire directed against the men of Troops B and K—which was practically all of it—necessarily passed through the Indian camp, directly behind the soldiers.

Major Whitside had gone to the south side of the ravine, to the second position of Troops C and D. There he directed Captain Jackson (C) to take his troop up the hills "and round up anything I found there," and bring in the Indians' pony herd, which he pointed out, then "a couple of miles to the northwest." Jackson started due west "up the bluffs" with his troop and had to go two miles to reach the head of the ravine. There he found some Indians well protected in the sharp breaks of the ravine's edge. He dismounted and attacked on foot. The fire fight lasted some time and one soldier was killed. Lt. Taylor came up with two of his Indian Scouts, and these crept near enough to open conversation with the Sioux. "It took a half hour's talk and I had to withdraw my men before they would come out." There were eight bucks, of whom five were wounded, and seventeen women and children, about half of them wounded. Jackson at once sent a request to Colonel Forsythe for an ambulance and a wagon for the wounded. Meantime first aid was given to all.

Before the arrival of Major Whitside on the position, Captain Godfrey had sent Lt. S. R. H. Tompkins with 12 men toward his left front to prevent Indians making their way up the ravine into the hills. Before he got in position the party Jackson found at the head of the ravine must have gotten by, and also a larger party that took up a position in one of the lateral ravines and had to be dis-

lodged by artillery fire. But there were still armed Indians coming up and Lt. Tompkins' party had some skirmishing which resulted in three bucks being killed.

Major Whitside directed Captain Godfrey to pursue, with the remainder of his troop, some Indians seen going up the hills to their rear. He did so but saw only one Indian, far off. He continued on to the Divide—a couple of miles from his starting point—and down the opposite slopes for some distance. It was on this scout that an incident occurred that was the cause of a special investigation. Godfrey started on foot with two or three men to search a brushy ravine head, and suddenly glimpsed blankets quite close, and opened fire. No reply coming, they went in and found a squaw, a boy, and two small children, dead. Captain Godfrey and his men were exonerated of the charge of wanton killing.

Returning toward camp he saw Captain Jackson's troop off to the north and joined him. Jackson was waiting for the transportation for his wounded prisoners. Jackson was the senior, and he suggested that Godfrey return to camp, scouting the big ravine as he went. Godfrey detailed a few men to follow the bottom of the ravine, he, with the others, to follow them on the high ground. They were just starting off when four or five mounted Indians approached from the direction of the Agency (west), and waited to see what this might portend. These Indians were armed and one wore the badge of the Indian Police. They rode up with words of friendly greeting and shook hands with the two officers. One gave Captain Godfrey's hand such a pull as nearly unhorsed him. He asked the policeman what the man meant by it, and received the peculiar reply, "I don't know; he is my father." Then they rode off in the direction from which they came, turned at about a hundred yards and fired—except the policeman, who was waving his arms and appeared to be trying to stop them. These Indians then galloped off and disappeared but presently some fifty or sixty came in sight from that direction, deployed in line and at the gallop. Others appeared approaching on either flank. The Indians began firing; one of the soldiers was wounded; Captain Jackson mounted quickly, abandoned his prisoners, and retired to a better defensive position about a quarter of a mile to the rear and north of the ravine, where he again dismounted to fight on foot. He had thirty-four men, Godfrey fourteen—allowing for the minimum of horseholders, about forty soldiers awaited the attack of mounted Indians whose numbers had now increased to about one hundred and fifty. But the attack was not made; Troops E and G were in sight, "coming up on the jump," and most of Troop A, Indian Scouts, and the hostile lines faced to the rear and galloped off.

It was learned later that these were Brule Sioux from Pine Ridge Agency. Of course all Indians thereabout must have known of Big Foot's surrender, and been greatly stirred up about it. The news of the fighting might have reached them, but that seems scarcely probable in the time available. It was thought, and with good reason, that no particular band was involved; that this was a gathering of hotheads who started off with some idea of a relief expedition. There is a possibility that some contact was made with Big Foot's band during the night and that the latter expected some such relief party, which might explain the long delay about the surrender of arms and the frantic efforts of the squaws to get the train packed and ready to move.

Immediately after the melee Edgerly (G) and Taylor (Indian Scouts) had assembled their commands and proceeded to the vicinity of the battery. There Colonel Forsythe directed Edgerly to proceed with these two troops and Troop E to the west, to round up the Indian herd and look for hostile Indians. He quickly did the former, left some soldiers and scouts in charge and went on, arriving in time to save Jackson and Godfrey from their precarious situation, as described above.

One batch of Indians had established themselves in the head of a small ravine, about half a mile up the big ravine, and a lively fight went on for some time. Finally Colonel Forsythe sent one gun under Lt. Harry L. Hawthorne to dislodge them. He went into action at 500 yards and the Indians were soon finished off. Hawthorne was severely wounded early in this action.

Besides the small engagements above described there were many smaller exchanges of shots on or in the vicinity of the battlefield. It must be remembered that smokeless powder had not been heard of at that time. When an Indian fired from concealment a large puff of smoke betrayed his position, and brought shots from all who saw it. Should the soldiers have waited and tried to learn if any women and children were in the vicinity of that smoke? The idea is absurd. There was an armed buck at that smoke, trying to kill one of them and he might succeed if there was any delay in despatching him.

During this mopping-up officers gave repeated warnings to their men against shooting women and children, and it is highly improbable that a single one was intentionally shot. There was one case of intentional shooting of a wounded buck by a very young soldier. His troop commander gave him a savage berating on the spot. The boy burst into tears and said he understood a wounded Indian was as dangerous as any.

From the testimony of several witnesses it is possible to give a fair picture of what happened at the camp after the melee. The mass of the Indians rushed through Troop K, through the Indian camp, to the ravine, but some hid in the camp and continued firing from concealment there. Troop K fell back on the cavalry camp, thus clearing the way for the artillery to end the activities of an Indian in a tepee, as related above. The men of Troop K were now, of course, facing south and southwest and their fire against these Indians was for the *first time* in the direction of other troops—the sentinel line from A and I, the Indian Scouts, and Troops C and D. Lt. Garlington was in charge of the sentinel line on the west and with the men near him, dropped into a sunken road. He was wounded by an Indian firing the ravine after the rush through, and the hospital steward was killed near him. The action by the

sentinel line on the south is described elsewhere. Just when or how the heavy losses by the sentinel line occurred cannot be determined, but when the Indians opened fire those men were standing in groups of three, along the arc of a circle over which the fire swept, and from 100 to 150 yards from the rifles. It is much more likely that their losses were greater then than during the subsequent intermittent firing.

Troop B suffered heavily in the melee, but the rush of the Indians through Troop K freed them of pressure, and Captain Varnum led them to their picket line, mounted up, and reported to Colonel Forsythe, who directed him to "cover the hospital," and some hours later, to clear up a portion of the ravine. He found many dead and wounded Indians and brought out nineteen unwounded women and children.

The losses suffered by these two troops (nearly one-half the total) and those inflicted by them on the Indians, were almost wholly during the progress of the melee. Two-thirds of Troop A and I, in groups of three or four, formed the sentinel line behind the Indian camp, wholly in the field of fire of the Indians. Their casualties nearly equalled those of B and K. *After* the melee, in the mopping-up of the camp, the fire of these lines into it endangered both, but it was not heavy and was soon ended. *None* of the other troops fired into the camp area.

Captain Capron "opened fire with all four guns as soon as the field was sufficiently cleared as to allow us to shoot without injury to our own men." His first target—"for my own two guns"—was at a "bunch of Indians firing on our troops," about 300 or 400 yards away. He fired at groups here and there over the field, but could not distinguish squaws from bucks. After the fight he saw a group of two bucks and one squaw, that had been killed by artillery fire, "2,000 or 2,500 yards from the battery."

The fire from scattered Indians finally ceased, with one notable exception; a lone buck in the head of a coulee kept up the fight until the troops had marched for Pine Ridge Agency! Colonel Forsythe stated this in his formal report of December 31; fire had failed to get or dislodge the buck and the Colonel considered him not worth the casualties that might follow an attempt to rush him.

Charges of inhumanity by the troops were refuted by every witness. Surgeon John van R. Hoff was emphatic. "I saw none. All the field which was the center of active operations came under my observation * * * a considerable number of wounded bucks and squaws brought in had had their wounds dressed by company bearers." As to whether any soldiers were victims of the fire of the troops, "I have not the slightest reason to know or think so; it was possible, but I have no reason to believe it." And in his capacity of surgeon of the command he must have known the source of all the gunshot wounds.

The fighting at an end, the troops gathered up the wounded Indians and their own dead and wounded, and marched to Pine Ridge Agency. They had one officer and twenty-six men and an Indian Scout dead; four officers and thirty enlisted men wounded. Sixty-two women and children and eighty-three bucks were buried in a common grave a few days later. Some of the wounded died later.

Some writers have chosen to animadvert on this abandonment of the Indian dead. But the troops had suffered a heavy loss, collecting the wounded and getting them ready for the march required some time; the march would require four hours, it was necessary that the command return to the Agency as soon as possible, not only to get proper medical attention for the wounded but to escape possible attack by the thousands of Indians within a few hours' march. There was only a short winter afternoon available—they made the best possible use of it. And actually, several thousand Indians decamped that night and were only returned to the reservation after several skirmishes.

On the following day, December 30, six of these troops of the 7th Cavalry were ordered out and before evening had scored another victory in a skirmish at White Clay Creek. Each had one or more casualties the total being one killed and seven wounded, Lt. James D. Mann being among the latter.

There is nothing to conceal or apologize for in the Wounded Knee battle—beyond the killing of a wounded buck by an hysterical recruit. The firing was begun by the Indians and continued until they stopped it—with the one exception noted above. That women and children were casualties was unfortunate but unavoidable, and most must have been from Indian bullets.

Looking back from this distance in time, it seems curious that so little apprehension of danger was felt by the troops. Most of Whitside's officers spent the evening of December 28 in a Sibley tent, listening to Lt. Garlington's narrative of the Arctic relief expedition of which he had been a member. Had there been any thought of danger, each would have been with his men.

Assistant Surgeon Charles B. Ewing, from Pine Ridge Agency, was with the group near Colonel Forsythe, and had got in his wagon to return when the first shot was fired.

The hospital steward and the regimental sergeant major, certain to be men of intelligence and common sense, had wandered into the camp during the search and were both killed.

The troops were at a strength of about 50 men. For the formation the cooks and a few others would normally have been left in camp, but it would seem that some, at least, of the troop commanders did not consider it necessary to turn out all available men. Captain Jackson had 34 and Captain Godfrey 14 men in their fight with the Brule; each troop had had one casualty and Godfrey had detached Lt. Tompkins with 12 men. So the actual numbers of men present in ranks were 35 and 27. Definite figures cannot be had, but apparently A and I, the two guard troops, were the only ones in near full strength.

Father Craft, with ten years' experience among these Indians and well acquainted with this particular band, did not believe a break would come until it actually did.

The formation was one well designed to impress the

Indians, but not at all suited for fighting them—would an old and experienced soldier like Colonel Forsythe have ordered it, had he even dreamed of armed resistance?

Not since the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876 had anything comparable happened. Then, most of the 7th Cavalry was killed, including its colonel; at Wounded Knee most of a band of Indians was killed, including its chief—and by the 7th Cavalry.

No newspaper men witnessed the fight but they soon began arriving, and photographers as well. In their accounts the drama of the affair overshadowed the cold and simple facts that made up the true story. Hastily collected stories and "color" could not present a true picture. The writers could not be blamed; any reporter who sat down to analyze and weigh the "evidence" he collected, would have been hopelessly late in getting the "story" to his paper, and soon be seeking a job elsewhere.

It is highly improbable that any of these young men were motivated by a desire to do an injury to the Army in general or the troops in this fight in particular, but the idea did creep into the press that the 7th Cavalry had at last got its revenge for the "Custer Massacre" of fourteen years before.

Many writers toyed with this idea in the years following, and many military men made indignant denials and defended the honor of the Army in the public press. Sometimes official records were drawn upon but more often only personal recollections.

Four days after the fight at Wounded Knee, President Harrison, shocked by the reports, directed "* * * immediate inquiry into the killing of women and children." A Board of Investigation began its work on January 7, on the spot. Its records are on file in the War Department, and it is from them that this article is written. No tale compiled in the excitement of the days following the fight could possibly be as accurate as one compiled from the sworn evidence of eye-witnesses, obtained on the spot by a tribunal following the cool and impartial procedure prescribed by law and regulation.

Wounded Knee and controversies arising therefrom long ago lost all news value, but there was something of a flurry in 1931 when a book entitled, *Massacre*, by Robert Gessner, appeared. It is a general attack on the Government's policies toward the Indians throughout our history. The part relating to Wounded Knee is a sob story containing more misinformation, misrepresentation, ignorance, and falsehood, than probably any story ever written. In proof of this let us analyze it a bit:

To begin with, he "drove very hard" and arrived at the scene "very tired." One gets the idea he is talking of December, 1890, and the idea persists until far on in the narrative; "As I sat in the Wounded Knee store an old soldier came in who was present. * * * During the past forty years he had never returned to the scene, but he had come on that day." So the reader at last learns that his visit was forty years after the battle. He gives the man's name as D. E. Babb—but the rolls of the troops at Wounded Knee, on file in the War Department, bear no such name.

He "sat by the fire and recalled the events of that day." But he knew the average reader is not critical, so he did not trouble to look up a map, inform himself as to the military dispositions prior to the battle, or the organization and equipment of the troops.

Big Foot led his band down through the Bad Lands, with the *four* battalions of the 7th Cavalry "in full pursuit."

No cavalry regiment had four battalions; two of the 7th were at Pine Ridge Agency from November 27 until about December 26, when one of them was sent to Wounded Knee; Big Foot was somewhere far to the east of the Bad Lands, and it was a mission of the military to prevent his reaching them.

But he gets a bit mixed and has the four battalions of the 7th in camp at Wounded Knee. And speaking of the Indians, "* * * they managed to worm themselves through a pass, leaving the desolate, barren Bad Lands, and came to camp at Wounded Knee."

Again he gets mixed up, as witness, "In the meantime General Forsythe and Major White (sic), with all of the battalions of the 7th Cavalry, surrounded Big Foot's camp, * * * the old chief willingly surrendered. He was not seeking a battle; he was only trying to find some forgotten corner of the earth where his band might worship unmolested."

Big Foot surrendered to Major Whiteside nine miles northeast of Wounded Knee and was taken there by him.

"The troops got drunk at Christmas," and were still in that condition December 29.

That would have required a lot of whiskey, and it was many miles to any source of supply! And it hardly seems consistent with the "full pursuit" through the Bad Lands that terminated with the "surrounding" of Big Foot's camp on December 28.

"On the morning of the 29th a dozen drunken soldiers dragged Big Foot from his tent and killed him." This is perhaps the most atrocious of the many lies in the narrative. The proof is absolute as to the events preceding the fighting, and described herein.

He gives a thrilling picture of the fight, the troops firing indiscriminately at Indians of any age or sex, "Gatling guns poured in their fire," etc.

There were no Gatling guns with the troops. General Miles had declined the offer of some in a telegram to the War Department on November 23, in which he stated Gatlings were useless in fighting Indians.

"Two officers were wounded, twenty-five privates were killed and thirty-three wounded."

Actually, one officer and twenty-six enlisted men and one Indian Scout were killed, four officers and thirty enlisted men wounded.

But inaccuracy is nothing to Mr. Gessner. After giving the officer casualties as two wounded, he later describes Captain Wallace as being dead "with a tomahawk sprouting from his forehead." He also assigns him to the 9th Cavalry—no mistake in the figure; he spells it out, "Ninth."

Actually, Wallace was shot twice and had a bruise on the head which might have been inflicted by a stone war-club that lay near.

"Only one soldier was killed at the hands of an Indian."

But why continue? Not a statement of Gessner's that cannot be refuted by sworn testimony given forty years before *Massacre* was written. The pity is that such a foul libel on the Army of our country should be permitted in circulation.

Seven years after the appearance of *Massacre*, Wounded Knee again made the front pages. Two Indians, alleged survivors of that battle, appeared before a Committee of the Congress and under the guidance of a Washington lawyer, told their stories. This was in support of a bill to reimburse the survivors and the descendants of Indians in that fight, in the sum of $1,000.00 each, the estimated total being $980,000.00.

The Indians at Wounded Knee brought on their own destruction as surely as any people ever did. Their attack on the troops was as treacherous as any in the history of Indian warfare, and that they were under a strange religious hallucination is only an explanation, not an excuse. They do not come into court with clean hands, though they may believe their recollections of what happened forty-seven years ago are accurate.

One officer and twenty-six enlisted men and one Indian Scout died on the field doing their duty. Three more enlisted men died next day. Four officers and thirty enlisted men were wounded on the field. Has anyone thought of compensation for twenty-nine bereaved white families and an Ogallala one? Or for the families of the wounded soldiers? Or for those killed and wounded next day on White Clay Creek, the direct aftermath of Wounded Knee? Or for the descendants of all these and the four hundred-odd soldiers and the hundred loyal Indians who risked their lives on that field?

Not that anyone has heard!

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

Cavalry Operations in Spain

(Continued from page 17)

other hand, Poland and Russia have kept their horse cavalry, developing its operational formations on a large scale. Terrain and other conditions justify both schools of thought. In the United States, the value of horse cavalry can be estimated best by studying the possibilities of warfare against a specific enemy and the character of the probable future fields of battle. A careful and impartial analysis of the conditions affecting this nation would avoid thoughtless statements and needless controversies and would help to determine the requirements of a force suitably organized and equipped to carry out certain specific missions. An army so created and organized in peacetime, based upon actual conditions, would undoubtedly give the best solution to the problem of national defense.



PART IX

When we entrained for Clermont-Ferand we were issued some bread and canned rations for two days. I inspected these rations, for in the Spanish War I had made the acquaintance of cans with swelled heads and had had ptomaine poisoning three times, so naturally I have never trusted canned goods since. I discovered now that some patriot had slipped the Army for cash something he could not have given to the starving Armenians, for fully seventy per cent of the canned goods had swelled heads, infallible sign of sudden death or acute intestinal riot. So I hove them all out into the ditch beside the right-of-way, explained to the men that it was better to starve three days than to have a super bellyache and advised them to take up their belts a notch. They all grinned happily, as the American soldier always will if you give him a sound excuse for making him suffer and he knows you are on the job looking after his comfort and health. I promised the lads I'd have a good luncheon for them next day or bust a hamestrap trying.

After inspecting my battery's rations I thought it the part of wisdom to confide my discovery to the lieutenant colonel who was in command. The colonel was following via automobile. The former didn't seem to realize the importance of my report so I suggested that, in all probability, the canned rations of the other batteries were as bad as mine and ought to be destroyed or serious illness or even death might result. I added that I knew I was the only battery commander who had inspected his men's rations.

The lieutenant colonel thereupon begged me to mind my own business and refrain from attempting to tell him or the other battery commanders their business. To which I replied: "I'll just make my report on those rations to you in writing and then, if nothing is done about it and any of the men die or a serious illness strikes this regiment so hard it can't be moved, a general court-martial will be telling you and the other battery commanders their business. I'll certainly make an issue of it."

He pondered this about ten minutes and then ordered the other battery commanders to inspect their canned rations for swelled heads, and this was fortunate for most of their canned goods went into the ditch. But I was in Dutch. It doesn't do for one to be efficient when, by so doing, he exposes the inefficiency of an untrained, inexperienced, or negligent superior.

The lieutenant colonel got off the train at Perigeaux and got left behind, so I took command and stopped the train until he could catch up with us in a French taxicab. Long before he appeared, however, I had ready for his reception a song descriptive of his inefficiency in missing the train—and all hands sang it to him with great gusto.

I noticed he was wiring ahead to Toul to a Frog to have coffee for twenty-two hundred men ready when we got there. What an optimist he was! I think he wanted five hundred litres and I collapsed when a Frog appeared with five litres!

Now, there were strict orders against riding in the cab of the locomotive with the French engineer and equally strict orders against the troops disembarking until the colonel gave the word. He was to meet us at Toul. I instructed my first sergeant to have a dozen of the Big Fours empty their barrack bags and stand by; when they saw me at the railroad station giving them the signal to rally on me, they were to jump off, run like the devil with their barrack bags and join me. I then climbed up in the cab of the locomotive to ride there into Toul. The French engineer tried to put me off but I waved a ten franc note at him and he bade me remain and even gave me his cushioned seat. Later I discovered I could have had the same service for five francs.

As we slowed up to stop for a couple of hours at Toul I slipped off the still moving locomotive, ran into the railway eating house, made a quick survey of his shelves, and asked the proprietor how much he would take for the entire contents of his little store. He gazed at me pop-eyed and started to bargain, but I cried him down and he said "eighteen hundred francs." I laid the money on the barrelhead and while he was making out a receipt for my battery fund voucher I ran out. The top had his cold nose poked around the corner of the last car on the train and I gave him the signal. In no time at all the brave lads were loading into their barrack bags 115 cans of *pate de foie gras*, 150 cans of sardines, some forty cans of peaches and apricots, forty or fifty cans of Libby's corned beef, a couple of boiled hams, a cheese as big as a gun wheel and twice as thick, and about thirty loaves of French war bread of the general dimensions of a railway tie. I had to borrow the Frog's hand truck to move the cheese and bread. Of course I had paid too much for this food but why trade when my lads had empty stomachs? And I had lots of money in the battery fund and knew I would never spend it all. (As a matter of fact, upon demobilization, I turned $1,800.00 in to the government.)

As we emerged with our plunder, down the side of the train came the colonel and the lieutenant colonel and the battery commanders, with old man Krantz far in the lead, hurrying on his long legs to grab off for Headquarters Company the grub I had just purchased. "Too late,



"The French engineer tried to put me off but I waved a ten franc note at him."

August," I taunted him. "I rode the engine cab and got there first before the train had stopped. I've bought out the house."

Krantz grinned. He could take a licking, but he always had a wallop left. "You, Peder," he said, "vill let me have some of dot food for my noncoms und a sick man or two." Good old Krantz. Always out to salvage something from defeat. Of course he got it.

The colonel caught sight of my enlisted pack-train and yelled: "Captain Kyne, what do you mean by disobeying my orders and taking these enlisted men off the train before I have given the word?"

"I have disobeyed you, sir," I confessed, "and I did it deliberately. My men are hungry and I'll risk a general court any time for their sake. But I have the food I promised them. If the captain fails to stay with his men in a day of stress they are not so apt to stay with him in a day of stress." He replied without animus: "You'll be court-martialed." I grinned and said: "I bet I will not be court-martialed by you." The colonel didn't quite know what to make of this weird brand of military behavior, but I think he approved of it, so he said: "Well, get the remainder of your battery off and let them stretch their legs. And we'll divide this food you have with the regiment."

"We will, like hell," I replied. "This grub is mine. I bought it for my men and I don't care a hoot whether the remainder of the regiment starves or not. In the army, Colonel, it's a case of the devil take the hindmost, and I have been in the forefront so I guess the devil will not take me."

The lieutenant colonel said he thought my action extremely selfish but I paid no attention to him. Then the colonel demanded an explanation as to why I was de-

"I had to borrow the Frog's hand-truck to move the bread and cheese."

training my men in full pack, so I begged him to stand by and see. I formed the outfit up company front, opened ranks, and ordered my outfit to unsling packs and then sit down on the packs and be comfortable! So much better than sprawling in the dirt! The mess sergeant and his cooks then spread the kitchen carpaulin and a detail started to open the canned goods. The station master loaned us an axe to break up that gigantic cheese and I went over into the town and returned with two hundred and twenty pints of very good red wine to wash down the cheese and war bread and sardines and *pate de fois gras*. A pint for every man, and how the rascals taunted the other batteries because they didn't have an old soldier skipper to look after them!

At sight of the wine the colonel blew up and reminded me very forcibly of the A.E.F. edict against bringing liquor aboard troop trains. "I am well aware of that order, sir," I replied, "but it refers to bringing liquor aboard in containers, whereas, my men will bring it aboard in their stomachs." Unable to beat that sophistry the colonel walked away and my gang snickered. Some of the old hands even winked slyly at me. I didn't give any officer except Krantz and my dear old pal who commanded Battery B even a crust of bread. These two rated it, however, for they had their dues always paid in advance in the League Of Outlaw Battery Commanders . . . ah, oui! On active service let me have men about me who are fit for treasons, stratagems and spoils.

We had enough food left over for supper and at daylight, in a freezing rain we piled off in the railroad yards at Clermont-Ferand. My mess sergeant promptly swiped some old railroad ties and made a fire between the tracks, dug out the rations we had salvaged from our practice march two months before and which I had refused to turn in to the regimental supply office. Upon entraining for France I had had these rations boxed and labeled accompanying baggage. My men had had their condiment tins filled with coffee, sugar, etc., for two months, so we pooled it all now and breakfasted heavy on beans, corned willie, hardtack, coffee and canned peaches. So, for the second time on that trip, the remainder of the regiment had to stand around and slaver at the mouth. I knew I was making myself more unpopular than ever, if this was possible, but I did not care. Why should I? I had a happy family, as snooty as they come and I wanted to keep it that way. The colonel wanted to know by what authority I had made a fire in the railroad yards and I told him I was acting under the right of eminent domain. Whereat he laughed. He couldn't hold a grouch worth a cent. Quite usually he expected me to hand him a laugh and I think he credited my overdraft on his patience with the chuckles I gave him.

In this respect I recall an answer I once made him. Whenever we transferred a man to an A.E.F. casualty draft our old man always would have us up and question us as to our reasons for sending this particular man, his idea being that maybe an inferior man could be sent. I had a huge, pot-bellied private of Hebraic persuasion; he owed me twenty-five dollars and wouldn't pay it so I decided to send him away where he might get killed. "Why are you sending this fellow?" the colonel demanded. "Because he's a Jew?" The colonel was not remotely anti-Semitic; it was instinct with him to demand a square deal, except when he was crowding an enemy and even then, if the enemy laid off him forty-eight hours, he would forgive him.

I replied: "No, sir. Like the colonel, I am not a Jew baiter. In fact, one of my grandest sergeants is a Jew, but I want to get rid of this fellow because he spoils my formation in two places. Whenever I right dress my outfit this bird's belly and his nose are sticking out and neither can be drawn in far enough. He violates my sense of military aesthetics."

"Off with his head," said the colonel. He was a long time getting over that one.

Well, my battalion settled down in a village called Plauzat. Nothing had happened in Plauzat and environs since Julius Caesar fought Vercingetorix about two miles from Plauzat. Indeed, I had some arrowheads picked up on that sanguinary field. My outlaw pal and I, following our insistence on giving ourselves all the best of it, secured a lovely room each in the chateau of a Bourbon gentleman, the Comte de Seray and a swell fellow he was. I ran his clan down about twenty generations by their oil portraits on his ancestral walls and they all looked as alike as a litter of pups. The long, acquisitive Bourbon nose showed up in every man Jack of them. The count gave me a nickname, due to my habit of saying to my interpreter when talking with the count: "What does he say?" So the count called me Capitaine Qu'est ca se. That was as close as he got to translating my English query.

While we were there the count had an elder brother, Comte Henri de Chassaigne de Seray come up from Paris to visit him. This old lad was a speaking likeness of the late John L. Sullivan, a hell-raising old Royalist with a roving eye and a great judge of liquor and ladies. I called him John L. and my pal explained in French to our host that this was a title of respect. The count thought I was trying to say general as the French pronounce it, so his brother became General de Plauzat and this was considered extraordinarily funny.

That rascal, John L., came nearly putting an inglorious finish to my riotous military career. He invited the two of us to dine with him one night in Clermont-Ferand. He was to pick us up at a cafe with his brother's car. I got in first and in the darkness fell over a lady with a little dog. She smelled strongly of lady powder and her cheerful: "Ha, my little cabbage" (in English) told me all I wanted to know. I sat between her and another lady, boy friend sat in the jump seat and John L's lady sat up front with him. I said to my pal, "Tommy, we're up to our necks in a social bog. There's a G.H.Q. order against this sort of skylarking and while I'll take all sorts of liberties with our colonel, John J. Pershing has me stopped in my

tracks. Explain to this Parisian rake that we can't do this sort of thing."

My pal had one inevitable answer to any protest against fun. "Snort and carry six." So we carried on. John L. drove us to a cafe and in the light the ladies showed up very beautiful and well-dressed and charming, but they all spoke English so well I knew they must have been associating with our troops. I couldn't eat. I was frightened. Suppose a general came in and decided that this wasn't a war to make the world safe for democracy, after all! Even Tommy's repeated "snort and carry six" failed to cure my agitation.

We danced to the tune of a hewgag into which M. le Host dropped coins. The front door was the sort of swinging three-quarters door they used to have in old-fashioned saloons—the sort a dog could come to and look in under to see if his master was there whooping it up. The light from a wet pavement bounced in under that door and in that subdued radiance I saw a pair of military legs, standing immovable, while over the top of the door a soldier with a mean eye took stock of our innocent little party.

And I had the answer. I waltzed mademoiselle over to Tommy and said: "Tom, that infernal John L. has taken us to a cafe that is out of bounds for American troops and an M.P. has discovered us."

"Snort and carry six," said Tommy. "You're seeing things. I have never known a more nervous man."

Just then the proprietor shot across the dance floor and slammed a big thick inside door in the M.P's face. Then waiters appeared with civilian clothes and, although I protested pitifully that I'd rather be caught redhanded in uniform than in a long black French civilian overcoat and a billy-cockhat, I was overruled. I took a look at Tommy and he took a look at me and the girls said we were *trey joile* and we howled with laughter. Then we each took a girl by the arm, the landlord threw open the door and out we marched in the face of a squad of M.P's and to the sound of whistles blowing frantically.

We got through them and down the street about forty feet when the officer in command of the raiding party noticed pigskin puttees sticking out below the hem of my overcoat. "Halt," he yelled. "You're in arrest."

"We do not speak English," said John L. in his excellent French.

"To hell with you. You're a Frog, but those birds with you are American officers. Halt, you officers. Halt or we'll shoot."

I knew they wouldn't. I knew they wouldn't have the courage to shoot until they'd stripped us. So we marched on.

"Take 'em," said the provost-marshal, and they rushed us, just as a door opened. So John L. went in and we followed and slammed the door in the noses of the enemy. With an elderly female guiding us we ran down into the basement, out a door into a vacant lot and the pouring rain, across that lot and through a door in a brick wall—and lo, we were in a garage and there was our late host warming up the count's car for the getaway. We paid him, handed him back his accursed raiment, got in the car and put up all the curtains. A frightful riot raged outside; dimly the clamor could be heard through the walls. When all was ready the Frog threw the garage door open and I had a glimpse of a dozen soldiers in the alley through which we had to proceed. The place was surrounded. But John L. put his car in second gear and shot out with a whoop, and the M.P. all flattened up against the walls to escape being run over, the while they flourished pistols and bayonets and howled to us to halt or they'd shoot.

So my pal put his lips to the hand-hole in the curtain on his side and gave them the Bronx cheer. On my side I did likewise for I knew they'd never dare fire into a French car with the curtains drawn. And they didn't. They chased us out into the street, where John L. put his car in high and away we went slithering and careening and skidding around corners, with a Ford car chasing us. John L., like all the French, had no sense when it came to driving an automobile. He stopped for nothing and I noticed he had a trick of locking his brakes and sort of throwing the car around a corner. Later I learned he was an old automobile race driver.

We shook them off, pulled in to a cafe, dumped the ladies out without ceremony and fled back to Plauzat, still hungry and thirsty. The dear lasses screamed for money which they didn't get, because the lights of the Ford were showing and we had no time to count out money for those gold diggers!

When finally we succeeded in explaining to John L. the nature of the awful fate from which we had escaped; when we quoted to him G.H.Q. orders about being found in out-of-bounds cafes with ladies to whom we had never been formally introduced and how we could have been in very serious trouble with the grand jury if we had been caught, he proclaimed that of all fools extant Americans are the greatest. And I think so, too. However, I suppose that whenever we go to war G.H.Q., will always, in deference to the edicts of the Holier-than-thou fraternity, smugly assume that single men, or even married men, in barracks can, by the mere issuance of an order, be made to develop gracefully into little plaster saints.

I never went out with John L. again. I was afraid of him.

One Saturday I went down to Clermont-Ferand and engaged a room in the Hotel De La Poste, to enjoy a bath in a real tub. About midnight Snooper rolled in on me, a little tight and badly frightened because he had just killed two men and three women. How? With his mighty fist, of course. No two weedy men and three women could live after having been on the receiving end of an arm like a hawser. It seemed he had met these Frogs in a cafe and had had a few drinks with them. They had then suggested a change of pasture and Snooper had gone with them and in an alley they had made the fatal mistake of jumping on him all together. Oh, la! Oh, loo la-la!

"Hop into that twin bed, Snoop," I told him. "Nobody, it appears, saw you commit this wholesale murder, so forget it. If they find the bodies and try to pin it on you I'll be your alibi. We were together all day and all night."

No bodies were ever found, so we forgot it until one night about a month later I found myself in Clermont-Ferand in a cafe eating alone. A little *nymph du pave* came to my table and tried to interest me, but I told her I was going back to my village in a taxicab presently. So then the news came out that the taxicabs were out of gas that night and not operating, but she said she had a friend who was chauffeur to a gentleman who had an American car; that his master would be in bed by ten o'clock and, for a consideration, his chauffeur would take me home. Fine. I bade her go forth and fix it, which she did and for her services I gave her ten francs. I was to meet her and her friend at the railroad station at ten-fifteen.

I found her there talking to a bird in a little Overland car. Beside this driver, who had one eye and looked like a crook, sat two big hearty young women about twenty-eight or thirty. In the tonneau sat a yellowish, slight weedy young man with another buxom lass. I thought the weedy man was a drug addict. And I was to sit in the tonneau between these two and be driven home!

My back hackles came up. *Two men and three women!* Undoubtedly here was the same gang that had jumped Snooper! I excused myself and went to the rear in an adjacent cafe, for I remembered that, in paying for my dinner in the presence of the little streetwalker I had pulled a roll of about eighteen thousand francs out of my blouse pocket. It was my battery fund. The French would not take checks and I had to have it in cash; I couldn't leave it in my locker and I had to carry it on my person. SO SHE KNEW I HAD A ROLL ON ME. She had framed it for the gang, on a percentage basis!

I removed my puttees, wrapped my roll against the calves of my legs and rolled the puttees again. I left a few francs in my pocket for seed and then purchased from a waiter a pocket knife with a six-inch blade. I slipped this knife, opened, into my right hand blouse pocket with the point against my wadded handkerchief and came back to the car. They wanted me to sit between them in the tonneau but I was too polite for that. Ah, no. What? Intrude myself between monsieur and mademoiselle and their love! Impossible. I walked around and got into the tonneau and seated myself on the right, so, in the event the big lass next me should reach around to garrote me I could come around with the knife in my right hand and slit her weasand. I felt perfectly able to clean up the bunch and was rather anxious to try, for the years had been long since I'd mingled in physical combat with anybody, and in my youth I liked it!

Well, they drove me past the turn-off on the road to my village and far out into a lonely valley, through the center of which a creek ran. The creek was lined with a thick growth of willows, so I knew they planned to kill me and hide my body here. I was not surprised, therefore, when the car stopped suddenly and my companions in the tonneau bailed out the left hand side saying we had a flat tire. They came around to the right side very quickly to receive me as I emerged on that side—but I fooled them. I got out the left hand door, pretended to stumble and fell prone long enough to look under the car and note THAT ALL FOUR TIRES WERE STANDING UP! Then I came around the rear of the car to the right—and they rushed me. But alas, I was also rushing them! It was what you might call a meeting engagement. The weedy bird clawed at me and I straight-lefted him and right-crossed him and he was out. I did the same to two gals. This gave me a view of the one-eyed man bending over the tool box on the running board trying to get out a hammer. So I kicked him from the rear but well forward and up—and he collapsed screaming, while I socked the remaining damsel a kick in the posterior as she was trying to escape out into the field. I returned, got possession of the hammer and sat down on the running board to await the resurrection, first, however, having taken the precaution to frisk the fallen for guns and finding none. Their knives I threw into the creek.

When the one-eyed man was able to sit up I made him get in and drive me home, while his friends stood off in the field and were very cold, for it was a frosty night. Arrived home I slapped him around a little for good measure and neglected to pay him. This was the only danger I was ever in in France and I enjoyed it tremendously. But for good old Snooper, however, I would have been a gone fawn.

Suddenly for no reason at all that I was aware of, the colonel removed me from command of the first battalion and gave it to my pal, commanding B Battery. After two weeks the colonel busted him and put me back in command. I served a week and then old Krantz was relieved temporarily of command of headquarters company and sent over to relieve me. He was much embarrassed, because he was several months junior to me, but we welcomed him as one welcomes a gentle rain over an arid district and gave him a special dinner at our mess.

I was the mess officer and had decided that, with so little of life remaining before us, we should do ourselves well in the matter of eating and drinking. We did. We had two cooks for twelve officers, a butler and assistant butler and an Italian soldier whose sole duty was to dig up the best in drinkables, mushrooms, old cheese, fat ducks, geese, turkeys, chickens, and truffles. Our mess cost us sixty dollars each in American money, but with the exception of three second lieutenants we could all afford it. They suspected nothing but good mess management on my part, when I charged them twenty-eight dollars.

Presently I achieved command again and somebody sent us a Y.M.C.A. man. I ordered him to establish a battalion post exchange but he pleaded he couldn't buy anything. So I fired him. Somebody then sent us out another, but he was a total abstainer, too, and when we put brandy in his coffee and got him tight he wanted to sing hymns instead of ribald songs of an up-and-coming soldiery. So I fired him and started a store of my own and forgot to pay the commissary for the goods I stocked it with until some sharp fellow up at Tours deducted it from my paycheck. When I paid it to the quartermaster in Bordeaux I insisted on four receipts—one for me, one for my battery fund

voucher, one to send to the bird at Tours, and one to show somebody in Washington years after the war was over that I'd really paid the bill.

They fooled me. Six months after demobilization I received a demand from Washington for payment of the account, so I sent on my fourth receipt and that was that! There must have been a crook in the A.E.F.!

Presently our colonel settled the problem as to who should command the first battalion. One of our captains was promoted to major and sent over with many a warning to be firm and make me and my pal walk in the way we should go. The new major was quite filled with misgivings. He felt that an immediate showdown and a frank statement of his ideals and desires was necessary, particularly with me, because I was the worst outlaw. At least everybody had assured him I would be his problem child and yet he wasn't quite ready to believe this because he liked me. Without in the least wishing to let him down easy, I hailed his advent with pleasure, assured him that if we'd had the selecting of a major we would have picked him, promised him affectionate, cheerful obedience and loyalty, and gave him a dinner, all of which had the effect of making him happy in his new job. He was gravely concerned, however, and almost a little scandalized to discover that I only had four sentries scattered through the village, in case of fire or riot, and that I had no provost and a guard to visit the estaminets and see that the soldiers behaved and obeyed the order from G.H.Q. limiting the troops to light wines and beers and outlawing champagne and cognac.

I assured him my soldiers never got drunk and never created a riot, because, after I had read the G.H.Q. order to them three times in succession at retreat formation I had gathered them around me and announced that having expounded the law to them, I would now interpret it. And I interpreted that order to mean that they could swim in cognac and champagne provided they could carry the load home with dignity; that I regarded them as men not morons or minor children, that I would not snoop upon them, that all the estaminets in the village were theirs with one exception, and that was for the officers, and that if any man got drunk and disgraced the uniform and I found it out I'd bust his corporal and sergeant.

They were on their honor and they played the game with me, but when the new major organized an hourly patrol to watch them, he snooped on empty estaminets, for I had ordered a boycott on him. So, after three nights of that, and a lot of cheerful jeering from me, he gave up and the men came out of their billets and trade resumed its normal flow. I was in a fair way of making of him a very fine major when we were demobilized. Albeit he resisted stubbornly, I was slowly but steadily indoctrinating him with brand new theories of troop management and exorcising his preconceived ideas of army life. He tried to make me get up for reveille, but I told him I didn't expect to live very long and while I lived and the opportunity offered I purposed having my breakfast in bed. And lieutenants should be worked else they would get out of hand.

We were the first American troops ever to set foot in Plauzat and wild excitement, incident to the contemplation of unusual profit from us, broke out at once. I had the mayor in and pinned him down to a price on all liquor, eggs, cheeses, truffles, poultry and vegetables. I had to do a lot of figuring, based on five francs, sixty-five centimes to the American dollar to discover that the prices he named were not only reasonable but even cheap. So I made up a schedule of prices one hundred per cent higher. Thus, a bottle of vin ordinaire costing a Frog fifty centimes sold to a soldier for a franc. These lists I had posted up all over town and then hired the town crier, an ancient female who looked like a witch and had a voice as shrill as a fife, to go around tapping her drum and spreading the gospel. If profiteering above my listed price was indulged in the shop doing the profiteering would be posted as out of bounds. I wanted to give the French a break.

The largest estaminet in town was presided over by a young woman we all considered a little bit addicted to bats in her belfry. She was known as Split-tooth Annie and the soldiers felt so sorry for her low mental state that she got most of their trade. In fact, one of my bucks felt so sorry for her that when he went home he left Split-tooth Annie a little souvenir, but whether it was a boy or a girl I never knew, although I passed through Plauzat in my automobile in the fall of 1924 and asked, but nobody seemed to remember her. Ah, well, c'est la guerre.

That was a strange village. One night, in a back street, I pulled seven young or middle-aged women off a very old peasant woman. They had her down and were beating her to death. I clouted them left and right and carried their victim in to the count's park and washed her off at the fountain and begged the count's butler to bring me a shot of good old brandy for her. But he wasn't interested. He wasn't even sympathetic. Then the count came out, and he smiled at my concern over the old lady and my anger at the brutality of the younger women. He said: "They will yet kill her. They think she has the Evil Eye, that she is a witch."

About a week after we arrived an instructor was assigned to each battalion. He was a real instructor—gentle, patient, never smiling when one asked a boob question, explaining everything in simple, non-tautological, uninvolved English. He had been up to the front a year and he knew his business and we knew he knew it, wherefore, for the first time since I had held up my hand I had confidence in my instructor. To prove to you how good he was he taught me how to shoot at a balloon and hit it—theoretically. I almost got a swelled head to think I was smart enough to learn to shoot down a sausage balloon.

After our instructor had completed his lesson in theory we went up to the target range at Randanne to see if the theory would work. It did. It was zero weather, with a foot of snow on the ground and before we commenced shooting we were supposed to receive by wireless from a French meteorological station on top of Puy-De-Dome a report of the direction and velocity of the wind, the temperature and the barometric pressure. We never re-

ceived anything but a dark blue silence, so we guessed all that and did the most amazingly accurate shooting. Even I, to my own vast astonishment and the unbelief of my comrades, did excellent shooting.

I thoroughly enjoyed that tour of target practice because, for the first time, I knew exactly what I was doing and why and I had the utmost confidence in my instructors. A boy second lieutenant had charge of the firing. One day he gave me a shift of target and ordered surprise fire. I figured my data. The range was say 5,850 yards—and I transposed my figures and figured my base range as 5,580 yards. As the lanyard was pulled I saw my error, quickly computed the error in the base range, looked at my range table, decided not to bother with any other minor adjustments but just give the gun the new and correct elevation. Before the first shell had landed the gunner had the new data and another shell was in the gun; it was on its way as the first shell landed short and was so reported. Number two was target—and the boy blew the whistle on me.

"You are only allowed one shell, captain," he reminded me. "You used two. How come?"

I explained. Now if that boy had been a run-of-the-

"I hired the town crier, an ancient female who looked like a witch and had a voice as shrill as a fife, to go around tapping her drum and spreading the gospel."

AVIS!

mine instructor he would have given me a sour puss and murmured: "No solution." Being a perfectly whaling gorgeous instructor he smiled and said: "I ordered surprise fire, and by George, you discovered your error and corrected it so fast you actually did achieve surprise fire. Solution! Why? Because just now you learned something important and all by your own little self. Hereafter you'll be more careful of your figures. We learn more from our mistakes than we do from our successes and as long as you live and fire a field piece you will never again transpose your figures."

I told him I really ought to blow his brains out then and there in order that his young soul might be wafted to its reward before military sin could lay its devastating hand upon him. I still think of that boy with the utmost affection.

On our first tour on the target range we used British eighteen pounders simulating G.P.F. methods. Only the officer personnel and the gun crews went up to the range at Randanne, the remainder of the regiments remaining in their respective billets and this situation developed a perplexing problem for our colonel. He wanted all of his officers to have target practice and, indeed, they HAD to have it, but on the other hand he feared to leave the troops alone in their villages without an officer in command. He sent for me to ask me what officer I thought I could readily spare for this job and I told him that we had one in the first battalion who would never learn to shoot or be a soldier if he remained on the target range until he grew a long gray beard, because the colonel had recommended him for a second lieutenancy after he had failed miserably as a corporal, although he was socially o. k. in civil life. I added that I viewed with terror the prospect of leaving this cheerful idiot and first class souse in command of the battalion because it would embarrass him, and suggested that the young man be taken to the target range and that my first sergeant be given command of the battalion.

"But," the colonel protested, "first sergeants never command battalions." I reminded him that I had soldiered under first sergeants perfectly competent to do it and that sometimes first sergeants did command when all the officers were killed or wounded. And that my first sergeant would have discipline or else. So, much against his desire the colonel gave me my way. When I returned from two weeks up on the target range and asked my top how he had gotten along he said a few of the new selective service men had tentatively tried him out but that he had discovered an old dry well, stone-lined, and after he had lowered a couple of them into this well and kept them there three days on bread and water there had been a vast improvement in discipline. When I was demobilized I stole the delinquency book, just for a jolly souvenir and one day I looked through it and had the horrors at what I read there: That top was a strong man and fit to command.

After returning from the target range we laid around the village two or three weeks doing nothing, while waiting for the issuance of G.P.F. rifles, trucks and tractors. During this period one of my first lieutenants was detailed to attend a school to learn orientation. He duly graduated from this school and the day after his return to our midst he was, on the colonel's recommendation, commissioned a captain. Evidently the colonel deemed a captaincy infra dig for an orientation officer, so he made our orientation officer battalion adjutant.

Now, there wasn't a bit of battalion adjutanting to do, so our major decided to make orientation officers out of all of us, with our recent graduate to instruct us. And lo, it then developed that he was a battalion adjutant, for seemingly he had forgotten his orientation as readily as he had learned it. At any rate he was of no use to us so the major began trying to puzzle orientation out by himself. Then somebody sent us over a theodolite and one day we got out in a field with the theodolite (vintage of 1870) and tried laying down some orientation lines in an effort to discover the coördinates of a colossal statue of the Virgin on a distant hill.

Suddenly a dispatch rider scorched up the road on his motorcycle. A few minutes later we saw the village cure scamper out of his parsonage to the church across the street, losing his slippers en route. And then the church bell began to ring and I said to the major: "To hell with the coördinates of the Statuede la Virge. We are no longer interested, because the war is over."

My first sergeant came running over and confirmed my suspicions. The motor cycle rider had brought the news formally from regimental headquarters.

"You remain here," the major ordered, "and finish this problem."

"It was finished before it started. We're all wrong and we even suspect it, major. Never, never will our battalion adjutant-orientation officer function in his dual rôle." And I folded the legs of the theodolite, handed the instrument to a soldier and bade him carry it up to battalion headquarters.

"Come back with that theodolite," the major yelled.

"No, soldier," I said firmly, "carry on. Major, on such an auspicious occasion only a very dull man could possibly monkey with a theodolite and ponder coördinates. You are far from being a dull man, so follow me, amigo, to Split-Tooth Annie's or some other refreshment bureau, for I am about to knock over a quart of warm champagne."

He sighed and followed me, cursing me for an outlaw and then, as was his custom, breaking into laughter and putting his arm through mine. He knew I would never seriously be disobedient.

I have often wondered what would have happened to us if the Armistice hadn't saved us. There come occasions in the life of a battery commander on active service when he can use an orientation officer. I often wonder, too, what the colonel was up to when he promoted a brand new orientation officer to a different job and never filled the vacancy!

Well—c'est la guerre!

(To be continued)

COMBINED CAVALRY MANEUVERS

By Major Vennard Wilson, Cavalry

EDITOR'S NOTE: The comments carried herewith on the maneuvers at Fort Riley last Autumn represent the observations and impressions of an individual and in no wise reflect official endorsement nor concurrence.

The October, 1938, maneuvers and demonstrations at the Cavalry School were conducted in accordance with directives from the War Department and from the Chief of Cavalry involving the 7th Cavalry Brigade and the Cavalry School maps.

They were of such character that all who witnessed them profited by the experience. No type of training compares in value with actual participation in operations in the field where capabilities and limitations of coöperation, organization, mobility, and technique are established as matters of fact.

Nature of Exercises

The exercises held at Fort Riley during the month of October were divided into three phases as follows:

(1) Instruction of officers at the Cavalry School.

(2) Demonstrations for the Command and General Staff School, the Cavalry school, and visiting officers.

(3) Maneuvers designed to verify or revise the methods of coöperation between horse cavalry and mechanized cavalry, and to work out the technique of operations involving the tactical employment of large horse and mechanized cavalry units in the field. Five separate maneuvers were held, each distinct in itself.

The scope of this article is limited to an account of the maneuver phase mentioned above.

Restricted Terrain Limits Value of Practical Military Training

General and special situations in each maneuver were drawn so that contact and final deployment took place on the Fort Riley Reservation.* This procedure was necessary because of the impossibility of leasing lands and to avoid damage to private property. ***The artificial conditions imposed by lack of adequate terrain for maneuvers of modern mobile troops is one of the greatest handicaps to efficient military training in this country.***

General and Special Situations

Since the general and special situations in these maneuvers were, of necessity, drawn to assure contact on the Fort Riley Reservation, they are not described in detail, but the resulting tactical situations in each case are presented in a very brief manner to give a picture of the operations.

Enemy Representation

Officers and noncommissioned officers of the resident classes and small detachments of school troops were used to represent enemy forces in the first three maneuvers. Enemy units and guns were indicated by flags carried and maneuvered by the students under the direction of the officer in charge of the exercise.

The enemy was more fully represented during the fourth maneuver than during the preceding ones, but not to the extent that it could be designated as two-sided.

The fifth maneuver was two-sided.

MANEUVER NO. 1: October 15, 1938

Horse Cavalry Regiment, Reinforced by a Combat-Car Squadron, in an Attack

The purpose of this exercise was to study the employment of a combat-car squadron supporting a horse cavalry regiment in an offensive action, and the defensive measures of the combat-car squadron against attack aviation.

A blue horse cavalry regiment (2d Cavalry) reinforced by a battery of horse artillery, was engaged in attacking a Red horse cavalry regiment on the Fort Riley Reservation. The Blue mission was to secure a bridgehead position, the key terrain of which is now occupied by the enemy. (See sketch of Maneuver No. 1.)

The initial attack of the 2d Cavalry was not successful. As the maneuver opened, the 2d Cavalry was disposed with two squadrons in line along the line Four Way Divide—Morris Hill—Caisson Hill; one squadron was in reserve. The enemy held the high ground on the north side of the reservation, Custer Hill—Randolph Hill—Carpenter Hill.

Red reinforcements, consisting of one horse cavalry regiment and a battery of artillery, were approaching from the north, were 15 miles away, and could affect the action in two hours unless delayed.

Blue reinforcements of one combat-car squadron (1st Squadron, 13th Cavalry, Mecz.) reinforced by one mortar platoon, from a higher echelon, were expected by the 2d Cavalry.

Red forces were known to be using attack aviation.

The Operations

At 8:45 AM the Commanding Officer, 2d Cavalry, was at his OP at Morris Hill, where he was informed that the combat-car squadron would arrive at the Washington Street Bridge at 9:00 AM. He returned to his command post and from time to time issued necessary orders for the operations that followed.

The Commanding Officer, Combat-Car Squadron was directed by radio to proceed with his squadron to Republican Point, where he would be met by a staff officer from the 2d Cavalry. Regimental S-3, 2d Cavalry, with marked map and written order, contacted the combat-car squadron at 9:20 AM. The squadron commander issued his attack order and advanced to the north.

At 9:40 AM the reserve squadron (1st Squadron, 2d

*EDITOR'S NOTE: This fact should be kept in mind during any consideration of these maneuvers. Lack of available maneuver area with consequent artificial restrictions necessitated arbitrarily narrow limits. In a large measure, also, the problems discussed represent the detached operations of relatively small units.



Cavalry) was moved forward to near Arnold Divide to be prepared to support the attack of the combat-car squadron.

At 9:53 AM, the Commanding Officer, 2d Cavalry learned through a radio report from his scout cars that the combat-car squadron was preparing to attack. He ordered artillery fire on Custer Hill, and, at 10:00 AM, directed his 2d Squadron (right squadron in line on Morris and Caisson Hills), by mounted messenger, to watch for hostile movements about Wolf Canyon and Forsythe Canyon, and to advance the squadron to drive the enemy from Carpenter Hill.

Troop B, Combat-Car squadron attacked Custer Hill at 10:03 AM. Troop C, Combat-Car Squadron attacked Randolph Hill at 10:10 AM. The attack was made in column of platoons at 200 yards, platoons echeloned. It was well delivered initially and would no doubt have been successful.

At 10:15 AM, when the attack of the combat cars on Custer Hill was observed from the Regimental OP on Morris Hill, the reserve squadron 2d Cavalry was directed to advance and support the combat cars. The squadron moved out at 10:20 AM. With little over a mile to go, it should have arrived on Custer Hill at 10:25 AM, or 10:30 AM at the latest. The fast movement of the mechanized attack had caused the combat cars to clear and pass beyond Custer Hill, part of them already having reached their assembly area at Cameron Springs by 10:20 AM. The outlined enemy movements then indicated that they had retaken Custer Hill, and this caused a second combat-car attack to be launched. The horse squadron halted on the way to Custer Hill for a dismounted attack, and did not arrive until about 10:40 AM.

The 2d Squadron, 2d Cavalry moved north at 10:20 AM on Carpenter Hill, which was occupied at 10:35 AM. The 3d Squadron was moved to Cameron Springs in regimental reserve. At 10:30 AM, the combat-car squadron was directed to advance north against the approaching enemy regiment, which had been delayed by the scout-car platoon of the 2d Cavalry after the combat-car attack was launched.

The operations of the attack aviation had been planned for an attack against the combat-car squadron in its initial approach on the reservation. Due to the fact that the attack planes were due to arrive on the day of the exercise, it was necessary to arrange for the mission prior to that day. The Commanding General, Barksdale Field, arranged to have this attack made as a continuous mission from that post, the planes to leave Barksdale Field in time to reach Chapman, Kansas, at 8:30 AM, where they were to be contacted by an observation plane and have the target designated. This was accomplished on schedule. The attack was delivered a few minutes before the exercise actually started, the 1st Squadron, 13th Cavalry (Mecz) then being in an



administrative halt awaiting the opening of the exercise. A second attack was made on this unit about 10:15 AM as it was entering its assembly area, but the vehicles were well dispersed at that time. Antiaircraft machine guns were in readiness to fire on the attack planes.

Comments

The tactical situation required that an objective be secured quickly. The force primarily allotted proved to be insufficient, and the only other force available to the higher command to send in as reinforcements was a squadron of combat cars. This was a suitable mission for mechanization and shows the usefulness of a combat-car squadron for employment with horse cavalry.

The attack of the combat-car squadron was launched one hour and three minutes after it arrived. Of this time, 20 minutes was required to issue the regimental order, 20 minutes in marching, and 23 minutes for issue of squadron and troop orders and for deployment. *If the full effect of surprise is to be obtained, these times must be cut to the minimum.* It is very doubtful that the total time could be reduced to less than 40 minutes under the most favorable circumstances.

The plan contemplated the use of one of the squadrons of the 2d Cavalry, which was deployed in line, in a pursuit or exploitation mission. This squadron was ordered forward at the time the combat-car attack started, and actually began its advance twenty minutes later. This was a very small squadron, due to the reduced strength of the 2d Cavalry, and a full squadron would no doubt have required longer to assemble from a wide front. Prior to the attack, this squadron could have withdrawn most of its rifle units and part of its light machine guns, and could have moved forward as part of the combined attack.

Lack of experience in operations of this type hindered coördination in the attack, not only in the squadron which followed the attack of the combat-car squadron, but also in the attack of the right squadron of the 2d Cavalry against Carpenter Hill. The results of the operation would have been more decisive had all elements started at the same time. Some form of coördination is essential, preferably a "time of attack."

The successful operations of attack aviation in executing an attack mission during a continuous flight from Barksdale Field, Louisiana, was an interesting feature of this maneuver.

While certain imperfections were noted in the execution of this maneuver it nevertheless shows the feasibility of cooperation of horse cavalry and mechanized cavalry and the potential power of such a combination. The powers and limitations of each are such that one supplements the other to a marked degree. The crushing effect of combat-car units greatly assists horse cavalry in advancing its attack. The holding power of horse cavalry secures the objectives gained by mechanized cavalry. Horse cavalry, with its mobility, appears to be the best available means to furnish the prompt coöperation required by this situation.

MANEUVER NO. 2: October 18/19, 1938

Concentration of Mechanized Cavalry Brigade and Horse Cavalry Regiment on the Battlefield, After Night March, for Combined Offensive Operations After Daylight.

This exercise consisted of a daylight administrative phase and an overnight tactical phase. The administrative phase consisted of the march of the 2d Cavalry to Manhattan (about 15 miles) and the march of the 7th Cavalry Brigade to the vicinity of Blue Rapids, Kansas (about 75 miles from Fort Riley via Wamego). The tactical phase started at 4:00 PM, at which time all units were to be in concealed bivouacs, with outposts established, prepared for defense against attack aviation. The tactical march was to start at midnight, with the 2d Cavalry attached to the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz), the two units arriving at Fort Riley prepared for a combined offensive action at daylight.



At 4:00 PM, the 2d Cavalry was in its bivouac at Manhattan and the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) was entering its bivouac in the Blue Rapids area. The only information available to the brigade commander was that the 2d Cavalry had been attached to his brigade, and that the entire force was to be prepared for a night march on orders from army headquarters. (See Sketch No. 1, Maneuver No. 2.)

At 10:00 PM, the 7th Cavalry Brigade Commander was informed that Fort Riley was occupied by a brigade of enemy infantry; that a flight of attack aviation was available to him on call; that he would move on Fort Riley at midnight with his entire force, drive out the enemy forces, and secure the bridges at Fort Riley.

The enemy infantry brigade, reinforced by one battery of artillery, with outposts established, was occupying a defensive position on the Fort Riley Reservation. (See Sketch No. 2, Maneuver No. 2.) Its position was generally fan-shaped, with Fort Riley as a center, extending from 3,000 to 4,000 yards therefrom, with east and west flanks on the river. The total length of its line was about 8,000 yards. The northeast sector (about one-half of the total) was protected on the north by canyons. The northwest sector, although on open ground, was favorably placed on high ground. This information was not available to the 7th Cavalry Brigade.

The Operations

The 2d Cavalry, at Manhattan, received orders through a staff officer of the 7th Cavalry Brigade at 11:50 PM to march at once to Ogden and there await orders; to reconnoiter thoroughly the hostile position on the high ground on the Fort Riley Reservation, and to report the result of reconnaissance to the 7th Cavalry Brigade at Magic School (about 10 miles north of Fort Riley) not later than 4:00 AM. (Note: The 2d Cavalry had no radio set to work direct with the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and the range of its scout-car sets was not sufficient in the early stages. The brigade staff officer had a 193 radio set to work in the brigade net, but this set went out of order.)

The 2d Cavalry sent five officer patrols in scout cars to accomplish the reconnaissance. The horse elements marched in one column at 12:55 AM on Ogden, halting one mile north thereof at 3:25 AM, where they remained until 5:05 AM.

The five officer patrols in scout cars reconnoitered the enemy position and reported the result of the reconnaissance to the brigade commander at Magic School prior to 4:00 AM. The information obtained was in greater detail than could possibly have been obtained had an actual enemy been present.

At 5:05 AM, the 2d Cavalry received orders to be pre-

pared to attack at 6:15 AM along a designated axis (Williston Point—Artillery Hill), which would bring it against the enemy right—that part of the front covered by canyons. It was also directed to make its main effort on its right. The distance to the attack area was about five miles; the regiment moved out at the trot at 5:05 AM, after preliminary orders had been issued, and was assembled in attack position by 6:20 AM.

The 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) marched from its bivouac area at midnight in two columns, 1st Cavalry (Mecz) on Highway 77 and the 13th Cavalry (Mecz) on roads west thereof. It was halted at 4:00 AM about 10 miles north of the Fort Riley Reservation. In this area, orders for the attack were issued by the brigade and regimental commanders, based upon information received from the 2d Cavalry. It was expected that the attack could be launched by 6:30 AM.

The plan of operations, as developed at this time, was as follows:

A coördinated attack by the entire force, including attack aviation, on order, about 6:30 AM.

2d Cavalry to attack enemy right.

1st Cavalry (Mecz) to attack enemy center, axis Randolph Hill—Morris Hill—Machine Gun Ridge.

13th Cavalry (Mecz), entering through J. Dixon, to attack enemy left, axis Arnold Divide—hill west of Machine Gun Ridge.

Upon completion of attack, to assemble approximately in center of enemy position as a result of the converging directions of attack.

The 2d Cavalry was in attack position on time as indicated above. The mechanized elements required longer time to develop than had been anticipated, and were ready to attack at 7:10 AM. The attack was launched about 7:15 AM. The attack proceeded satisfactorily at that time, and coördination of movement into the final assembly areas was well executed.

Comments

The administrative march was well conducted. Its rate was 20 miles per hour. The mechanized elements, using several bivouac areas, and placing vehicles under trees and camouflage, obtained excellent cover from air observation and were not located by observation planes.

The primary tactical purpose of this maneuver, that of concentrating horse and mechanized elements on the battlefield from distant areas under adverse conditions, was accomplished, although certain imperfections were noted as indicated below.*

The march of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) to the south during darkness was under very severe conditions of dust and a cold north wind. Lights were used. The rate was about 15 miles per hour as far as Magic School, slower thereafter.

The 2d Cavalry in this operation, especially in the reconnaissance phase, could have been employed differently. Initially it was 12 miles from the reservation boundary, and about 16 miles from the farthest part of the enemy position. Its initial reconnaissance orders directed it to secure information of enemy dispositions and to report them by 4:00 AM, a time allowance of 4 hours. It would have been impossible to accomplish this mission by horse patrols alone. However, a minimum of one troop could have proceeded at once to reinforce the scout-car reconnaissance and the horse patrol reconnaissance could have been continuous after the report of 4:00 AM had been made.

In the attack phase, the 2d Cavalry was given a zone of attack which converged upon the final objectives of the mechanized elements. This is one possible solution, apparently adopted because of the relatively wide front and comparatively strong enemy to be attacked. Another solution would have been to place elements of the 2d Cavalry in contact along the entire line, with its mass in rear of the mechanized attack on the west, and to have the horse elements exploit the success of the mechanized elements and cover their assembly.

The development of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) consumed more time than had been originally estimated. However, when the attack started, it was well coördinated and controlled, proceeding from one terrain objective to the next in an orderly manner. The degree of success which could have been obtained against infantry on favorable ground, with over twelve hours to organize the position, is, of course, extremely questionable. Undoubtedly the 2d Cavalry would have had a difficult task in its sector also.

The outstanding difficulty in this operation was communication between the 7th Cavalry Brigade and the 2d Cavalry. In the initial phase there was a lack of sets in the 2d Cavalry with sufficient range to reach brigade headquarters.

The attack aviation was employed against antitank guns on the enemy front line west of Morris Hill at 6:17 AM as planned. The objective was suitable, but the attack was delivered too early because of the unexpected time required for the development of the ground forces. This illustrated the difficulty of coördinating ground and air attacks and the necessity for close liaison between ground and air until the final attack is actually launched. The enemy artillery would also have been a suitable target.

MANEUVER NO. 3: October 24, 1938

Mechanized Cavalry Brigade and Horse Cavalry Regiment in a Delaying Action Against an Infantry Division.

This exercise, in its larger tactical aspects, represented the coöperative employment of a regiment of horse cavalry and a brigade of mechanized cavalry in delaying the advance of a Red infantry division. Due to terrain limitations, the lack of sufficient troops to outline a complete infantry division, and to the desire to study the detailed operations of a mechanized unit the size of a regiment, that part of the exercise which was held on the Fort Riley Reservation, and which was developed in complete detail, was essentially the launching of a counter-attack by a

*EDITOR'S NOTE: Imperfections noted here will undoubtedly continue to exist so long as there is lack of opportunity for continuous combat training between all types of our cavalry.

horse regiment, reinforced by a mechanized regiment, against the leading exposed infantry regiment of the Red division.

A regiment of horse cavalry had been engaged during the previous day in delaying the advance of a Red infantry division, which was advancing westward from Manhattan (15 miles northeast of Fort Riley). This Red division, with the 2d Cavalry in contact along Three Mile Creek, had bivouacked in the area of Ogden (5 miles northeast of Fort Riley) during the night preceding the maneuver.

During the same night, the Blue 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz), reinforced by a flight of attack aviation, under army control, had been moved from a distant area to take over the delaying mission previously assigned the 2d Cavalry, and the 2d Cavalry had been attached to it.

The maneuver began at 8:30 AM, 24 October. At this time, the 2d Cavalry was just completing the occupation of its second delaying position, having been driven from its initial delaying position by a daylight attack of one regiment of Red infantry, supported by one battalion of Red light artillery, the only enemy troops actually in contact. The remainder of the Red infantry division was beginning to advance, with one infantry regiment so placed that it could reach the 2d Cavalry in about two hours, and the remaining brigade just beginning to break into columns from its bivouac area. (See Sketch of Maneuver No. 3.)

The Blue 7th Cavalry Brigade was disposed with the 13th Cavalry (Mecz) about four miles in rear of the 2d Cavalry (with a liaison officer at the Command Post, 2d Cavalry), and the remainder of the brigade just completing its crossing at Milford. Colonel 2d Cavalry, as senior regimental commander, had been designated to command the joint operations of the 2d Cavalry and 13th Cavalry (Mecz).

The Operations

The operations of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (less 13th Cavalry) will not be discussed in detail. Terrain limitations prevented development for offensive action, although the reconnaissance phase was actually carried out successfully. Account was taken of the tactical significance of this operation in the development of the actions of the enemy forces. The threat against its rear would have forced the Red infantry division to dispose itself for an all-around defense and to employ a large proportion of its force for rear and north (exposed) flank protection. It would also have had the effect of delaying the movement of supporting forces to assist the exposed leading infantry regiment. Without this threat, the enemy in contact with the 2d Cavalry could have been strongly supported, especially by artillery, within one hour.

Orders for the combined attack of the 2d Cavalry and 13th Cavalry (Mecz) were issued by the Commanding Officer, 2d Cavalry, at 8:30 AM. Plans had been prepared prior to this hour. The method used was to radio the Commanding Officer, 13th Cavalry (Mecz) to continue his advance to a designated point where he would be met by a staff officer of the 2d Cavalry with detailed orders.

The 13th Cavalry (Mecz) launched its attack at 9:30 AM, and fired a rocket signal at that time. The initial objective was Four Way Divide.

The reserve squadron of the 2d Cavalry moved out promptly in rear of the 13th Cavalry and was in position to follow up very closely the attack of the combat cars. (See Sketch of Maneuver No. 3.)

The initial attack was very well executed. The supporting horse elements followed the combat cars within three or four minutes, and the objective could have been taken easily. However, the coördination of the subsequent movements of the horse and mechanized elements was not all that could have been desired, due to lack of experience in this type of operation.

The attack of the combat-car units proceeded from the initial objective to the Redoubts and then to Machine Gun Ridge, a total advance of about 5,000 yards. Its direction was approximately parallel to the line initially held by the 2d Cavalry and from 1,500 to 2,000 yards in front of it. One combat-car troop operated farther north against the enemy artillery positions.

The 3d (right) Squadron of the 2d Cavalry, noting that the combat-car attack had reached Machine Gun Ridge, advanced at 10:15 AM (45 minutes after initial attack) to Machine Gun Ridge, which it occupied at 10:50 AM.

The 2d (left) Squadron of the 2d Cavalry formed in regimental reserve after the combat-car attack passed its front.

The artillery batteries attached to the 2d Cavalry and to the 13th Cavalry (Mecz), acting as a provisional battalion, remained in their original attack positions to support the reorganization of the new position.

The 13th Cavalry (Mecz), upon completion of the attack, assembled in rear of the 2d Cavalry, completing its assembly at about 11:15 AM. It was then prepared to rejoin its brigade for further operation.

The flight of attack aviation was ordered to attack advancing enemy infantry columns on the north flank, which attack was made about 9:15 AM. A second mission was given the attack aviation against a battery of enemy artillery and a truck column (enemy infantry battalion) approaching Caisson Hill. This second attack was delivered at 9:55 AM.

Comments

The tactical missions were considered to be suitable and satisfactory. The technique of execution was not all that could be desired, due to the limitations imposed by lack of adequate terrain.

In this exercise horse cavalry fixed the enemy in position, and, except for small battlefield movements, held him in position, reported his dispositions, and prepared the way for the attack of mechanized cavalry. The movement of the Mechanized Brigade (less the 13th Cavalry) against the right flank and rear of the Red division prevented the movement of additional Red troops to the battlefield.

An attack by mechanized cavalry requires continuous fire support. The initial attack of the mechanized regiment was supported by field artillery and light machine guns. After advancing several hundred yards, the combat-



car elements passed beyond the effective range of light machine guns and was thereafter supported only by field artillery fire and very limited small arms fire delivered by the 2d Cavalry.

In this exercise, the attack of the mechanized cavalry was shown to be very effective when closely supported by horse cavalry. The reserve squadron of the 2d Cavalry attacked immediately in rear of the combat-car units and moved with equal speed toward its objective. Practice and experiment are essential to obtain the correct timing and coördination of the two elements. In this particular maneuver, a great improvement was noted in the movements of the horse units over than shown in Maneuver No. 1. In the first maneuver the horse units were too slow; in this maneuver their timing for the initial attack of the mechanized units was excellent.

The time required to commit the mechanized regiment from march formation to attack, with plans prepared but no orders issued, was approximately one hour. It is difficult to judge this time accurately because terrain limitations required advance over, and development from, a narrow road. It is not believed, however, that this time could be reduced to much less than forty-five minutes.

The liaison between the horse regiment and the mechanized regiment, prior to and during the attack, was excellent. Communications were very satisfactory, but it was noted that great reliance was put upon radio. Every effort should be made to utilize additional means.

The tactical missions of the attack aviation were not considered to be the most suitable. The initial mission was against infantry columns which could not have affected the main action, and which could have been delayed sufficiently by the scout-car elements. The greatest threat to the attack of mechanized units is the enemy artillery and anti-mechanization weapons. Therefore, it is believed that the attack aviation should have been concentrated on these elements just prior to the attacks of the 13th Cavalry. However, it was demonstrated that the communications with the attack aviation were successful, and that its attack could be delivered where and when desired.

MANEUVER NO. 4: October 25, 1938

Mechanized Cavalry Brigade, Assisted by a Regiment of Horse Cavalry, Operating Against a Motorized Infantry Division.

The purpose of this maneuver was to illustrate the employment of a brigade of mechanized cavalry, receiving coöperation from a regiment of horse cavalry; action necessary to stop a wide encircling maneuver by a motorized infantry division; and the defensive measures of a motorized column against mechanized cavalry. It was an extended maneuver, with the 7th Cavalry Brigade and the 2d Cavalry (reinforced by a battery of horse artillery) on the Blue side, and an outlined Provisional Infantry Division (3 regiments), represented by 6 scout cars of the 9th Cavalry, 54 trucks, a company of the 17th Infantry, and students of the Cavalry School, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Heard of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, on the Red side.

Blue south, Red north. Main forces were stabilized east of Manhattan. Red army had a motorized infantry division available; Blue army had a mechanized cavalry brigade and a horse cavalry regiment available.

At the opening of the exercise, at 9:30 AM, Blue dispositions and missions were as follows: (See Sketch No. 1, Maneuver No. 4.)

7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) was at Abilene (25 miles west of Fort Riley), with its reconnaissance elements in possession of the crossings over the Republican River at Clay Center, Wakefield, and Milford. Its mission was to locate and destroy the hostile motorized force last reported at 7:00 AM in the vicinity of Blue Rapids.

2d Cavalry, covering the Blue left flank, was at Fort

Riley. Its immediate mission was to reconnoiter to Riley (town) and Milford, to report any movement of the hostile motorized force last reported at Blue Rapids at 7:00 AM, and to contact and delay the advance of Red columns. The 2d Cavalry was to coöperate with the 7th Cavalry, but was not attached to it, each operating under army control.

The Red Motorized Division was at Blue Rapids at 7:30 AM. Its mission was to move south between the Republican and the Blue Rivers, prepared to attack across the Kansas River between Junction City and Ogden. At 9:30 AM its leading elements had reached the line Clay Center —Garrison.

The Operations

Red Motorized Infantry Division:

Red reconnaissance elements arrived at Clay Center and found it occupied by a Blue (Mecz) reconnaissance detachment. Reds moved south, avoiding Clay Center, and destroyed the bridge at Broughton (south of Clay Center).

The Red flank guard arrived at Clay Center about 10:00 AM. The Blue reconnaissance elements had moved east to locate the Red columns, and the flank guard was enabled to occupy Clay Center, damage the bridges, and hold up the advance of the Blue 1st Cavalry (Mecz) for a considerable period of time.

Red reconnaissance elements moved south to Wakefield, where they held up an attempt of the Blue 13th Cavalry (Mecz) to cross at that point.

As a result of holding up the crossing of the main body of the mechanized cavalry, the Red division was enabled to advance south with little delay except to the right column. This column was attacked by Blue attack aviation and was also delayed by armored cars and by one squadron of the 13th Cavalry (Mecz) which had crossed at Wakefield. When this occurred, the Red commander employed his artillery and one company of his anti-mechanization battalion, marching with the center column, to flank the Blue armored cars and combat cars holding up his right column.

Leading motorized infantry units reached the Fort Riley Reservation by noon and gained contact with the 2d Cavalry. By 2:30 PM, the infantry division was well closed up and had secured commanding terrain on the north of the reservation. (See Sketch No. 2, Maneuver No. 4.)

2d Cavalry:

As stated previously, the 2d Cavalry was initially on the south of the Fort Riley Reservation, with only its scout cars on reconnaissance. At 10:30 AM, it sent Troop A to the vicinity of Randolph Hill to reconnoiter all roads to the north.

At 10:50 AM, the 2d Cavalry, through its scout cars, learned of the Red infantry movement taking place along Highway 77. At the same time it received a message from the 7th Cavalry Brigade to move north promptly to block Highway 77 and roads east thereof. The regiment then moved to Four Way Divide.

At 11:30 AM, the 2d Cavalry learned through its horse patrols that the enemy was one mile north of the reservation. The 1st Squadron was sent to Randolph Hill to delay. This squadron made contact at noon. The 3d Squadron was sent to Estes Gate at 2:00 PM, when it was apparent that the enemy was developing for attack. The 2d Squadron was sent to Four Way Divide to cover the withdrawal of the two advanced squadrons to a delaying position on the Redoubts--Morris Hill line when the enemy attacked the advanced position.

7th Cavalry Brigade:

As indicated above, the 7th Cavalry Brigade was delayed in its attempt to cross the Republican River at Clay Center and Wakefield. It, therefore, was unable to gain contact with the flank of the Red infantry division while it was moving, the only action being local actions between the mechanized brigade advance guards and the infantry division rear guards, and the delaying action against the right column, conducted by armored cars and by the combat-car squadron which crossed at Wakefield.

The Red infantry division was not fixed until it met the 2d Cavalry. The 7th Cavalry Brigade could probably have attacked about 3:00 PM, but the infantry division was well closed up by this time. The maneuver terminated at this point.

Comments

This exercise involved movements over large areas and operations on roads which prohibited development or movement across country. The initial dispositions and distances gave an advantage to the motorized division.

When the maneuver opened, the bridges over the Republican River were in possession of the reconnaissance units of the 7th Cavalry Brigade. When those units moved out on reconnaissance, the river crossings were left unguarded. The right flank guards of the Red infantry division, which moved in between these reconnaissance units and their main bodies, were therefore enabled to secure the bridges and delay the crossing of the Cavalry Brigade. The resulting operation became more of a pursuit against the rear of a fast moving infantry division than an interception by striking the head or flank of the columns.

This exercise illustrated the difficulty encountered in controlling the operations of a unit as large as the mechanized cavalry brigade when operating against defiles such as were the bridges over the Republican River. The brigade had no ground reconnaissance agencies deployed except the armored-car troops of its regiments. To have held these units to cover the crossings pending the arrival of the main bodies, from 30 to 35 miles in rear, would have forced reliance on air observation for an hour and a half. Sending the reconnaissance units ahead on a reconnaissance mission, as was actually done, exposed the crossings to seizure by the Reds. An alternative solution would have been to reinforce the reconnaissance troops with combat-car units to hold the bridges.

Another important illustration was the need for coördination of the action of all cavalry units in a locality.



The 2d Cavalry, in accordance with the draft of the problem, was not attached to the 7th Cavalry Brigade. It is believed that this should have been done.

The recurrent difficulties of communication and control when reliance is placed upon radio communication were also illustrated.

Attack aviation, operating on the Blue side, attacked the right column of the advancing infantry division and delayed this column.

This maneuver illustrates the effective possibilities of cooperation between widely separated forces of horse cavalry and mechanized cavalry, wherein the horse cavalry is used to delay and fix an advancing hostile force on its axis of advance and the mechanized cavalry may be used offensively against the hostile flanks and rear.

MANEUVER NO. 5: October 27-28, 1938

Two-sided Maneuver, Mechanized Cavalry Brigade Operating Against a Horse Cavalry Regiment Reinforced by Mechanized Units.

This was a two-sided maneuver. Blue (north) was the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) (less detachments). Red (south) was the 2d Cavalry, reinforced by two batteries of horse artillery, one platoon of armored cars, a squadron of combat cars with a section of mortars (from 7th Cavalry Brigade), an observation squadron, and an engineer demolition detachment. The maneuver was drawn to illustrate day and night reconnaissance by both types of cavalry, maintenance of contact with horse cavalry at night by mechanized cavalry, and combat of mechanized cavalry against horse cavalry reinforced by mechanized units.

Blue (north) and Red (south) main forces were in contact east of the Blue River. Red retirement south of the Kansas River was imminent. Blue had a mechanized cavalry brigade available at Randolph (30 miles north of Fort Riley). Red had a reinforced cavalry regiment at Keats (10 miles north of Fort Riley). Except in the Junction City area, bridges south of Clay Center and as far west as Salina had been destroyed. (See Sketch No. 1, Maneuver No. 5.)

At 5:00 PM, the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) was in bivouac in the vicinity of Randolph. It received orders to send reconnaissance elements at once to gain and maintain contact with an enemy cavalry force reported in the Riley—Keats area. At midnight it received orders to drive this force out of the area between the Republican and the Blue Rivers, and to seize the bridges near Junction City. A flight of attack aviation was made available to assist in the operation.

At 5:00 PM, the 2d Cavalry, reinforced as indicated, was in bivouac in the Riley—Keats area, with reconnaissance and delaying detachments on its front at not more than five miles from its bivouacs. Its mission was to continue flank protection from its present location until midnight, then to withdraw to the Fort Riley Reservation, and to remain north of the Republican and Kansas Rivers until 9:00 AM. After that hour, to withdraw south of the Kansas River, destroying the bridges after crossing.

The Operations

Blue (7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz)) Operations:

Reconnaissance Phase:

The two regimental reconnaissance troops, starting at 5:00 PM, operated by phase lines and made a thorough reconnaissance of the zone of advance. This reconnaissance reached the vicinity of the 2d Cavalry after dark. When contact was established, information was obtained by sending a dismounted man into the Red bivouac. Aerial reconnaissance located the 2d Cavalry bivouac at 6:30 PM (before dark).

Withdrawal Phase:

The reconnaissance troops were able to determine that the 2d Cavalry had withdrawn, but were unable to follow the movements of the horse elements. They were able to

follow the movements of the Red combat cars, due to the noise of the vehicles.

March Phase:

The march started at 2:00 AM, without lights, 1st Cavalry (Mecz) with one battery of artillery via routes west of Highway 77; 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) (less west column) via Highway 77 and routes east thereof. The march was controlled by the same phase lines used for the reconnaissance units, which units reverted to regimental control. Dust conditions were very severe. Due to the halts on phase lines, temporary loss of roads by some units, and to the dust conditions, the mass of the brigade reached the Fort Riley Reservation about 6:30 AM, four and one-half hours for the march of thirty miles.

Attack Phase: (See Sketch No. 2, Maneuver No. 5.)

The original plan of operations contemplated that the 1st Cavalry (Mecz) enter through Milford Gate and J. Dixon. Discovery of damage to the bridge over Four Mile Creek near the Milford Gate required that the entire regiment enter through J. Dixon. This caused a change of route, a delay of twenty minutes in getting into position, and a change in the brigade plan of attack.

The 13th Cavalry (Mecz) entered North Gate and Estes Gate and was ready to attack at 7:00 AM. The outpost of the 2d Cavalry on Morris Hill was withdrawn upon the approach of the 13th Cavalry (Mecz), but one troop of the combat-car squadron attached to the 2d Cavalry remained on Macomb Hill. The 13th Cavalry was then ordered to attack this combat-car unit and to seize the Highway 40 bridge over the Republican River, which attack it performed.

The 1st Cavalry (Mecz), entering through J. Dixon, was ordered to change its attack direction to that originally planned for the 13th Cavalry. This change of direction was performed. Although the attack directions crossed, the 13th Cavalry had cleared before the attack of the 1st Cavalry (Mecz) approached.

The attack of the 1st Cavalry (Mecz) did not reach the main position of the 2d Cavalry on Machine Gun Ridge prior to 8:30 AM, when the exercise terminated. This position was well protected by canyons.

Attack aviation was used against the Machine Gun Ridge position about 7:30 AM.

Red (2d Cavalry) Operations:

Bivouac Phase:

The bivouac, although concealed to some extent, was located by air observation at 6:30 PM. Attack aviation was directed against it, but approaching darkness prevented effective operation.

Outguards covered the crossings of Wild Cat Creek, south of which the regiments bivouacked. The Scout Car Platoon, 2d Cavalry, covered the roads on the east side of the bivouac area, and sent a section of four cars, each with one-half rifle squad, to hold the bridges over the Republican River on Highway 40, the bridge over the Smoky Hill River south of Junction City, and Engineer Bridge.

The attached combat-car squadron (2d Squadron, 13th Cavalry (Mecz.)), with an armored-car platoon, established a counterreconnaissance screen along the road three miles west of Highway 77, with armored-car patrols covering Highway 77 and the route through Milford.

The engineer detachment destroyed the bridges over Wild Cat Creek, the Washington Street Bridge at Junction City, and the bridge over Four Mile Creek on the Milford Road.

Withdrawal Phase:

This operation, starting at midnight, was accomplished as planned. As indicated above, the enemy reconnaissance was able to follow the movements of the combat cars on the west, but was unable to follow closely the movements of the horse elements.

Delaying Action Phase:

This phase proceeded as indicated in the description of the Red operations.

The result of the attack of the 13th Cavalry (Mecz) against the combat-car squadron would probably have given the bridge over Highway 40 to the Blues, due to preponderance of force in this area. This was an important but not vital bridge to the 2d Cavalry, as it still held the Engineer Bridge. An encircling maneuver against the rear of the 2d Cavalry would have required the Blue forces to capture the lightly guarded bridge over the Smoky Hill River south of Junction City; this operation no doubt was possible but would have consumed considerable time.

The position on Machine Gun Ridge chosen by the 2d Cavalry was protected by natural obstacles and would have been difficult to attack, especially as supporting artillery was in position on the south bank of the Republican River. Since the opposing forces were in close contact, the withdrawal of the 2d Cavalry across the river and the final attack of the 7th Cavalry Brigade were not attempted, and the maneuver was terminated at 8:30 AM.

The artillery attached to the 2d Cavalry had excellent targets, due to the exposed movement of the combat cars across its front. Its possible effect, of course, could not be judged, nor could that of the field artillery of the 7th Cavalry Brigade firing upon the 2d Cavalry.

Comments

The daylight reconnaissance of the armored-car elements of the 7th Cavalry Brigade, starting at 5:00 PM and conducted by phase lines, did not reach the 2d Cavalry bivouac in time to locate the enemy prior to dark. This reconnaissance was very thorough and included the necessary road reconnaissance for the advance of the brigade. It is believed that more information could have been obtained had the ground reconnaissance agencies been divided into two groups—one to go on long distance reconnaissance immediately to the enemy objective; the other to conduct a thorough reconnaissance of the zones of advance. Aerial reconnaissance located the bivouac area at 6:30 PM (before dark).

In the night reconnaissance phase, the armored-car elements of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) were able to maintain contact with the combat-car squadron of the Red force, due to the noise of the vehicles. Information was

obtained of the withdrawal of the horse elements, but accurate information of their routes of withdrawal could not be obtained in the dark. The dispositions of the Red forces on the reservation were not obtained until daylight, and then only the outpost position was located prior to the main attack.

The 2d Cavalry did not attempt any distant reconnaissance to locate the enemy to learn whether he was approaching, and if so, by what routes. Scout cars were used to hold bridges in rear of the 2d Cavalry. This may have been proper during the withdrawal, but during the bivouac phase these cars might have been used to better advantage on definite reconnaissance missions.

The march of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mecz) during darkness was at the average rate of approximately six miles per hour. It was made without lights over very dusty roads, the dust adding greatly to the difficulties of driving.

The use of combat cars by the 2d Cavalry for outpost during the night was considered questionable. They could have been held in reserve, while security was provided by the horse cavalry. The horse cavalry operated during the night without disclosing its movements and positions to the enemy, while the opposite was true of the mechanized unit attached to the horse cavalry.

The night operations of mechanized cavalry and horse cavalry in the battle zone are made at approximately the same speed. Mechanized reconnaissance is very limited at night, except for specific missions to verify information reported by other means, such as air service, secret service, and information from inhabitants. In an operation such as represented by this exercise, in which the mechanized cavalry is to operate against a mobile enemy and must operate at night, it can operate much more effectively with horse cavalry than alone.

In this exercise, the attack aviation was first employed against the bivouac of the 2d Cavalry as a result of the 6:30 PM aerial reconnaissance. Due to approaching darkness, it was only partially effective. A more effective employment was made the next morning at 7:30 AM, against elements of the 2d Cavalry on Machine Gun Ridge.

The outstanding illustration of this exercise was the extreme difficulty confronting a mechanized brigade which attempts to advance at night against an unfixed enemy and make a dawn attack. Preliminary operations after daylight are essential to locate the enemy main positions, which can seldom be determined by ground reconnaissance agencies without a reconnaissance in force. Mechanized reconnaissance can rarely, if ever, follow a moving enemy at night and accurately locate his dispositions.

THE END

LESSONS

EDITOR'S NOTE: Maneuvers are conducted to furnish training for commanders and staffs, to test results of garrison training methods and doctrines and to arrive at some conclusion as to the efficacy of such methods and doctrines; else, the expense and time involved in these activities could not be justified. In arriving at definite or arbitrary conclusions of a broad nature some care must be exercised to determine whether all factors involved warrant such expression. Lack of maneuver room, artificial restrictions, and a number of other considerations might lead only to localized conclusions rather than to those sufficient to establish future doctrine. Realizing these requirements, the following lessons derived from these maneuvers are listed as representing the opinions of some observers; also, they are presented more in the spirit of future consideration than as broad, general conclusions.

1. The tactical characteristics of horse cavalry and mechanized cavalry are largely complementary. Therefore, their combined employment against a common objective, if and when the situation permits, is usually more effective than the employment of either type alone.

2. Horse cavalry, by virtue of its unexcelled cross-country mobility, is especially able to furnish close support to mechanized cavalry on the battlefield whenever the situation permits or suggests combined operations.

3. The strategical mobility of mechanized cavalry enables it to afford opportune assistance to distant horse cavalry in spite of their initial wide separation. The tactical mobility and combat power of mechanized cavalry are valuable adjuncts to horse cavalry in the performance of its battlefield missions.

4. The strategical mobility of mechanized cavalry greatly exceeds that of horse cavalry but their tactical mobility is more nearly comparable, being dependent largely on the obstacles of terrain to which mechanized cavalry is relatively more sensitive.

5. Daylight reconnaissance is effectively accomplished by mechanized cavalry but, under most circumstances, horse cavalry is more suitable for night reconnaissance and close-in battle reconnaissance.

6. The whole matter of cavalry communications needs a thorough study from the ground up with a view to simplification, coordination, and other improvements.

7. Control of a mechanized cavalry unit of this size with the present facilities for command and communications is a difficult problem and indicates that no material increase in the number of organic units under one command should be attempted until adequate means and ability to control them have been tested and proven.

8. The machine-gun fire support within the Mechanized Brigade is inadequate, due primarily to the limited range and limited fire power of the light machine gun. It is believed this could be improved by the substitution of the heavy machine gun for the light machine gun.

9. In order to obtain the maximum combat effectiveness of cavalry as a whole, it is essential that the two types—horse and mechanized—be able to train together continuously.

A Fox Hunt—and Some Other Things

By Tommy Wadelton, Jr.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Again editorial judgment dictates that CAVALRY JOURNAL readers be furnished a gustful reading morsel. Not to be guilty of monopolistic tendencies, the CAVALRY JOURNAL is pleased to publish this story concurrently with *Country Life and Sportsman.*

The following letter affords some insight into the creative struggles of this twelve-year-old contributor:

Dear Major Kilburn:

Thanks for your letter. I am glad you liked my new story. There are some persons here on the post that think my mother writes my stories because my mother is a writer. I wish you would put it in that my mother would not do such a thing because that would be a very dishonest thing to do and my mother would not do it. The last story I did in this way: I woke up in the middle of one night and remembered I had not got my public speaking up. Well, I thought and thought and then I hit on the Fox Hunt because I knew that the teacher did not know much about Fox Hunts and if I made a mistake it would be O.K. Well, I told it in public speaking class and every one was interested and asked questions and I got a good grade. I wrote it down afterward and when you wrote and asked me for a story I fixed that up some and put the other things with it.

I hope you have a swell Christmas. I wish I could have some snow for Christmas for a change. I only had snow once in Nashville. Boy was it swell.

I am your friend,

TOMMY WADELTON, JR.

At Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, where I live there is a Fox Hunt. A Fox Hunt is a meeting of ladies and gentlemen and civilians who ride horses after hounds that are chasing a fox, only sometimes it is not a fox, but a bag some foxes having been living on to make it smell. This is called a Drag Hunt. It is fine to watch the hunt riding through the green pine trees and the trees that have dead brown leaves on. The officers of the hunt wear red coats that are called pink. I don't know why, and the red looks swell going through the green and brown colors of the trees. Only the hunt officers wear red coats. Some of the others wear black coats with yellow collars and hard crowns to their hat to keep their heads from getting hurt when they bunk into trees. These are called the formal huntsmen. The rest wear loud plaid coats and their old hats and are called rat catchers. I don't know why they are called rat catchers either. Once the drag hunt turned into a pig hunt by mistake. The pack was running the drag through Sergeant Akers farm and they found a pig and chased him and bit his ear. All the hounds piled on him and he squealed like the dickens. I guess he did not like being a fox.

When one of the officers who have the fox hunting jobs are ordered away my mother thinks my father should have the job because my mother thinks my father is lots smarter than the officers who have the jobs. My father never wants to do it because he says any one who goes around looking for extra work is crazy, so he don't care when they pick out some one else, but my mother gets mad any way and thinks my father ought to be master of hounds or whipper in or what ever job is vacant. One time I was with my father and some officers were talking about getting some hounds to fill in the pack and when we were riding home my father said, "Tommy maybe we better not tell mamma they have vacant places in the pack or she will think I ought to have the job." My father always makes funny jokes.

This year when the hunt opened four soldiers rode around the post playing on horns. They started at the stables and rode down to the flag pole and met the hunt there. The officers of the hunt are: master of fox hounds; three whippers-in; and a field-master. The whippers-in take care of the hounds and make them mind, and the field master takes care of the field, which is all the persons who ride in the hunt except officers, and makes them mind. The master is the big shot and bosses every body.

When every one is there the master says, "good morning gentlemen." He does not say any thing to the ladies. Every one says, "good morning master," and then the master yells, "gone away" and they go. This is a drag hunt so a soldier rides ahead dragging the bag and the pack take after it yelling like blazes. This is called giving tongue or giving cry. Mother says in Ireland they call it belling or singing. Any how you must not call it barking or forget and call the hounds dogs or it would not be official. You must call your horse a mount and remember what the crys mean like "ware ditch," "hold hard," "ware hounds," and I forget the rest. I got yelled "ware hounds" a lot because I am not a very good fox hunter yet and got too close. This is called cutting off their tails when you ride too close to them. Tom and Dick Hoffman are swell fox hunters and they are only eleven and thirteen. I have only been out twice—it frightens my mother when I go. She thinks it is enough to have to worry about my father.

The hunt lasts about two hours. There are four parts to it. When they stop it is called a check. The soldier takes the bag up, when the hounds can't smell it any more they stop. Then every one gets off their mount, walk around, visit, and get drinks from the persons who follow around

the roads in cars. Then they mount to go on to the next check and do the same thing all over again. When they come to the last check the master says, "good day gentlemen," and the hunt rides home and stop at each others houses for cocktail parties and after that they go to a hunt breakfast. Persons who go to the hunt breakfast have fun. I go if I get invited. Last time Mrs. Tice who was the hostess invited me specially and I wore my new brown civilian suit. Mostly I have to wear my uniform. The food at hunt breakfasts is always swell. I can eat any thing I like so I have the food my mother does not have at home, because it is not good for a growing boy, like pickles and ham and coffee and hot biscuits and mince pie. My mother has tea every afternoon and when I was little she used to give me cambric tea which was just hot water and a little tea and milk and sugar, and now I hate tea. So I only drink coffee when it is strong with cream and sugar in it. At the hunt breakfast they sing hunting songs like, "Do ye ken John Peel" and "Drink Puppy, Drink" and "A-Hunting we will go." My father sings too but mamma and I go home because we like music.

My mother used to hunt in Ireland and she says they don't think much of drag hunts there; they call them "skrim-shankers." But she does not like to see the pack kill either. They call it breaking up the fox. She said when she hunted she always praved like crazy the fox would get away, because it seemed like she was inside his skin and knew just how he felt. One time she went to a hunt with her husband, not my father but another husband she had once. He had a little niece with him and it was her first hunt and he had her blooded. That means they cut off the fox tail and call it a brush and rub it on the person who is at the kill for the first time. My mother felt awful to see the blood on the little girl's nice face and she did not care so much for her husband for a while and he was sorry because he was a good man and did not like to hurt person's feelings.

My mother says over there they only hunt once a week because it takes them the other six days to sober up.

My mother told me a story about one of her ancestors. It is about horses and I think it is a swell story.

Once there was a man named Owen. He was an awful proud man and thought he was pretty good because he had a lot of ancestors who did noble deeds and got their names in the history books. He bragged that his family always married persons who were as swell as they were and that he had the best blooded horse in all Ireland and they all had pedigrees as long as your arm. Well, he had a stallion whose name was *Shawn Dhue*, as black as night and all of Owen's horses were black too. If one of the mares had a colt that was another color he sold it away to England or France or some far place. One night *Shawn Dhue* got out of his stable and bred with a mare that was just plain horse and did not have any good blood that any one ever heard tell of. When Owen heard of it he made the farmer who owned the mare sell it to him and he was going to have it killed because he did not want any cross breed of *Shawn Dhue's* hanging around. Before the mare had her baby Owen had to go to France where his daughter was in school. She was very sick and Owen had to leave suddenly and forget to have the mare killed. Well he was gone a long time before his daughter got well and when he did come back the mare had her colt and every one was talking about it because it was the color of new butter all over and did not have a different colored hair on it any where. Owen's daughter was named Ann and he thought more of her than he did his own life and did everything she told him to. So she told him not to have the colt killed because she liked it very much. He said if that was what she wanted it was O.K. with him but she could not keep it with his swell horses so he bought her a farm to keep her colt on. He was a very rich man and did not care what he did with his money.

The colt grew up to be a stallion and was he good! Ann loved her horse and trained it herself and when he grew up she put him in all kinds of races and steeplechases and won them and her father did not like it much because it did not have good blood and it made a sucker out of his horses who had lots of good blood. After a while it got to be a well known horse and lots of persons wanted to buy it but Ann would not sell it for love or money. One day a young man came to see if Ann would sell the horse to his boss and right away he fell in love with Ann but he did not think it would do him much good because Ann had such proud blood in her arteries. Well, he came back a couple of times and hung around until Ann got in love with him too, but they were scared of her father so they eloped away one night and it made Ann's father as mad as hops. He packed all her gold and jewels and dresses and sent them to her, but Ann sent them back because she was going to be poor and did not need such fine things, but she asked her father if she could have her horse and he sent it to her with an insult about cross breeds and Ann knew he meant her husband too. She loved her father, but enough was enough, so she got mad and to spite him sent her horse every place her father had horses running and jumping and she beat him every time. She went fox hunting the same time he did and she always got ahead of him there and when she took the stiff jumps her father refused she grinned. After a while her horse won so much money her husband was able to go in the horse breeding business and they stopped being so poor and got quite a little money. Her father kept on trying to beat her and sent to foreign lands for horses to improve those he had but Ann kept right on beating him. The horse's name was *Garth* and when Ann had a baby she named him Garth, too. In Ireland every one believes in fairies and a Garth is a place the fairies come out and dance on at night. All the persons who saw the stallion and knew how he was come by said the fairies had sent him, so that was the reason Ann named him *Garth*.

When the boy Garth was seven he was a pretty good rider and one day he was riding through a lane and he met his grandfather. He did not think so much of his grandfather because he was still mad at Garth's mother and Garth thought his mother was pretty swell. His grand-

father stopped him this time and said, "Do you know who I am?" and Garth said "I do so, you're me grand sire and a contrary old lad if ever there was one." Well his grandfather thought it was a good joke and that Garth was a good spunky kid and maybe cross breeds were not so bad after all, so he went to see Garth's mother and made up with his father and after that they were all good friends and Garth and his grandfather got to be pals.

My father and I take care of my mother most of the time and when she has to take care of herself it is not so good. Last year we drove to New York and my father could not go with us. When we came out of the Holland Tube mamma was kind of dumb about getting the right turn. I had not been there before and I was not so good either. A tough policeman blew his whistle at us and told us to pull over. He talked kind of tough out of the side of his mouth and said he was going to give us a ticket. My mother smiled and shook her head and said, "Svenska me Svenska," and the policeman said what was she saying, and my mother said, "no Eengleech," and the policeman started yelling like if he could make her know English if he yelled loud enough but my mother kept on smiling and saying, "no Eengleech" and "Svenska" and then the policeman looked at me and yelled, "Do you speak English?" I looked as dumb as I could and did not say anything. After a while the policeman rubbed his sweat off and said, "get the hell out of here you damn square heads," and we drove off and went down a side street and stopped the car so we could laugh and the persons on the sidewalk looked at us like they thought we were crazy. My father said he did not know how we got away with it because we have the wrong kind of faces to be "Svenskas," which means Swedish persons.

Once we were going to Nashville, Tennessee, and my mother was driving the car. We saw some wire across the road and a shoe right in the middle of it and my mother said, "that's funny, what is it?" It was a wreck. There was a truck at the side of the road and a car with the side all out of it and two smashed persons were hanging out of the car and there was human blood all over the road. Well, my mother started crying but my father got out and went to help the hurt persons. There wasn't any one around but us. My father came back and said to go to Murphysburg and get some help. My mother did not say anything but kept her face hid. He told her again and my mother said, "Oh I can't drive right through that blood" and my father said, "it's tough but you have to do it." My mother kept on hiding her face and did not go, so my father reached in and gave her a hard slap and said, "get going." My mother was so surprised she started driving and we went to Murphysburg and brought back a doctor and an ambulance. After things were fixed up and we were going on my father said, "I'm sorry but I was afraid you would quit driving forever if I did not make you do it," and my mother said, "all right but just don't make a habit of it." I think my father was pretty brave to slap my mother.

When I was a little boy I used to wonder how persons got together and were a family. I asked my father and he said one day he was walking along minding his own business and smoking a cigarette when my mother tapped him on the shoulder and said, "young man what is your name?" My father gapped his mouth open; he was so surprised because he was not used to having strange women speak to him so he did not say any thing at all and my mother said, "don't gap your mouth open like that you look silly; tell me your name." My father said, "my name is Thomas, mam" and my mother said, "well, Thomas, I am going to marry you." My father gapped his mouth wider than ever and my mother said "come, come now, no nonsense, come along and be married or I will give you a hard slap," so he went along and they were married and lived happily ever after. I used to believe it but I know now he was fooling—that gentlemen have to get down on their knees and propose honorable marriage to the lady and will I feel silly when I have to do it. You have to buy a license and have it sanctified by the church or a justice of the peace or you cannot have legal children.

My father said how I got to be his son: he came home one day and my mother had her hands behind her back and she yelled, "surprise, surprise," and told him to choose a hand. He pcked the right one and when my mother brought it around it had me in it and he said if he had chosen the left one he certainly would have been embarassed because when mother brought that around it had a black baby in it. My mother said how she got me to hold in her hand for my father, to choose was this way. When she was a little girl she read Mr. Barries' book about Peter Pan and she read it so often she got to know Peter pretty well. Whenever she went to London, England, she went to call on him, even when she got to be a big lady. In a place called Kensington Gardens the English people have built a statue of him and my mother used to go and talk to him about the island where babies live before they are born and Peter is the boss of. One day she went to say good-bye to him because she was going back to the United States. It was raining pretty hard but she did not mind because it rains so much over there you get used to it. She said good bye to Peter and went home and when she got there she was going to close her umbrella when some one yelled, "look out or you will drop me"; so my mother put down her umbrella without closing it and there I was sitting on top holding on to the ferule. I was all wet and my hair was slicked down with the rain and my mother knew right away I was a going away present from Peter Pan so she gave me a good hot bath and an aspirin tablet so I would not take a bad cold; and she combed my hair and brought me back to the United States. I think it is swell to tell kids stories like that because after a while they grow up and have to study biology and it is kind of messy. This year we had a fish to cut up and we had the same fish for a couple of days, and boy! did it smell before we got through.

This summer I was in New York with my mother and she said I was to pay bills and do the tipping so I could get some *savoir faire* which is French for not falling over persons feet or upsetting water at the table and getting the

right change. She told me ten per cent of the check was the right money for a tip, but when we left the hotel I had to tip the boy who brought down our bags a quarter and he gave them to the man at the door and I had to give him a quarter to put them in the car. I asked my mother why I had to give them each a quarter and she said it was an old Spanish custom but I guess she was joking. I think it is a pretty easy way to get money. My father says it is a racket.

We went to see the place where they are going to have the World's Fair next year but we could not get in and the buildings were not finished any way, so we went to Long Beach to stay with my cousins. When we came back to New York we had dinner at a sidewalk cafe. It felt kind of funny eating right out on the sidewalk with persons passing but the food did not taste any different. We went to the Heyden Planetorium and R. H. Macy and up in the Statue of Liberty. Then my mother had to write a story about the Youths Congress that had a meeting at Vassar College Po'keepsie, N. Y. We drove up Riverside Drive to the Hendrick Hudson Parkway to the toll bridge where we paid ten cents but it was something for the money because it had swell scenery and there was not so much traffic. We ran into a storm and it was so bad my mother thought we had better lay up for a while. We found a filling station that has a rest room. My mother was just going in the rest room when lightning struck the telephone and cut the wire and the telephone flew across the room so my mother said we were between the devil and the deep blue sea and we got back in the car. When we had gone only a little way the car skidded and we went up a bank and right along it sidewise for a good ways. I thought sure we were going to turn over but my mother got the car headed back toward the road and stepped on the gas. We made it all right, but boy! were we scared. Persons in cars stopped and said they never saw anything like it and admired my mother because she did not lose her head. My mother said she was practically unconscious all of the time. She said "Saint Christopher was looking after us." We have a Saint Christopher medal on the side of the car. He is the saint who was a ferry man and carried Jesus on his back across a river when he thought he was just a poor old beggar man who could not pay him for the ride. After that God made him the official saint of travelers.

My mother looked pretty shaky and a man got a bottle out of his car and gave her a drink of whiskey. I wanted to laugh because my mother is a prohibitionist and does not like to have persons drink whiskey, but she said the man was kind and meant well and she would have drank his whiskey if it choked her. When I told my father about the skid he said my mother has more guts than any one he ever knew because she is scared to death most of the time but she never lets that stop her when there is something she thinks she must do.

In September when I came home I started being a dormitory boy at school because it is twelve miles to go to school every morning and twenty-four by the time I get home at night. I start at seven-thirty and get home at seven. My mother thought maybe I had better stay there week days and come home over the week-ends. Well, I was in a room with two other boys and when my mother saw them she said, "Good Heavens," but I thought they were all right at first. We were all the same age. One was a scrappy kid that was always taking punches at boys for nothing. Me too. He was a skinny little shrimp and I did not want to hit him because you have to get mad and you get all hot and sweaty and then you fight and afterward some one always comes along and makes you shake hands and it is a good deal of trouble. My mother said to ignore him but it is pretty hard to ignore somebody who is kicking you in the shins on the sly when no one is looking. I am a big boy and when I do have to fight with boys my age someone always says, "look at the big bully," even if they are a good deal older. I look older than I am. I look as old as Bob Dillman and he is sixteen. My mother says only unintelligent nations and persons resort to force, but my father believes in a good sock in the nose when needed. The other roommate used to rush up to my mother when she came out and tell her how much money his father had and about his mother's jewelry and his aunt's house. My mother has not got much patience with persons who talk about money because she thinks manners and who your grandfather was and things like that are more important than money, but she kept on being polite anyhow. Well, the boy kept hinting to come home with me over the week-end and gave my mother his mother's address to write for permission to leave the school, but my mother said life was too short to have a face like that around more than you could help and kept putting him off with fair words. My mother picked up some of the day boys on the way to town and she asked them what they thought of my roommates because I was having trouble with them. One boy told my mother he did not think the boy she disliked most had very good manners because he spit on the floor all the time. My mother asked me did I ever see the boy spit on the floor in our room and I thought she was feeling bad enough, so I said no I never did see him spit on the floor, but I did not tell her about the spit places on the rug every morning. I guess he spit in his sleep.

I got disorder campus three weeks, one after another and did not get home for the week-ends. Once I got it for forgetting my tie and once for not sweeping under my bed. The last time I guess they just got used to putting my name down because I never did find out why. When I did get home I had a disease, and boy, oh boy, was my mother mad! She went out and took the school apart. I had to come home and be treated at the hospital here. Every time she took me there she got mad all over again. My mother is not very healthy and throws up easily so my father said, "Jeanne, try and be reasonable about this," and my mother said, "reasonable, reasonable, I've been reasonable so much I've broken out in a rash with it." She took me out for a week so I could get treated and the head master and coach came to see me. My mother thinks the coach

is a very intelligent man and has good ways with boys, I guess he has because all the boys are nuts about him. When they don't do right he bats them around and the boys don't mind a bit. I think he is swell. Well they talked and talked. My mother talked the most. She said what was there in the private school that costs a good deal of money that was not in a public school that was free and the head master said there was things in a private school that could not be put into words, and my mother said they certainly did not put the athletic foot they had out there into words. Any how I got an extra week's vacation and now I am a day boy again, and am I glad! Home, when it is time to get up my father comes in rubbing lather on his face and singing, "Get up you bums and whiches, put on your government breeches; I can't get 'em up, I can't get 'em up, I can't get 'em up in the morning." Instead of bums and whiches the song has two swear words but my father does not say them. I never get up and then he yells, "Mamma this fella won't get up," and mamma comes tearing in with my dog and sics him on me and the dog barks and tries to nip me. The cat comes running too and gets under every one's feet and we all have fun. At school they blow a bugle and you get up—or else.

The cat we have now is a kitten. It is new. My mother found a boy dragging it around by the neck and she talked him out of it and gave him a dime. She had to feed it warm milk with a medicine dropper and sleep it on a hot water bag. It was so weak it could only stagger and when it tried to meow nothing happened. Nancy, the girl next door, asked my mother if she invented a meowless cat. It got all right and now is a pretty good cat. My mother says she thinks its ancestors are questionable but it is doubtless by garbage out of ash can. She says most of her cats have been by garbage out of ash can because that is the only kind of cat she likes. Once she had a blue Persian that was very expensive and it was an awful stylish cat and would only eat certain things. She said it would sit and stare at her with a haughty look and make her remember one of her ancestors was hung in a Fenian Uprising.

One night my father was fixing cocktails and the kitten kept following him around meowing and my father said it was saying, "Whiss-keee, Whiss-Keee," and my father said, "no you can't have any whiskey, it is not good for cats," and my mother said, "no and it is not so hot for humans either." My mother is a prohibitionist.

Mr. Kipling wrote a swell story about a cat. It is in the *Just So* stories. My father gave it to me. In the book it says, "Tommy from Daddy 1930." That is a long time ago. I learned to read from that and the *Posterior of the Horse*. I used to sit on my father's lap when he was reading and he would show me the letters and what the words meant. So I learned to read. In Mr. Kipling's story a wild lady and gentleman hunt a cave to keep house in, when they find it they build a nice fire and have a baby. All the wild animals come and watch the fire because they never saw a fire before. The wild lady was smart and got the dog to be a friend and help the man to hunt, but the cat said, "no, I want to be wild and walk by myself." Then she got the horse to be tame and carry the wild gentleman when he went hunting with the wild dog, and she got the wild cow to give milk, I guess the milk was wild too. But she could not get the cat to be tame and he went around waving his wild tail and walking in the wild woods. He was a smart cat and after a while he wanted to go in and live by the fire and get some of the wild cow's milk, so he tricked the wild lady into letting him do it, but when the wild gentleman and the wild dog came home they said the agreement was only with the wild lady and had nothing to do with them so they said as long as cats lived all proper men would throw boots at them and all proper dogs would chase them up trees and so it has been from that day to this. There is a lot of "wilds" in that but that is how Mr. Kipling wrote it. That is what makes it funny.

It is an ill wind that blows no good and if I did not get Athletes Foot I would not have time to write this story.

One military aspect of the need for preparing against future disturbed conditions along the frontier is the need thereby imposed upon us for maintaining considerable forces of horse-mounted cavalry; since, on both sides of the border there is a dearth of communications and of local sources of gasoline supply which would gravely impede the operations of troops wholly dependent on motor transportation. In such a terrain, horsed cavalry alone is adequate to the more extended duties of the service of security and information, insofar as these cannot be performed by the Air Corps or by armored cars operating directly on the roads.

—Page 67, *The Ramparts We Watch*,
by GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT.

Special Activities

This Shooting Business

By CAPTAIN P. M. MARTIN, Captain, Cavalry Team

Can marksmanship training methods be improved from the viewpoint of interest?

How can more good shots and cavalry team material be developed?

Here's the answer: The .22!

Having learned to shoot with a .22 I feel certain that much more could be accomplished with it than is now being done. As a troop commander my first experiments with the .22 were to supplement the service calibers. By returning young shooters that were having trouble with their service weapons to the .22 caliber, I found that what appeared to be hopeless cases of flinching were cured readily.

This success prompted me to go a bit farther with the use of the .22 the next season. By scheduling regular preliminary marksmanship instruction in the afternoon it was possible to take all young soldiers turned to duty through an additional course with the .22 during the winter months. There were several top notch shooters in the troop that were used as instructors. This afforded them an opportunity for extra shooting while teaching others.

Some skeptics will doubt the value of the .22 caliber training. The strongest argument against it is paradoxically its greatest advantage, that is, lack of recoil. It affords the young shooter a great opportunity to be grounded in fundamentals before he is subjected to the punishing effect of heavy recoil. Of course the economy of this type of training is obvious, and it can be carried on with rifle, pistol, and machine gun.

It is interesting that the best results in training shooters is obtained by bringing them up to their peak and then resting them for a long enough period to permit their complete regeneration of the energy expended. Repeating this process several times during the season is the basis of the cavalry team training. Using this knowledge in training an organization will produce astonishing results. Take the recruits just turned to duty, they have had one short course of marksmanship instruction. Now give them a bit longer and more thorough course. When these young soldiers arrive at the third course in the spring just prior to going on the range they will be able to assimilate more instruction and will be better shots their first year than many older soldiers were in three years.

Young soldiers are keen about shooting. As they gain in proficiency they desire to demonstrate it in competition. Noncommissioned officers enjoy match shooting, musketry problems, and take pride in training men for this work. Young officers enjoy this instruction and should be encouraged to participate in it as well as supervise it. Organization commanders should stimulate and encourage this desire to shoot. It is a challenge to their leadership.

I have mentioned musketry training with the .22, this can be carried on in conjunction with the marksmanship training. Moving target firing can be carried on as well. Small airplanes and mechanized targets can be used. One troop I commanded had an electric toy train for carrying a moving target.

The question may arise as to why the Cavalry Team is interested in organization training in marksmanship. Better shooting in the organizations will bring better shots to the team. The team officials feel that if the team members are used properly while with their organizations that they will be invaluable to the commanders. If a plan to use these highly trained instructors during the winter months is worked out, two very desirable results are obtained. As the saying goes "to learn something well teach it." Team men learn more by instructing than by continuous shooting. Organization commanders will see the advantages in this and be desirous of sending their best material to Perry.

Training in marksmanship is similar to golf. The latest systems of golf instruction tend to keep the novice off the course until he has been well grounded in fundamentals. The shooter may be handled in the same manner to best advantage. One of the best prospects for the 1939 Cavalry Rifle Team is a young soldier who was discovered on the gallery, shooting .22, in 1938. He reported as a member of the squad having never fired a shot with the service rifle up to that time. As stated, he is now an outstanding candidate for the 1939 Team.

The .22 is the solution to many of our problems.

Revised Tables of Organization Cavalry Regiment, Horse

(EDITOR'S NOTE: It should be realized that charts and comments contained herein apply only to revision of present tables of organization; the reorganization of Cavalry units is not involved.)

Tables of Organization for the cavalry regiment, horse, were revised, effective December 1, 1938.

The accompanying manning charts are published in explanation of the revised Tables. It is much easier to see the ideas back of the organization from the charts than from the Tables of Organization.

The War Department directed the revision of the 1928 Tables in order to include the new weapons and matériel which have been issued to regiments since 1928. The revision does not constitute a reorganization.

The 1928 regiment consisted of a headquarters troop, a machine gun troop and three rifle squadrons of two troops each. The revised regiment consists in peace of a headquarters troop, a machine gun troop and two squadrons of two rifle troops each; in war, it consists of a headquarters troop, a machine gun troop, a special weapons troop and three squadrons of three troops each.

The 1928 rifle troop, having 166 men which it was contemplated to use in war as two half-troops, has been reduced to a rifle troop of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon.

The revised machine gun troop in peace consists of two caliber .30 machine gun platoons and one special weapons platoon, which include eight caliber .30 machine guns, four caliber .50 machien guns and two 60 millimeter mortars (37 millimeter guns to be used until mortars are issued). In war, this troop splits into two troops, a machine gun troop of twelve caliber .30 machine guns and a special weapons troop of eight caliber .50 machine guns and four 60 millimeter mortars.

The headquarters and service troop has been revised to include modern equipment, consisting of a scout car platoon, each section of which has a motorcycle scout, a scout car as a command car for the regimental commander, a station wagon for a command post car, a maintenance truck and the usual allotment of kitchen and combat trucks. In addition to the motorcycles in the scout car platoon, there are four motorcycle sidecars in peace and seven in war. The adjutant and supply sections ride in station wagons. As shown in the chart, which is divided into echelons and groups, every man has a horse, or a seat in a motor vehicle, with no men left over to thumb a ride. In revising this troop, the underlying principle was to provide it with enough horses so that, should the regiment be separated from its motors, it can continue to function efficiently, provided other means of supply are attached.

The squadron headquarters have been separated from the headquarters and service troop and set up as separate units.

Throughout the Tables, men to perform necessary functions have been included and a modest increase in grades and ratings are shown.

All regimental commanders should organize and train their units as near as possible in conformity with the Tables, insofar as the men allotted to them will permit. This is the only way that defects in the Tables can be determined.

The tables do not constitute authority for promotion or reduction of enlisted men. These will be governed as heretofore by the yearly allotment of grades and ratings.

RIFLE SQUADRON

SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS

RIFLE TROOP

RIFLE PLATOON



TWO ADDITIONAL RIFLE PLATOONS IN PEACE AND WAR

LIGHT MACHINE GUN PLATOON



TWO RIFLE TROOPS IN SQUADRON IN PEACE, THREE IN WAR

TROOP HEADQUARTERS



(RIDE IN TRUCKS)

- Mess Sergeant
- Supply Sergeant
- Cook

LEGEND

Sq = Squadron	Bug = Bugler	Sad = Saddler
CO = Commanding Officer	Mes = Messenger	Plat = Platoon
Op = Operations	Tr = Troop	Sup = Supply
Off = Officer	Cl = Clerk	Fc = File Closer
Int = Intelligence	Sta = Stable	D = Driver
Sgt = Sergeant	Ck = Cook or Cooking	G = Gun or Gunner
Maj = Major	Ra = Rations	AG = Assistant Gunner
Cpl = Corporal	Hr = Horseshoer	Am = Ammunition

= Mounted Man = Led or Pack Horse = Dismounted Man

= Peace and War = War Only

MACHINE GUN TROOP



SPECIAL WEAPONS TROOP

CALIBER .50 MACHINE GUN PLATOON



TWO CALIBER .50 MACHINE GUN SECTIONS



TWO CALIBER .50 MACHINE GUN PLATOONS

60-MM MORTAR PLATOON



TWO 60-MM MORTAR SECTIONS



TROOP HEADQUARTERS



(RIDE IN TRUCKS)

- Mess Sergeant
- Supply Sergeant
- Armorer
- Cook

LEGEND

Same as for Rifle Squadron and Machine Gun Troop

CAVALRY REGIMENT, HORSE

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE TROOP, MACHINE GUN TROOP, SPECIAL WEAPONS TROOP AND THREE RIFLE SQUADRONS OF THREE RIFLE TROOPS EACH IN WAR

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE TROOP

FORWARD ECHELON

COMMAND POST GROUP



COMMANDER'S GROUP



SCOUT CAR PLATOON



LEGEND - IN ADDITION TO THOSE OF RIFLE SQUADRON AND MACHINE GUN TROOP

Mot = Motor
Mn = Mechanic
Adjt = Adjutant
SM = Sergeant Major
Ad = Administrative
SO = Supply Officer
MS = Mess Sergeant
SS = Supply Sergeant
Arm = Armored
Tm = Truckmaster
(—) = Man from another troop

= Motorcycle with sidecar = Peace and War = War Only

CAVALRY REGIMENT, HORSE

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE TROOP, MACHINE GUN TROOP AND TWO RIFLE SQUADRONS OF TWO RIFLE TROOPS EACH IN PEACE

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE TROOP

REAR ECHELON



Each truck is armed with a caliber .50 machine gun; a caliber .30 machine gun; or a semi-automatic rifle.

LEGEND - IN ADDITION TO THOSE OF RIFLE SQUADRON AND MACHINE GUN TROOP

Mos	= Motorcycle Scout	MM	= Motorcycle Messenger	Ch	= Chauffeur
CC	= Car Commander	Col	= Color	Pan	= Panel
Regt	= Regimental	MC	= Message Center	St	= Stenographer
Com	= Communications	R	= Radio	Chap	= Chaplain

= Scout Car, Station Wagon or Truck

= Solo Motorcycle

The Value of Cavalry on the Border

By SERGEANT KENNETH F. KELLER, 5th Cavalry

"Why do we have Cavalry on the Border?" This question has invariably been uttered many times in conversation among the military personnel of the various groups of the service and will in all probability be asked many times in the future.

To begin with, one must first know what Cavalry is. Briefly defined, it is that branch of the service composed largely of mounted troops trained to fight mounted or dismounted. The superior mobility which distinguishes it from any other combat unit, the mobility of its weapons and flexibility of fire make it particularly valuable for the rapid changes in situations and sudden engagements that must be met in time of combat.

The primary mission of Cavalry is to provide a highly mobile combat element for the army. This mission alone will clearly illustrate the necessity of maintaining cavalry on the border. However, its characteristics are determining factors in assignment of missions other than primary. Other missions assigned to the cavalry are: reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, security on the march, at halts and in battle, offensive and defensive combat, delaying action, liaison, pursuit, raids, covering withdrawals and providing a mobile reserve.

In placing the cavalry on the border, it has definitely been given a defensive rôle. If attacked, it could delay hostile forces or hold terrain of tactical importance until friendly forces arrive.

Calculating the value of cavalry in regard to the border, it must be borne in mind that the border on the south is 1,993 miles in length from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean if the sinuosities of the Rio Grande River are considered. In active campaign, the sinuosities would have to be considered, and the most logical means of covering this distance would be by the employment of cavalry from strategic points along the border.

During the process of evaluation, there are numerous natural and physical obstacles which would confront troops. These obstacles would be practically impassable to infantry but to cavalry are in reality almost insignificant. Incident thereto, let us take a few of these obstacles and discuss them from a military viewpoint.

First, Road Conditions. Approximately the entire area known as the "Border" has but one road which is passable in all kinds of weather except during heavy rainfalls. At this time, hundreds of miles of this road are impassable for days and in many instances impassable for weeks to motor driven conveyances. This road in some places practically contacts the river but in other places it is more than 100 miles from the international boundary. Side roads connecting the main highway are such that in many cases only mounted troops could travel with speed. History shows that main highways are the very places that are avoided, and combat activities are never confined to the roads. During the months when rain is plentiful dismounted troops would find it difficult to move; this also applies to motor vehicles. In the months of dry weather the roads become so dusty that dismounted troops would be able to move only a short distance, and then with great discomfort to themselves. These conditions, however, do not materially affect cavalry.

Second, Terrain. The geographical structure of terrain bordering the area in question is of such nature that only mounted troops could maneuver readily. Maneuvers conducted in these areas have proved that the horse is a sure means of transportation which will meet the requirements of the situation and respond to the demands of the rider. Miles of this area, away from the roads, consist of steep hills covered with rocks of such nature that marching of troops other than by horse is practically impossible. Again, the reader is asked to remember that it is in places like this that combat occurs.

Third, Water. Water being one of the main factors to be considered with respect to troop movements, one could hardly consider any combat units other than cavalry operating in this area. Certain periods of the year, water is plentiful but this condition does not exist during the entire year. Watering places are in most cases miles apart. Dismounted troops could not reconnoiter for water after marching or participating in an engagement, but cavalry can do this even though it has marched 50 miles in that day, or participated in combat.

Fourth, Climatic Conditions. Very little need be said about the climatic conditions. Anyone who ever served along the border can state to what extent the sun casts its rays of heat on this part of the country and its affect on humanity. The point to remember is that regardless of how high the temperature, there is one thing of which we are positive, and that is, the cavalry will reach its destination. Recently on maneuvers, the temperature reached 110 degrees. At the end of the day the cavalry had marched 42 miles, established a main line of defense and held that position till relieved the following day by friendly forces.

The value of cavalry on the border can not be judged in dollars and cents nor figured by percentage. Facts and figures are evidence of its value. It should not be misconstrued. Cavalry activities fill the pages of our history and will continue to do so till the end of time.

Marching on Borium

By LIEUTENANT ELWIN T. KNIGHT, 6th Cavalry

"Could you, under modern conditions of hard roads, cover 500 miles in three to five weeks?" This question, quoted from the March-April issue of The CAVALRY JOURNAL, and referring to the feet of the horses, is of vital importance to every cavalryman. Quoting further from the JOURNAL: "Tests show the present model shoe is worn out after 100 miles on paved roads! . . . If we knew that the new field shoe would last, say 15 days, on pavement, what more could be desired?"

The questions outlined above have been answered! It *is* possible under modern conditions of hard roads, to cover 500 miles in three to five weeks! It *is* possible, with borium, to make our shoes last 15 days, or more, on pavement!

On a recent march, conducted partly in the interest of experimentation, the solution offered in the same issue of The CAVALRY JOURNAL to the questions quoted above was tested under campaign conditions. During the test, a reinforced platoon marched 371 miles in 15 days, including one day of rest. Of that distance, 118 miles was on pavement, 161 miles on graveled shoulders and graveled roads, and only 92 miles on dirt. Of the 36 horses that made the march, 5 were shod with borium, 23 with manganese, and 8 with regular shoes. At the end of the march, all 5 borium shod horses, 22 of the manganese shod horses, and none of the regular shod horses were still wearing the same shoes with which they started. The wear on the borium was negligible, and the only noticeable wear of the shoe was caused by improper spacing of the borium deposits near the toes, but even this left the shoe serviceable for many more miles. The manganese had worn smooth in most cases, and many shoes showed a great deal of wear. Incidentally, not one of the borium treated shoes had to be pulled before it had rendered a full month of service. *It is believed that under normal campaign conditions shoes properly treated with borium would wear until the natural growth of the hoof made reshoeing necessary!*

In addition to the wearing qualities of borium, it was noted that for the marching gaits, there was much less tendency to slip on pavement. Often a distinct pattern from borium digging into hard pavement was observed.

As has been mentioned, two types of metal were used, borium and manganese. The manganese was of the type made marked "Fuzon Type T," and retails at $2.05 per pound. It is the hardest manganese made and was developed to compete with borium. The test showed, however, that its wearing qualities do not compare with borium and for that reason it will not be further considered.

The borium was secured in tube form at a retail cost of $5.00 per pound. One pound treated approximately 48 shoes, thus the cost of borium per shoe was about eleven cents. Since the cost of the normal garrison shoe is approximately eight cents, borium shoes seem rather costly in comparison until consideration is given not only to factory production methods lowering costs, but also to the fact that borium treated shoes will wear at least twice as long as garrison shoes. Of even greater importance is the fact that pulling the shoes too often will ruin the horse's hoof. Thus, in the event of emergency, the small difference between the cost of garrison shoes and borium treated shoes might easily be the difference between cavalry with horses and without.

The borium is easily placed on the shoe with an electric welding machine in about half the time required with the acetylene torch. The direct current machine with borium in tubes to conduct this type current is probably the best method of application. The tube is merely touched to the shoe at the points where borium is desired and the borium is fused as a deposit into the shoe easily and quickly. The size of the borium deposit may thus be regulated, insuring a uniform thickness and proper spacing.

The method of application described above, easy as it may seem, is not considered feasible within the regiment. Few regiments, if any, would have electric welding machines available, or the men trained to use them. Since the shoe may be fitted to the hoof after the borium has been applied, with no damage to the borium, it would seem that factory application is the answer. In addition, factory application would lessen cost, and insure a more uniform product.

The spacing of the deposits is the one phase of the borium treatment which must be handled with care. If the deposits are not at the proper place, so the shoe is out of balance, the shoe will be worn badly at the unbalanced points. The deposits must be on the outer edge of the shoe, particularly on the toe. While this is not of such great importance on the hind shoe, the much greater "roll" of the front shoes makes it imperative, otherwise



the toe of the shoe will be worn down as far back as the borium, and may necessitate reshoeing before the borium has even begun to show wear. This is best illustrated in *Figure 1*, a front shoe on which the borium deposits were neither balanced nor far enough forward on the toe. The shoe is badly worn back to the borium and especially on the unbalanced side. In *Figure 2* the borium deposits are balanced but are not far enough forward on the toe, thus the wear on the toe is noticeable but even. *Figure 3* indicates the borium deposits in better balance and farther forward. There is no appreciable wear on the shoe or the borium. In *Figure 4*, a hind shoe, the toe deposit on the right side is too far back, allowing some wear on the shoe on that side. *Figure 5*, a hind shoe, shows the borium spaced and balanced but not quite near enough to the outside of the shoe at the toe. However, there is no appreciable wear on the shoe or the borium. The shoes shown in *Figures 3* and *5* may be taken as most nearly correct in borium spacing and balancing.

It will be noted that on the toe of the front shoe there are three deposits of borium. Better results would probably have obtained had a solid half moon of borium been placed on the outer edge of the toe. On the hind shoe only two deposits were used. While this gave very satisfactory results, better results would probably have been effected had there been three deposits.

From the above it will be seen that there are two general rules to be followed in treating the shoes if the desired results are to be secured namely:

(a) Space the borium deposits so the shoe will be balanced.

(b) Place the deposits on the outer edge of the toe of the shoe.

Just as the feet of infantry must be properly shod, so must the "feet" of cavalry. Borium is the answer!

The New Antitank Gun

The 37-mm. gun, M-3, on the 37-mm.-gun carriage, M-4, has been adopted as the standard antitank gun for infantry. This weapon gives the infantry regiment an antitank weapon that can cope with any foreign light or medium tank known to date. Its great accuracy, simplicity of fire control, and superior penetration, and its splendid mobility with its prime mover, make this one of the finest weapons of its type ever developed.

The gun and carriage complete weigh about 850 pounds. It is trailed behind a 4x4, half-ton truck. On roads the gun will trail at speeds of forty to fifty miles an hour without any side-sway or skidding. Across country the performance of the prime mover and the trailed gun is unequalled by any similar type of weapon. Gullies, shell holes, mud holes and slopes of twenty-six degrees are negotiated with ease.

When shell fire or the near presence of the enemy necessitates movement by hand, the crew can readily move the gun forward into position over varied and difficult terrain. The gun can be manhandled through woods, across deep ditches and shell holes, and across any stream whose bottom affords footing for the members of the crew. Streams as deep as fifty inches with sand or other hard bottoms are not obstacles to forward movement by hand.

The gun commander is responsible for movement of the gun into firing position, selection of targets, and control of fire. The gunner, or No. 1 of the squad, tracks the target, and fires the piece. He is assisted in maintaining a high rate of fire by No. 2, who loads the piece. No. 3 maintains an adequate supply of ammunition within reach of the loader. Other members of the squad bring up ammunition from the truck or local dump.

The elevating and traversing controls and the trigger and sight are so arranged that the gunner can sight, track, and fire his piece simultaneously without ceasing any of these necessary operations. These operations and the operation of loading are so simple that a crew with limited training can fire twenty-five rounds per minute. Well-trained crews should easily reach thirty to thirty-five rounds per minute.

The gun will have two kinds of ammunition. The solid-shot, armor-piercing projectile will penetrate the armor of any known light or medium tank at a range of a thousand yards, even though the projectile strikes as much as twenty degrees from normal impact. A powerful high-explosive type of shell is being developed for use against personnel and enemy machine-gun nests.

The gun crew is protected from long-range small-arms fire and shell fragments by a shield of armor plate which extends clear across the space occupied by the operating members of the crew. This shield has brackets for attaching camouflage material. Camouflaged with materials that blend with the gun position, the weapon is difficult to detect until it actually fires. Concealment from air observation can be obtained by using a suitable camouflage net.

The tactical uses of this splendid weapon are to be developed by extended service tests.

Top -Coupled to truck. Center -Traveling position. Bottom- Firing position

Porte Cavalry

LIEUTENANT WILLIAM E. CHANDLER
14th Cavalry

Although great progress has been made in the motorization and mechanization of our army in recent years, most of the effort has been devoted to increasing the mobility of the Infantry Division and the organization of the 7th Cavalry Brigade at Fort Knox.

While it is true that some units of the 1st Cavalry Division were moved by motor transportation a few years ago, these movements were made with obsolete or improvised vehicles rather than with those now adopted as standard. With the exception of the transportation of small groups of animals no movement of cavalry units had been attempted with the present motor transportation until this summer.

Realizing the strategic possibilities of transporting cavalry by motor in the theater of operations, the Corps Area Commander, Major General Hugh A. Drum and Brigadier General Karl Truesdell, commanding Fort Sheridan, agreed that the return of the 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry from Camp Custer, Michigan to Fort Sheridan, Illinois, in August provided an excellent opportunity for training in such a movement. It was therefore decided to return the Squadron to its home station by motor under an assumed tactical situation with a view to:

a. Providing training in strategic movements.
b. Providing training in the tactics and technique of motor movements.
c. Determining the practicability of moving mounted units with present authorized transportation.

Since C.C.C. transportation could not be used for this purpose it was necessary to use the tactical transportation of units stationed at Fort Sheridan. As a preliminary survey indicated that the transportation available would only permit the movement of about one troop at a time, a problem was written requiring the rapid concentration of the squadron by motor in the area southwest of Fort Sheridan, wherein the first troop to be moved covered the movement and unloading of the second troop.

Preparations for this movement included the equipping of available cargo trucks with frames suitable for carrying animals, organization of a motor convoy, training of personnel in loading and unloading, and the preparation of loading tables consistent with the tactical situation.

The Squadron is equipped with one Type 4 semi-trailer, a homemade two-horse trailer developed experimentally

Top: 1½-ton truck with frame. Center: 1½-ton truck and frame, showing separator bar and ramp in place. Bottom: Rear view of 2½-ton frame, showing tail board in place.



by the squadron for use as a horse ambulance, and one 1½-ton truck equipped with a two-horse frame. Obviously other available transportation must be modified to carry animals, but as there were no funds available for adapting cargo trucks for the purpose it was necessary to use enlisted labor and salvaged lumber.

Two types of trucks were available, the 1½-ton cargo model for which thirteen satisfactorily designed frames were available on the post, and the 2½-ton Dodges and Federals of the 61st C.A.C. (AA) for which a frame had to be designed. The frame for 1½-ton trucks, which has proved its usefulness at this station is constructed of 2 x 4's bolted together forming a wooden cage which fits snugly in the truck bed. The breast and tail boards are so placed that the horses' feet come just behind and in front of the wheel well on the truck floor. The breast bar is fixed whereas the tail bar fits in heavy wooden slots on each side of the frame. A separator bar runs from the center of the tail board to the center of the breast board. This fits in slots and is put in place after both horses have been loaded and the tail board placed. With breast boards, tail boards, separators and sides suitably padded, this frame provides a safe and comfortable conveyance for two horses.

The frame for the 2½-ton truck was constructed on the same basic pattern as the 1½-ton truck frame with certain modifications and changes to fit the different trucks. The 2½-ton truck is wide enough for three horses to ride facing to the front. These frames were built to place the horse directly over the wheel well which left about three feet between the breast bar and the cab of the truck. This space was utilized to carry two men, their equipment and forage. In order to allow for the weight of the additional horse the 2½-ton frames were constructed of 2 x 6 material. Due to the haste in which they were constructed and to the shortage of labor they were nailed together instead of being bolted. Separator bars were placed in slots in tail and breast bars as in the 1½-ton frames as it was found that the horses rode much more confidently when supported by this bar than when leaning against each other. The frames were constructed to fit the average horse and to place him over the wheel well. It was therefore necessary to brace the entire frame against the front wall of the truck body to prevent the whole affair from sliding forward, which was accomplished by pieces of 2 x 6 running from breast bar to floor.

Twenty-five of these frames were hastily constructed

of old salvage lumber and ramps were built in sections about two feet wide and ten feet long. Two of these sections were carried tied to the sides of each frame. Four sections made a ramp for a 2½-ton truck and three for a 1½-ton truck. Demountable supports in the form of saw-horses were built to support the center of the ramps which were too long to support the weight of a horse alone. With these ramps it was possible to load and unload on the level road.

These preparations took about two weeks due to the necessity of finding material without expense to the government and the fact that only four carpenters were available to do the work. Given the necessary material a troop could easily build frames for its horses in one day or less.

A Provisional Motor Transport Company was organized at Fort Sheridan consisting of all available vehicles, the majority of which belonged to the 61st C.A.C. (AA). This company was quite sizable and contained the following vehicles:

13 1½-ton trucks equipped with two-horse frames.
25 2½-ton trucks equipped with three-horse frames.
1 1½-ton truck equipped with two-horse trailer.
1 Type 4 semi-trailer (six-horse capacity).
6 2½-ton trucks for cargo and personnel.
4 motorcycles.
1 gas truck.
2 kitchen trucks.
1 ambulance.
1 reconnaissance car.

This provisional company was capable of conveying 109 horses and 100 men with their equipment. The operating personnel consisted of six officers, including a medical and veterinary officer, and 104 enlisted men, also mainly from the 61st C.A.C. (AA). It reflects great credit upon the organization and training of this regiment that, although totally inexperienced in carrying animals, the entire movement was conducted without a single serious injury to the animals.

On learning that the squadron was to return to Fort Sheridan by motor the Squadron Commander instigated loading drills, using the vehicles with the squadron at Camp Custer. These drills were for the twofold purpose of accustoming the horses to being loaded in trucks and to give the personnel experience in loading animals prior to the day of departure.

On August 11, 1938, the Commanding General sent a message to the Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry, to the effect that an insurgent labor faction in the neighboring Brown state to the north had assumed control of Milwaukee, invaded the Blue state, and was being opposed by detachments of Army and Navy troops at Waukegan, about fifteen miles north of Fort Sheridan. Blue forces were being slowly pushed southward.

The 1st Squadron, 14th Cavalry was ordered to proceed by motor and marching from Camp Custer to Wheeling, Illinois, about ten miles southwest of Fort Sheridan, where further orders would be received.

The Squadron Commander was also informed that the Provisional Motor Transport Company would report to him at Camp Custer late in the afternoon of 12 August.

The possibility of hostile interference with the movement demanded the formation of an advance guard and the maintenance, so far as possible, of the integrity of small units. This was rendered difficult by the composition of the Provisional Motor Transport Company, which was organized into four sections corresponding to the organizations of the 61st C.A.C. (AA) from which the vehicles had been drawn. This resulted in 2½-ton and 1½-ton trucks in each section, no two of which were alike. As this was the first movement of the kind undertaken by the 61st C.A.C. (AA) it was not deemed advisable to regroup the vehicles. Consequently the section with the least horse-carrying capacity was selected for the advance guard. This consisted of a rifle platoon of two squads and a light machine gun squad. To facilitate prompt contact with the Scout Car Section the pack radio and certain personnel of Headquarters Detachment were also assigned to this section.

Troop commanders were informed of the size and composition of the advance guard and the organization of the convoy with the capacity of each section. From this information they prepared loading tables, assigning men and animals to each vehicle.

The effective strength of the squadron on 11 August was 211 horses, 167 enlisted men and 11 officers, exclusive of Scout Car personnel. The Field Order for this movement directed the Squadron (less Troop A) to entruck at 7:30 AM, 13 August and move on Shiller Park, Illinois, a point about 30 miles southwest of Fort Sheridan, and to proceed by marching to the vicinity of Wheeling, with the mission of covering the movement and detrucking of Troop A at Wheeling on 15 August. Troop A was to remain to load heavy baggage, close camp and leave Camp Custer 15 August when the Provisional Motor Transport Company returned from Shiller Park.

Ample facilities for loading were available at Camp Custer in the form of freight platforms against which trucks could be backed. Loading of the Squadron (less Troop A) began in accordance with the loading schedules at 7:30 AM, 13 August. In spite of the loading drills previously held some difficulties were encountered in loading. Three horses backed precipitately out of a truck before the tail board was secured, taking frame and all with them. Another frightened horse fell out of a truck after being loaded and several frames were broken up by fractious animals due to the age and brittleness of the salvaged lumber from which they were constructed. By 9:30 AM all but two exceedingly unruly horses were loaded. In time of actual emergency these two animals would undoubtedly have been abandoned, but due to the necessities of peacetime service, another hour was consumed in inducing these two individualists to conform. By 10:30 AM the convoy was formed and moved out on the road.

Drivers of vehicles carrying animals were cautioned to use extreme care in applying brakes and rounding turns.

After the first mile all animals settled down and rode the remainder of the distance very comfortably, munching hay and looking around in a very contented fashion. Traveling at 20 to 25 miles per hour the column occupied about 2½ miles of road space. Scout car reconnaissance provided a certain degree of protection against ground attack, and air attack was guarded against by distances of 50 to 150 yards between trucks and by riflemen and light machine guns in open trucks distributed throughout the column. The efficacy of light machine guns in trucks without the aid of an anti-aircraft mount is very doubtful however.

The convoy arrived at Shiller Park, 30 miles southwest of Fort Sheridan at 8:30 PM, just at dark. Vehicles carrying animals were backed up to a curb and unloading begun. The wheels of the trucks were about six inches lower than the ends of the ramps which reduced the slope of the ramps but prevented the use of the trestles which had been provided, resulting in considerable loss of time in improvising trestles. The proportion of ramps to trucks, about 1 to 6, was undoubtedly insufficient but it is believed that time would have been saved by unloading in column on the level road where the ramps could have been used as designed. Undoubtedly loading would have proceeded much faster in daylight. Certain trucks had fallen out of the column for minor repairs and were late in arriving in camp, however unloading was completed by 10:30 PM and all animals were on the picket line. After caring for their animals the men collected their equipment and bivouacked nearby. Locating individual saddle equipment and packs in the dark was quite a task due to the darkness and the confusion during unloading. The trucks moved to a truck park about 600 yards from the unloading point and were serviced for the return trip to Camp Custer.

On 14 August the Motor Transport Company returned to Camp Custer to pick up Troop A and the Squadron (less Troop A) marched on Wheeling, Illinois, about 10 miles southwest of Fort Sheridan, with the mission of establishing a screen to cover the movement and unloading of Troop A at Wheeling on the following day. It was interesting to note that despite the 200 mile motor trip of 10 hours duration the horses were fresh and ready to go. Injuries to animals were confined to minor abrasions received when loading at Camp Custer.

Loading of Troop A at Camp Custer commenced at 5:15 AM, 15 August and proceeded very smoothly due to experience gained in observing the loading of the first group. The convoy cleared Camp Custer at 7:00 AM and was spotted at about 2:00 PM by an observation plane which kept Squadron Headquarters advised of the location of the truck column by radio and dropped messages for the remainder of the day.

Meanwhile the squadron (less Troop A) had established its screen north and east of Wheeling. Information gained during the afternoon indicated that the detrucking point of Troop A could be advanced to a point nearer to Fort Sheridan. When it became evident from airplane reports that the convoy would reach Wheeling about 7:00 PM, a new detrucking point was selected about three miles from Fort Sheridan and the Commanding Officer, Troop A was notified of its location.

The convoy arrived at the detrucking point at about 7:30 PM and unloading began, covered by Troop B and the Scout Car Section. Detrucking proceeded slowly as in the previous case due to the darkness and the insufficient number of ramps. As the command was to move out as soon as Troop A was formed, horses were saddled as they were unloaded and led to an assembly point in rear of Troop B. No serious injuries were reported from Troop A, either from loading or unloading. Horses were quiet and contented on the road.

When unloading was completed the Squadron assembled and prepared to move forward. At this point the problem was called off and the troops marched into Fort Sheridan, having completed in three days a march that took nine days in the reverse direction in June. Not a single animal was incapacitated for field work in spite of accidents in loading. On the contrary the animals were fresh and ready for extended field service. Due to the monotony of the long drive and cramped space available for personnel, the movement was much harder on the men than on the animals.

In addition to demonstrating the ease and safety with which Cavalry can be moved over long distances by motor, this movement brought out many points of interest.

The movement confirmed the principle that horses, to avoid injuries, should be loaded longitudinally, that is, with their spinal columns parallel to the direction of movement of the vehicle. If this is done it is only necessary to slow up for sharp curves or rough roads and the animals ride much more contentedly.

Since march casualties of vehicles are unavoidable it is impossible to maintain the integrity of all units during a motor movement. To minimize the confusion of mixing units each man should ride in the same vehicle as his horse and equipment.

On account of the pack horses of the light machine gun platoon and spare horses there are always more animals than men in cavalry organizations. To permit flexibility in loading, simplify loading plans, and to provide against breakage in frames, all cargo vehicles should be provided with horse frames.

While it is desirable that all cargo vehicles in a convoy be of similar type and capacity, this will not always be possible. However as regrouping vehicles results in less confusion than mixing units, vehicles should be grouped initially to permit them to be loaded in accordance with tactical considerations.

Time lost in loading and unloading reduces the time saved by motor movements. This loss of time could be materially reduced by providing a greater number of ramps and by making such moves more often for training purposes.

(Continued on page 96)

Your Journal

In the great commercial literary field a board of directors searches diligently for a managing editor with that sagacity to foresee the type of stories and articles which the versatile American reading public will like. In a professional medium such as The CAVALRY JOURNAL, the field is much more limited than one devoted to fiction and articles of a general nature. Therefore, reliance is placed upon generous voluntary contributors or editorial intuition in soliciting articles which will be both informative and interesting.

In order to determine some expression from the field on the type and choice of reading matter which should appear in The JOURNAL, the following line was inserted on proxy cards sent to all members within the continental limits of the United States: "The article I like best in recent JOURNALS was ....." Three hundred forty-seven replies to the question were received ranging as follows:

"Crazy Business," by Peter B. Kyne	146
General Hawkins	65
Colonel Schwien—Studies on Cavalry in World War	20
General expressions of approval	34
New M1 Rifle	7
Tommy Wadelton	5
"Bagging the Hedgehopper," and "New Face of War"	12
Mechanized Cavalry Articles	6
Maneuver Articles	7
Miscellaneous Choices	45
	347

In order to indicate that with reading, as with all other activities of the *genus homo*, "what is one man's meat is another man's poison"; *to wit: note the following* remarks taken at random from selected cards:

"Best article, 'Soldier Sources,' by Reilly; worst, Peter B. Kyne."

"Recommend less emphasis on JOURNAL articles on horseflesh, horseshows, old-time cavalry stories, etc., and more stress on modern cavalry. Modern weapons and methods have almost outmoded the 'Old Cavalry.'"

"Articles on actual experiences in handling men, in actual combat leadership, in small unit experiences are invaluable to junior officers."

"More 'horse' articles should appear in The JOURNAL —breeding, training, type, etc."

"Put in some simple ones."

The foregoing tabulation has been of great assistance in evaluating reader interest and choice. The 34 who registered general approval by the general statement of "They are all good" were very generous but of little help to the perplexed individual with eyeshade and pencil behind ear in the final selection of any particular article.

The above list of preferences, in reality, furnishes a very fair cross section of the type of articles which have recently appeared in The JOURNAL. From the professional point of view, emphasis, undoubtedly, has been laid on the main theme of "Cavalry in War" or the importance of the cavalry rôle *in any future war involving the United States.* The present Chief of Cavalry, in his one principal directive to the editor, has stressed the fact that, above all, The CAVALRY JOURNAL should furnish a free forum for the discussion of cavalry affairs. The JOURNAL belongs to its readers. Your preference for a discussion of any specific activity will not only be accorded the greatest attention, but will also receive much appreciation in the editorial office.

* * *

Horsemanship

On occasion the cavalryman encounters from those in high position the attitude that the horse is misfitted for the modern battlefield. Through a subsequent check it has been found that many of these speakers during the larger part of their services have felt great personal shortcomings in their own horsemanship. Through fear or aversion to the horse, these individuals are unable to appreciate how any other man can accomplish those things through the horse which have always rendered importance to the final successful outcome of military operations.

It is true that the care and maintenance of the horse in war, particularly modern war, is difficult. There will be animal casualties, and many of them, but unlike the machine the horse is not discarded but is capable of being salvaged through a period of proper care and convalescence. From the human angle it is easier to fight in a machine without either heart or entrails than in companionship with the warm-blooded animal for whom close attachment is formed in the throes of campaign and combat.

War is dangerous, and everything in its way in life and nature suffers from destruction. In this, the horse will have to risk destruction along with the manhood of the nation. So long as men and weapons on horses can furnish the most independently mobile force on the battlefield, so long will the horse be employed in war.

Dues

On December 31st there remained on the records of the Association a total of $1,228.50 which represented accounts receivable through membership dues. Unfortunately, the printer and engraver have not yet proven eleemosynary agencies and bimonthly make requests for reimbursement. These requests are much more comfortably met when money is in the bank rather than in accounts receivable. We agree with Banjamin Franklin, "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush."

* * *

Machines, Maneuvers and Mud*

Recent operations in Spain have demonstrated again that it is men, and not machines, that fight wars. Our national defense planners should heed the comments of Maj. Gen. Hugh A. Drum on the recent maneuvers at Fort Knox, as printed in the *Illinois Guardsman*. Gen. Drum says:

"The proposal that motors replace all animals is an extreme view not warranted by experiences in China and Spain and certainly not in the terrain surrounding this CPX [command post exercise.]"

Some explanation of the difficulties is given in another article in the same issue, discussing a rapid movement required of Illinois' 33d Division, to support an attack of horsed and mechanized cavalry. "The problem of coordinating the movement of the division, after it had been assembled and entrucked, was quite difficult," says the official report. "Roads were scarce and there were few turnarounds."

Even with antiaircraft artillery and a regiment of tanks attached, the National Guard division does not have a high proportion of motors to its total strength, yet "very careful staff work" was required to make the rapid movement described, and the solution is highly commended by Gen. Drum.

The exercise was carried out during a very rainy season, and unofficial reports are that the mechanized cavalry, tanks and truck trains encountered considerable difficulty except on paved roads. Many skeptics returned convinced of the importance of real cavalry in any modern scheme of war.

*Editorial, *The Milwaukee Journal*.

The United States Cavalry Association

Organized November 9, 1885

The aim and purpose of the Association shall be to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science, to promote the professional improvement of its members, and to preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of the Cavalry of the Army of the United States.—Article III of the Constitution.

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The Army

Dear Sir:*

Something has come over the Army, I doubt whether you realize it. It's different, it's American, the men composing it are not any braver, as a matter of fact, a ribbon counter clerk is as brave as any army man, so are natives of Africa and Asia, the army has no corner on courage.

For years the American Army has been an institution without imagination, arrogant, dumbly stupid in following unyielding silly rules, it took 150 years for the Army to realize that the rank and file would do better work if comfortably clothed; remember when the army turned down the machine gun, remember how long it took to put a simple ring on the submarine so that a line could be tied to it in case of accident and the poor devils inside brought to the surface?

But something has happened to make this man's army an American Army like Geo. Rodgers Clark's Band, like Stonewall Jackson's men—fire, snap, personality, a hard hitting outfit eager and ready to tackle any job. The men have a sparkle in their eyes, they seem to have individuality; not officer ridden.

I went to Louisville, Ky., in my car one day when the Army was returning to Ft. Knox, it was necessary for me to weave in and out through the long line of trucks and tanks but I made good time, I was treated like a gentleman like the Army's paymaster, the American Citizen. I encounterd utmost courtesy, no arrogance, I was conscious of efficient and business like courtesy, the trucks and other equipment kept on their own side of the road, and when parked, were on the shoulder, when occasion demanded, the men on motorcycles acted intelligently in directing the civilian traffic for the comfort and protection of citizens.

Your Army has come far in the past few years, somebody has had enough vision to realize that the American is an individualist—not a German machine.

This trip to Louisville completely changed my opinion of the Army and I am sure it is because the Army has changed not because my idea of what an Army should be has changed.

No I am not a nut—or an eccentric, I am a plain American Citizen, jealous of his freedom and his constitutional rights.

I am proud of our Army and if you have had anything to do with this new order of things, you have every right to be proud of your efforts. In these days of dictators all thinking men watch the attitude of the Country's leaders and especially the attitude of the army, keep it the way it is and the people will support it in an unlimited way when the call comes.

JACK KEELY, Owensboro, Ky.

*A letter received by the Commanding General, V Corps Area.

* * *

Dear Sir:

In this age of motor insanity, it does one good to read The CAVALRY JOURNAL.

The article—"Imagination Run Wild," by General Hawkins and "The Horse in War," by Major MacNamara, which I have read but recently, are sane, sound, presentations of essential facts. Please convey my congratulations to the writers.

WAYNE DINSMORE,
Secretary, Horse and Mule Assn. of America.

* * *

An Appreciation

Dear Sir:

General Farrand Sayre, U. S. Army, retired, has recently been awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Johns Hopkins University. Three years ago he received the degree of Master of Arts from the same university.

Is there another officer, retired or active, in the list of our army who has had that distinguished honor conferred on him by any university or college, let alone Johns Hopkins? I know of none. Besides the B.S. which by law will hereafter appear in the Official Register after the name of every West Point graduate, there are many names in the Register followed by A.B., A.M., LL.D., B.S., M.S., D.S. and initials of other collegiate degrees, but I suspect there is hardly another Ph.D. in the entire list; I am reasonably sure there is not another Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins. And many, if not most, of the degrees conferred on our officers by colleges and universities are merely complimentary, and carry no scholastic implication.

Not so General Sayre's Ph.D. He achieved it by five years of post-graduate study and research at Johns Hopkins, ending with an elaborate thesis—three years for his A.M. and two more for his Ph.D. And the marvel of it all is that General Sayre is seventy-seven years old. He has always been a student, and he has always been thorough, scholarly, intellectual; but to do five years of post-graduate work after one is seventy-two and win a Ph.D. from such a university as Johns Hopkins, if there be another such in the Americas, is a distinction, I venture to say, never achieved by one man in ten millions.

The theme assigned this distinguished scholar for his doctorate thesis was "Cynicism," and part of his disserta-

(Continued on page 82)

NOTES from the CHIEF of CAVALRY



What Would You Do?

DEAR "ED":

New Year's morning I woke up with a bad headache and thinking it was caused by something I "et" the night before, or that possibly I needed glasses, I dropped in at the station hospital for treatment. It was while under the influence of four aspirin that the medico gave me to dilate my eyes, that I had a dream. When I woke up I told it to him, and it is on his recommendation that I am passing it on to posterity.

Yours,

"SLINKOVITCH."

P.S.: The medico, Major I. Strayne, has never served with the mechanized cavalry, either.

* * *

I was in command of the 1st Platoon, Troop A, 901st Cavalry (Mecz) (Reconnaissance Troop.) At 12:00 noon our troop had arrived at "Rileyville College of Applied Aids" and had just received the following message from the regimental commander:

"Several motorized infantry regiments, some horse cavalry with mechanized elements and truck-drawn artillery are reported in the PINE GROVE area. At 11:00 AM these forces had not yet moved.

The 901st Cavalry (Mecz) will advance at 2:00 PM via RILEYVILLE and FEAGANSBURG against the enemy concentration reported near PINE GROVE.

Troop A, marching at 1:30 PM, will reconnoiter the zone as shown on attached map.

First objective to be reached not later than 2:45 PM. That line will not be crossed until further orders.

Missions:

(1) Report the location, strength, composition and movements of any enemy forces encountered in your reconnaissance zone.

(2) Determine the suitability of the road net for the advance of the regiment to the east or northeast.

(Signed) PRESTONE, Colonel, 901st Cavalry."

Upon receipt of the foregoing orders, Captain R. Moore Carr assembled us platoon commanders and gave us the dope. He gave each of us a zone as shown on the above map and he, with troop headquarters and the 4th Platoon (reserve), planned to march via Highway 57.

I moved out with the 1st Platoon as ordered and reconnoitered my assigned zone without incident until I arrived at a point 200 yards west of the stream crossing at A. Here my leading car came to a halt. A moment later the motorcycle messenger handed me the following short and cryptic message in code:

"Charlie McCarthy tight. Has not blurped yet."

which decoded read:

"Heavy log barricades across the road on the opposite side of the stream. Have received no hostile fire."

I immediately made a hasty approved estimate of the situation and said to myself, "And now, Mr. Slinkovitch,

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?"

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Slinkovitch has requested us to ask you *to* decide what you would do, then read the next situation; and *then* turn the page to see what he did in both cases.)

After successfully applying the proper technique in the foregoing situation we proceeded with the platoon until we arrived at B. From this point we could see a small village about three miles to the east. We were in enemy territory and I had to plan for moving the platoon through this village. Again my inner voice piped forth in a rather gutteral laugh: "Ha! Ha! Slinky, old boy, now

WHAT WILL YOU DO?"—(See below.)

(EDITOR'S NOTE: Now you can peek.)

Two More Cavalry Divisions Authorized

The Secretary of War has authorized the formulation of sufficient headquarters units to complete the organization of the 21st and 22nd Cavalry Divisions.

The 21st Cavalry Division comprises the 51st and 59th Cavalry Brigades, and includes the 101st Cavalry and the 121st Cavalry in New York; the 59th Cavalry Brigade comprises the 102nd Cavalry of New Jersey and the 110th Cavalry, including units located in Massachusetts and Connecticut.

The 22nd Cavalry Division will comprise the 52nd and 54th Cavalry Brigades. The 52nd Cavalry Brigade includes the 103rd Cavalry and the 104th Cavalry, located in Pennsylvania; the 54th Cavalry Brigade includes the 107th Cavalry of Ohio and the 123rd Cavalry of Kentucky.

The 24th Cavalry Division, already organized and commanded by Major General William K. Herndon, comprises the 57th and 58th Cavalry Brigades, located in Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Washington, and Wyoming.

It is believed that the remaining Cavalry Division of the National Guard, the 23rd Cavalry Division, will be authorized by the War Department in the very near future.

A Solution

FIRST SITUATION

I instructed the leading car to cover the barricade with its guns, then moved my car off the road to cover. Then, while the driver and radio operator remained in the car and protected us with turret defilade, the rest of the car crew and myself made a dismounted reconnaissance, taking the sub-machine gun caliber .45 with us. The other section halted and remained in observation on the road about 300 yards to our rear.

SECOND SITUATION

First I endeavored to reconnoiter by observation, parked at a distance from town under cover.

Then I moved by bounds through the town with entire platoon. We split into sections but remained in visual contact on each cross street.

One section then remained in observation on the northeast exit of town while the other section turned back and made a detailed reconnaissance of the town, hastily interviewing certain inhabitants. (The road block previously located looked suspicious to me.)

NOTE TO EDITOR: In a later issue of The CAVALRY JOURNAL I may tell you about the medicos deciding that it was my teeth that caused the headache and the dream that I had when they pulled all my teeth out.

"SLINKY."

General Hawkins' Notes

The Difference is Truly Amazing

Ever since our Civil War the American cavalry has claimed a point of superiority over European cavalry because it was armed and trained to fight both mounted and dismounted, whereas, until after the World War, European cavalry was armed and trained to fight principally in mounted charges against cavalry, and dismounted only as an expedient. It had within itself no fire power to support mounted action. It was very poorly armed and equipped for dismounted action and had scarcely any training for that purpose.

Boastfulness is not a virtue, but certainly the American idea has been proved right in many campaigns. European cavalry officers were inclined to speak scornfully of American cavalry and declared that it was only mounted infantry. They asserted that it was impossible to instill into mounted troops the spirit of mounted action if they were trained also to fight dismounted. This was disputed by us, but it took the World War to prove that we were right. However, it is true that for some years before the World War our interest and dependence upon dismounted fighting, and the improvement in rapid firing rifles, together with the opinion of other branches of the service, had served to discourage any great faith in mounted action in our cavalry.

But the idea, both in Europe and partially in America, of mounted action was the charge in closed ranks. The open order mounted action, so well exemplified by Allenby's cavalry in Palestine and by the Canadian cavalry forces in France, was something that some few American officers had visualized for a long time. In fact, open order attacks, using the pistol instead of the saber, had been used in our Civil War, in our Indian wars and in the Philippine campaigns. Since we were armed with both pistol and saber, there were many arguments as to when to use one and when the other, but the advocates of the pistol and open order attacks were gradually gaining headway which finally resulted in the abolition of the saber some years after the World War. Before that war we were still under the influence of European tradition and practiced mounted charges with the saber in close order as well as pistol attacks in open order. After their experiences in the Boer War, the British cavalry had also a gradual change of opinion as to charges in close order and came to favor open order for mounted attack, especially against infantry, but they retained the sword and refused the pistol.

Faith in the mounted attack, even in open order, had so diminished in the American cavalry, in spite of British successes in South Africa and in the World War, that it was necessary to revive it by recent historical examples and by reasoning, without in the least impairing its interest and training in dismounted action. This was undertaken in 1919, and the result has been to make the American cavalry equally enthusiastic and confident in its ability to fight either way as circumstances may demand. This happy result has a profound effect on the rôle of Cavalry as conceived by the American Army. Naturally, with such a Cavalry, its rôle is enlarged many times. With magazine rifles and many machine guns and other weapons cavalry fire power is equal to that of the same numbers of infantry. With an automatic pistol by machine guns and artillery in the larger formations, the mounted attacks in open order take on a formidable character, even against infantry, when combined with dismounted attack and used in accordance with the terrain and other favorable conditions.

If we compare this kind of cavalry with that in Europe in 1914 the difference is truly amazing. The greatest drama of the World War was that period from the invasion of Belgium to and including the Battle of the Marne and the German retreat to the Aisne River. During this period cavalry was much in demand and did perform invaluable services. How very much more it could have done on each side had the French and German cavalry been armed and trained to fight on foot and to fight mounted against infantry when opportunity came! Such, however, was not the case. This cavalry was armed with a little carbine not much better than a pop-gun. It had no machine guns to speak of. Almost its whole training was to fight in close order charges against cavalry and to oppose infantry only very weakly and mostly by the use of its supporting artillery. Even in reconnaissance its patrols could not face smaller infantry patrols. Disdainful of anything about modern war that we had learned in America or that the British had learned in South Africa, the French cavalry went to war in 1914 equipped and trained and dressed like the knights of old, or certainly no different from the cavalry of Napoleon. They were poor horsemasters and did not know how to march long distances and preserve the strength of their horses. They were always waiting for the opposing cavalry to line up against them and charge in the approved manner. What good this would have done, even had they beaten their opponents, is not clear, since with the enemy cavalry out of the way they could do

nothing else. They could not attack infantry; they could not fight powerful delaying actions; they could not intervene in the battle effectually from the flanks or rear. Yet they did perform valuable services by virtue of their presence in guarding flanks or filling gaps between army corps or armies. They were feared more than they deserved to be, and they served to hold off the opposing cavalry which was no better than they were. A cavalry division or corps had always to have a brigade of infantry to support them. They called loudly for and almost refused to operate without this support. But they were gallant! A little later in the campaign, during the so-called race to the sea, the French cavalry fought stubbornly and well in trenches against the advance of the German wide sweeping movement towards the channel ports. However, this was an act of desperation and with the support of infantry and, though successful until infantry could relieve them, their success was not as great as it could have been and their sacrifice much greater than it should have been had they been armed and trained for dismounted fighting.

When the German army came down through Belgium and, taking the French high command by surprise, attacked the left flank of the combined armies of the French and British in overwhelming numbers, the French Fifth Army and the British Army on its left felt the brunt of the attack. The Fifth Army was attacked along the Sambre River and driven south. The British Army was attacked near Mons and also driven south. The great retreat had begun.

At all times during this retreat the British Army was separated from the Fifth Army by dangerously great intervals. The British left was constantly in danger of envelopment by the German First Army commanded by Von Kluck. Part of the time, cavalry was used to stop the gap between the two armies, but the great danger of envelopment of the British left caused the assignment of Sordet's cavalry corps to this flank early in the great retreat, and even after the French Sixth Army was formed on the left of the British; but in reading the accounts of the activities of this corps of three divisions, one is struck by the weak resistance it was capable of in delaying the march of the German army corps which was attempting constantly to envelope the British left. Delaying actions were fought principally by the corps artillery, and Sordet was constantly calling for infantry support behind which he could rest his weary horses and men. He had to march his cavalry long distances at night to enable it to bivouac at safe distances from the enemy, and in the morning it was marched back again long distances to resume his proper place in contact with the enemy. Thus, his horses were marched off their feet, and by the time the Marne was reached they were completely exhausted. Infantry brigades were sometimes attached to the cavalry corps and marched in rear of it at convenient distance and then halted in position so that the cavalry corps could seek shelter behind the infantry at night. The necessity for this was due to the fact that the French cavalry was unable to protect itself when dismounted.

The Germans were just as ineffective as the French. Their cavalry marched habitually behind infantry in trucks. They did not allow themselves, when they could avoid it, to become engaged with the French cavalry in a cavalry combat. Marching behind a battalion of infantry in trucks with a few cavalry patrols in front the German cavalry would throw forward detachments as though to meet the French, and then fall back upon the infantry. The French cavalry would pursue (in close order of course) and soon find themselves under heavy fire of German infantry and machine guns. These were small units of French cavalry in advance of larger units. Had the French advanced their covering detachments cautiously and then attacked in force, using open order and depth of deployment supported by fire of some dismounted units, even though they had no machine guns, they would have overwhelmed the small German infantry units and the cavalry behind them; but the French knew nothing but impetuous attack in close order, unsupported by any kind of fire. They lost many gallant men and horses. They believed in mounted attack, but their method was as old as the muzzle-loading muskets of a hundred years before. The German cavalry was as antiquated as the French, but they were smart enough to play these tricks on the French and to refuse to meet them in the old-fashioned way. Neither the one nor the other knew how to make a mounted attack in the modern way; and the modern way is a combination of fire and movement.

It took the British to show the new method during the war, but the French and the Germans never learned it and their reaction to failure was to give up mounted action completely. Since they were not equipped or trained well for dismounted action, they failed on both sides to perform in full measure the priceless services that their numerous cavalry should have given to their armies. Although, as said before, they did render invaluable service in filling gaps between corps and armies and in guarding flanks, they were not as effective even in those roles as an up-to-date cavalry should have been. The French cavalry corps did fight a successful delaying action against the German Tenth Reserve Corps at the Battle of Charleroi. It fought, no doubt, many small actions while guarding the British left during the retreat, but it did not and could not give the measure of security to the British left flank that a properly armed and trained cavalry corps should have given. The British Army, made up entirely of regular troops, saved itself against great odds by magnificent fighting and the help of its own single cavalry division.

After the Battle of Guise, in which the French Fifth Army had had some success in a counter-attack, it resumed its retreat toward the Aisne River, hotly pursued by the German First and Second Armies. The British had retired well back of the left flank of the French. A wide gap of some twenty miles lay between them. The German First Army was pressing hard against the French left flank and attempting to envelop it before the French could retreat far enough south to avoid being turned and trapped between the two German armies. The German First Cavalry

corps was dispatched around this flank. It crossed the Oise River at Bailly and turned east into the gap between the left of the French and the British Army to the southwest. The French Fifth Army was in a critical position with its left partially enveloped by German infantry and the German cavalry corps well around its left and rear. The French lines of communication, wholly open and unguarded, were in danger. If the German cavalry succeeded in occupying the passages of the Aisne River in rear of the French army the latter would have its retreat cut off for a time sufficiently long to enable the German overwhelming forces in pursuit to crush it in a serious disaster. Frantic efforts were made by the French to send some infantry from the group of reserve divisions on the left of the army to meet and stop the German cavalry. Only a few battalions and some artillery were able to take position to oppose this cavalry. It was an insufficient force to oppose a cavalry corps backed up closely as it was by strong columns of infantry, but apparently it sufficed. The German cavalry went no farther. Just what it did do is obscure, but obviously it refused to attack. Because an inferior force of infantry lay in front, it was stopped. The German cavalry, like the French, was not armed and trained to attack infantry except by close order charges, which were probably out of the question, or by dismounted action for which they were not equipped and which they did not understand. Thus, on account of false doctrine and antiquated equipment and training, the German cavalry lost an opportunity of stupendous possibilities. Had the German cavalry been indoctrinated with the idea of mounted attack against infantry, and trained to make such attacks in open order and successive waves supported by all the fire power of modern arms, this great cavalry corps would have swept over the few battalions that were opposed to it, thus saving the time that would have been consumed in making a dismounted attack. It would have been well on its way to dispute, dismounted, the passage of the Aisne by the French Fifth Army, but it did not make even a dismounted attack. It was not prepared to do either.

During the Battle of the Marne, when the Germans were in retreat, an interval of twenty miles was formed between Von Kluck's Army and Von Bulow's Army. The British Army and part of the French Fifth Army were pressing forward to occupy this gap. The British cavalry division preceded the army, but it was insufficient. Had a cavalry corps of three divisions, properly armed and trained, been available to send through this gap, it could have delayed the arrival of the German reinforcements which finally plugged the gap before the British and French infantry had time to get into it. Had a penetration in force been effected between these two German armies, the Germans might not have been able to halt on the Aisne, and the long trench warfare in France might have been shortened or perhaps avoided. What a magnificent result by the use of a single cavalry corps properly constituted and properly used.

Although the American cavalry had the right idea in principle, the idea of a cavalry equipped and trained to fight both mounted and dismounted, it had not much to boast of during the years just before 1914. It was not well trained to carry out the principle. Its horsemanship was only fair, although improving since the establishment of The Cavalry School at Fort Riley. Its marching was better than the French but not good enough. It had no clear-cut method of making mounted attacks. The importance of supporting fire was not well understood, and there was little uniformity in the training for this purpose. Like the infantry, it was well trained in rifle and pistol marksmanship but also, like the infantry, it was lacking in tactical training for either mounted or dismounted action. As in the case of other armies of the world, it did not appreciate nor understand the importance of training and skill in the use of cover for advancing troops. Platoon and squad organization and leadership were not well understood. It is only fair, however, to state that despite these defects our dismounted action, like that of the infantry, was as good as that of the European armies of that period. At least we can assert that had the European cavalry been as well trained for dismounted action as the American it would have rendered much more effective services than it did in the first month of the war.

At the present date the American cavalry is vastly improved in both mounted and dismounted action. The only trouble is that we have so little of it. Cavalry, like for example that in the First Cavalry Division, cannot be improvised. It takes time to make such cavalry. We should have during peacetime at least four full divisions of cavalry as highly trained as that we have, for instant action in time of need.

Since the World War our cavalry has improved its marching methods so that now it can march faster, for longer distances and with less fatigue. This method is uniformly understood in all regiments. Because of better riding, improved saddles, and better method, the old curse of sore backs has almost disappeared. Horsemanship has improved until now it is unexcelled anywhere. Bold and fearless riding enables our cavalry to traverse almost any ground at speed. It knows how to make mounted attacks with successive waves of deployed horsemen supported by machine gun and artillery fire. It knows how to make combined dismounted and mounted attack which under certain conditions is probably its most effective means of offensive action.

Our regiments are equipped plentifully with the best machine guns, and our machine gunners are as well trained as any. The regiments have antitank guns. They know how to take quickly the necessary formations for defense against hostile aircraft. They are trained to hide themselves in bivouac by taking advantage of the ground and such camouflage as the country affords and by dispersion in small units without showing any regular lines or groups. Officers and noncommissioned officers are well trained in platoon and squad leadership. Patrols are better instructed by simple and uniform methods. Rifle, pistol

and machine gun marksmanship has been maintained in a high degree of excellence.

For dismounted action, the troops are trained to leave their led horses in small groups under proper supervision and hidden where possible. The troopers are trained to advance on foot to the attack by skillful individual use of cover and by infiltration when the nature of the ground indicates such measures. They are instructed in the rapid construction of hasty entrenchments and in the proper posting of machine guns and riflemen for defense. Security measures on the march and in camp are well understood by commanders of small units, and the use of advance guards and covering detachments is becoming better understood by all commanders. Troops are being instructed in reorganization and bring order out of confusion in difficult and dangerous situations.

A few scout cars, armed with machine guns, have been supplied to each regiment to assist in scouting and security measures, thus relieving in some degree the fatigue of horses that would be used in such duties. Supply trains have been motorized, thus insuring quicker and better supply to cavalry troops. The best pack saddles in the world have been supplied to pack the machine guns, ammunition and other loads. Through the efforts of the signal corps, radio communications have been assured to the larger units.

There is great enthusiasm and a high spirit of adventure and enterprise in the United States Cavalry. Realizing that the infantry is the great mobile fighting force in the army, the cavalry, confident in its training and its ability to coöperate, is a smaller but not less important member of the army team and seeks only the opportunity to render those indispensable services to which the army is entitled. It is necessary only that the principles which now control the training of the Cavalry be continued faithfully and that its numbers be made adequate to its tasks. Its great rôle should be understood thoroughly by the army so that these things shall come to pass. However, it should be understood clearly that Cavalry cannot be used according to a formula. The great captains used it to do this or to do that as circumstances and conditions seemed to suggest to their imaginations, and their knowledge of its characteristics dictated its employment in any particular situation. Its rôle might be understood by the study of particular and isolated historical examples. There is no order or sequence that can be determined beforehand for its employment. It lies in the hands of the commander-in-chief or the commander of the force to which it may be assigned or attached and his use of it will determine his success.

One brigade of our cavalry has been mechanized. Its future is problematical. But we may be sure that it will do all that may be done with the equipment that the Government chooses to give it. One thing is certain. It can never replace the cavalry which we now call horse cavalry in order to distinguish it from the newly mechanized form of the same arm. Its best hope is that, in combination, it may reinforce and strengthen the cavalry arm. Accordingly, the old principle of American cavalry, fitness to fight equally well mounted or dismounted, is being carried on, utilizing all modern inventions and appliances, but never losing to the Cavalry its fundamental characteristics or its indispensable rôle.

Our Cavalry of today is fashioned by other hands than those of the commander who will use it. We can fashion it only to meet those various situations wherein history and our own experience and reflection have taught us it may be used. Surmounting all the sudden and drastic changes in armament throughout the centuries of history, the cavalry has always been able to accommodate itself sooner or later to new conditions. Our cavalry of today is up to that mark. Let those who follow us keep it so.

All-Wheel-Drive Commercial Vehicles

The Marmon-Herrington Company, Indianapolis, manufacturers of All-Wheel-Drive vehicles report many unusual and surprising applications of their units to accomplish particularly difficult jobs in hauling and in the transportation of men and equipment. Especially is this true with respect to the company's conversions of standard Ford Trucks, commercial and passenger cars to all-wheel-drive.

The amazing tractive power of these all-wheel-drive vehicles, and their almost unbelievable ability to forge through deep sand, snow and mud, takes them into places where no other wheeled vehicles would dare to tread.

A recent purchaser of a Marmon-Herrington All-Wheel-Drive Ford coupe was the owner of a South American plantation, who plans to use the car to get about over thousands of acres of land, where no roads exist, to supervise the planting, cultivation and harvesting of his crops.

Hundreds of Marmon-Herrington All-Wheel-Drive Ford trucks and passenger cars are in constant use all over the world by explorers, desert and mountain travelers, oil scouts and other adventurous men whose work or recreation takes them off beaten paths and through the wilderness.

NOTES from the CAVALRY BOARD

"The Cavalry Board invites any individual, whether or not a cavalryman, to submit for consideration constructive suggestions or ideas relating to new equipment, improvement of standard equipment, or to any problem or project under study by the Board. The Board will also welcome suggestions as to new problems that may properly be considered. Communications should be addressed to the Director, Cavalry Board, Fort Riley, Kansas."

Armament for motor vehicles: The Cavalry Board has under consideration the advisability of replacing the caliber .30 machine gun, air-cooled, with the caliber .30 machine gun, water cooled, on all vehicles of horse cavalry. Whether or not the heavy machine gun can be operated on vehicles as efficiently as the light machine gun will be investigated, as will the comparative facility of removing the guns from the car mounts and placing them in action on the ground.

Machine Gun, Caliber .30, M1919 A4, modified: Six light machine guns have been modified to provide for quick replacement of the barrel from the front and to provide positive single shot action. A barrel jacket and muzzle cap are provided and so designed that when the latter is removed exposes several inches of the forward end of the barrel and permits of rapid replacement. The muzzle cap is held in place by a spring pin and can be instantly removed. A hinged trigger which operates in conjunction with an attachment to the back plate provides positive single shot fire or automatic fire as desired. Tests are being made to determine the advisability of incorporating these modifications in all light machine guns.

Individual anti-mechanization weapon: The Cavalry Board is engaged in testing an individual anti-mechanization weapon for cavalry. A Caliber .50 machine gun with bipod and butt rest has been received and tests begun to compare it with the caliber .50 machine gun with mount, tripod, M-3. In the near future it is expected to compare these weapons with one or more similar weapons of foreign manufacture.

Blank firing device for Caliber .50 machine gun (HB): Test of blank firing device for Caliber .50 machine gun (HB) will soon be completed. Development of an attachment for firing blank ammunition with this weapon has been carried on by the Ordnance Department for several years.

Pistol grips: Three sets of grips for the Caliber .45 automatic pistol, which were designed by Lieutenant Colonel James C. Long, 329th Engineers, O.R., have been received by the Cavalry Board for test. These grips are of wood with deeply corrugated surfaces in place of the conventional checked design. The inventor's theory is that the ribs of the corrugations will reduce movement of the pistol in the hand due to recoil. The object of the test is to determine whether or not they offer sufficient advantages over the issue items to warrant further action by the War Department.

Mines and obstacles for use against mechanized or motorized units: Troop A, 9th Engineer Squadron and the Cavalry Board are conducting experiments to collect data for the determination of doctrine, the development of Engineer technique, and the preparation of instructional matter. The experiments are divided as follows:

Antitank mines.
Antitank obstacles.
Road blocks.
Removal of antitank obstacles and road blocks (except mines).

Communications: The Cavalry Board is studying the subject of cavalry communications. This includes modification or replacement of pack radio set SCR-203, the adoption of a light radio set similar to the SCR-194 which transmits voice up to 7 miles, the redesign of panels for airplane liaison, and the preparation of codes which will speed transmission while maintaining temporary secrecy.

Reconnaissance vehicles: A number of new reconnaissance vehicles will be procured for issue to the horse regiments in the fiscal year 1940 and subsequent years. The Cavalry Board is now working on recommendations as to military characteristics of the proposed new cars.

One school of thought in the Cavalry believes that the ideal reconnaissance vehicle for horse units is a light, unarmored car which would be fast, very flexible, and possessing a high degree of cross-country mobility. This car would be inexpensive and easy to produce. It would depend for its protection upon its speed, mobility, and fire power. If destroyed it could be easily replaced. A type vehicle of this class is the Marmon-Herrington (Ford) 4x4 chassis which the Board has under study at the present time.

Others believe that we should continue development along the lines already established in the present M-3 scout car and that the ideal car will be armored at least to protect against small arms fire and will, in general, possess the characteristics of the M-3, except that it should have

a better horsepower ratio, shorter turning radius, and lower silhouette. It is believed also that the hull of this car can be redesigned to improve seating arrangement.

Very few Cavalry officers, however, believe that we should attempt to provide armor protection in reconnaissance vehicles beyond that which would effectively protect against small arms fire as to go beyond this would so increase size and weight and decrease flexibility and mobility as to make it unsuitable for reconnaissance.

Track and half-track vehicles have also been considered but, in their present state of development, apparently do not possess as many of the characteristics desired as do the wheeled vehicles with all wheels power driven.

A number of valuable suggestions as to improvement of reconnaissance vehicles have been submitted by cavalry officers who are operating these cars under field conditions. The Board is always glad to receive and consider these suggestions and it is hoped that others will be received.

Letters to the Editor

(Continued from page 74)

tion has been published in book form with the title, *Diogenes of Sinope, A Study of Greek Cynicism*. It makes an octavo volume of 140 pages.

Can one imagine a man's having a more tedious and uninteresting subject assigned him to study and write about? But General Sayre did the job with his characteristic patience and thoroughness. It is probable that no such complete research and study of the dull topic was ever made before by one person. The "Bibliography" names thirty-eight authors, mostly German and French untranslated, studied by him, and "Sources of Information in Chronological Order from Zenophon, 445-355 B.C. to Suidas, 10th Century A.D."

I make no doubt the professors at Johns Hopkins who selected and assigned the topic were disappointed at General Sayre's treatment and conclusions. They expected him to present Cynicism and Diogenes in a favorable light, after the manner of other modern writers. These have "idealized Cynicism and treated it as a modification of the teachings of Socrates"; it is so considered in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. But I rather think General Sayre dug deeper in the subject than any other modern writer. He finds, by weighing and balancing all the information he has dug up, that "the teachings of the Cynics and those of Socrates differed throughout and were for the most part opposed to each other."

Old Diogenes the Cynic he strips of all virtues. He was banished from his native Sinope for debasing the coin—the author calls him a counterfeiter; he was a hypocrite, a beggar and a glutton—he died of indigestion brought on by gorging. "The stories about him are of dubious authority and frequently conflict with one another, but the outlines of his character seem visible through them. . . . He had lost his citizenship and could not, or at any rate did not, gain citizenship in Corinth or Athens; and so was a man without a country. He was of ill-repute because of his early crime and his indecent conduct; he had no human ties, no friends, no home, no property, no occupation, no ambition, no object in life." In other words, the author thinks the name "The Dog," given Diogenes by his contemporaries was quite fit. He doesn't believe that old Diogenes ever went about with a lantern looking for an honest man, or that he lived in a tub. In fact he thinks many of the stories that make up the "Diogenes Legend" are spurious.

The Army has reason to be proud of the unique accomplishment of General Sayre, and I am sure his old friends of the Cavalry join me in felicitation and in the hope that he may live many years longer and gain other scholastic honors.

M. F. STEELE, Lieut. Colonel, Retired.

November 10, 1938.

In battle, the lives and successes of our superb American fighting men should not be entrusted to improvised control and directing units. In fact, the fate of the nation may rest on headquarters units of this type as much as on the actual fighting of the combat troops. The answer is evident. We should have in existence and under training in peace, an adequate nucleus for each of these headquarters. In each army we shoud have an army and two corps headquarters and each division should have its headquarters.

—MAJOR GENERAL HUGH A. DRUM, U.S.A.
Comments on Second Army CPX.

MORE ABOUT RIDING FORWARD. By V. S. Littauer, Captain, First Hussars, Russian Imperial Cavalry. Published privately by the author, Syosset, Long Island, N. Y. 192 pages. 19 illustrations and a chart in detail of a normal schooling program. $3.00. Reviewed by Captain Earl F. Thomson, 9th Cavalry, Chief Department of Horsemanship, The Cavalry School.

This volume is an excellent manual for any one wishing to train a young horse along the proper lines. It is easily read and can be understood by the inexprienced rider.

The author, Captain Littauer, has had over eleven years of experience in teaching the forward seat, and has been very successful in applying the methods he describes in his book.

The main theme of the book is that schooling, or proper training, is the foundation of good performance. It is written for the American amateur rider and does not attempt to present the art of horsemanship in its entirety.

After describing the development of the forward method of riding, the author gives the reader an idea of what to aim at in his training, and along what lines to work. He utilizes the Three Day Event in the Olympic Games for this purpose and gives an accurate description of what is required of horse and rider in this event. Personal observations on the last Olympic Games are given and several interesting pictures are included.

The author then, in an excellent manner, tells how to school a horse so as to make him "pleasant to ride." There is a very good chapter on "Longeing" and on "Placing the young horse on the bit." He emphasizes the very important fact that it is necessary to make the horse take the bit from the effect of the legs, and not from a pulling back of the hands. Another chapter describes all the different school movements used in the Three Day Event and how to obtain them from the horse.

The book contains a table showing the normal sequence of training movements. It was compiled by the author and Captain Eduardo Yanez, of the Chilean Army Horse Show Team. It is one of the very best features of this volume, and makes readily accessible a compact schedule of training movements arranged in the order in which they should be presented to the horse.

The chapter on jumping stresses the necessity for maximum freedom of the horse while jumping, and has some excellent sketches of the proper and improper method of jumping an obstacle.

The last chapter describes how to make a well planned training field for jumpers. The equipment includes everything necessary to give the jumper the exercises and experience to enable him to show in any field or ring.

This book will be found very useful to any one wishing to improve their riding or their horses.

* * *

THE COMING STRUGGLE FOR LATIN AMERICA. By Carleton Beals. J. B. Lippincott Company. 401 pages, $3.00.

To those who realize that warfare for the past five centuries has had an economic background, the work of Carleton Beals will hold particular significance. The struggle now going on in Latin America and the struggles ahead all tend toward the final objective of natural resources. It must be realized that probably the greatest treasure house of raw materials essential for the current industrial era of the world lie within the confines of the republics that make up Latin America. Capital already thrown into this area, having produced communications and sufficiently stable governments to protect and permit commercial undertakings, makes this field of outstanding importance in the economic struggle for national existence. This is true particularly of those nations who are classified as the "have nots" and who now display the greatest aggressiveness in the Latin American field.

This book deals in great detail on the activities of Germany, Italy, and Japan in South and Central America. The author covers the manner in which German penetration is taking place. He states that the main tools employed by Germany are subsidized trade, the barter system, and close attention to cultural ties and understandings. He intimates that Italian influence is based more largely on banking influences in selected areas, close political ties and alliances; that Japanese trade has increased immensely but more through the principle of volume and low price merchandise; that the sale of munitions, including airplanes, is a matter which is given great attention by both Germany and Italy. Just why Latin American countries are trading resources for manufactured munitions in their desire to improve their armaments is not explained. Perhaps after all, warfare is a disease if Latin American republics feel impelled to sacrifice so much for armament when not one of them is faced with a potential enemy and all are protected from over seas movements by the Monroe Doctrine.

British interests, trade, and influence is on the decline, according to Mr. Beals. Great Britain, soon after inde-

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pendence was won by Latin American republics, promptly solidified her position in that area through capital investments. From this source she was able until 1914 to dominate commercial activities in several parts of South America, particularly in the Argentine. Much of her trade was taken by the United States during the World War, and the remainder is now threatened by the barter system of the totalitarian powers and their subsidized foreign trade.

The author finds much to blame in American practices in Latin America. Although he is an admirer and disciple of the good neighbor policy, he seems to feel that outside evidences of good will as demonstrated by the North Americans are in the nature of a racket. He infers that our commercial buildup since the war has resulted largely from a form of disguised subsidy in our volume of loans to Latin America; that not only will these loans never be liquified but will now serve as a boomerang to new trade expansion in this area. Defaulted payments on bonds and American investments will serve to discourage any great volume of trade which might result in later admonitions on the settlement of these accounts.

One encounters several general contradictions throughout this volume. The reader is told that the existing positions of Great Britain and the United States are in great jeopardy; thereafter, he is told that the positions of these powers are predominant and will remain so for sometime to come.

The final portion of the volume is devoted to the future of Latin America. The author indicates that the countries involved are actually emerging from an historical era comparable to the United States during the early part of the 19th Century. A national consciousness is arising which is demanding national self-sufficiency; that before long trade barriers will arise in order to permit native industry to become firmly established. The real Latin American struggle is pictured in the following concluding paragraph of the book:

> The struggle of the people of the southern countries against militarism, against feudal enslavement, against mass serfdom, against foreign domination, against ecclesiastical exploitation—that is the only real struggle that exists in Latin America, that is the only struggle of importance.

For the informed on world politics and economics, this book is mandatory reading.

* * *

TACTICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE GRAPHICAL PLATES—DIVISION COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF. By Francis G. Brink, Captain, Infantry, U.S.A. 77 sketches. 24 pages. Indexed. Published by the author. Price $3.00. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Bohn, 9th Cavalry, Chief, Department of General Instruction and Publications, The Cavalry School.

This note book deserves a better and more descriptive title. If and when republished plates and print should

be enlarged for easier reading and scales should be added to the sketches to give an idea of time and space factors.

Captain Brink has prepared an ingenious, interesting, instructive and valuable work for the military student and also for the military instructor. His sketches graphically present the various types of maneuver by a force of all arms, and in each case the basic principles involved are shown with each plate.

Captain Brink shows the relation between tactics, terrain and principles in a brief, clear and understandable manner. The task of our Army educational system, especially in Regimental Schools, R.O.T.C. and Organized Reserve units and the Special Service Schools, would be greatly amplified if each instructor were furnished with a copy of this book.

The twenty-four pages making up this volume contain more military information of a practical nature than is contained in the same number of pages in any text known to this reviewer. As one looks at the sketches the logical action in the majority of cases is clearly and unmistakably indicated.

The reaction of those who have seen this book is the same in all cases and may be summed up by the question "Where can I get a copy?"

* * *

LORD ROBERTS. By Lt. Colonel H. de Watteville, C.B.E., M.A. (OXON.), p.s.c. Blackie and Son, Limited, London and Glasgow, 1938. 168 pages. 8 illustrations. Indexed. Two maps. Price 5 shillings net. Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel John J. Bohn, 9th Cavalry, Chief, Department of General Instruction and Publications, The Cavalry School.

This book contains a brief biography of Frederick Sleigh Roberts, Earl of Kandahar, and includes short descriptions of the stirring historical events in which the famous Field Marshal played a leading part.

From material which includes the Indian mutiny, the great vice regal durbars, campaigns in Afghanistan, the Boer War, and the first hundred thousand, through all of which runs the thread of life of a colorful character, one may expect a great story. However, this biography of one of the world's leading soldiers is written in the tone of a war diary or an official report. The book does not paint a living picture of "Bobs bahadur," idol of the British soldier, who added vast territory to the Empire, reorganized the British Army, and who, although small in stature, handicapped by ill health and the loss of one eye, still engaged in hand-to-hand fighting in the field and lived through to win a Victoria Cross and a field marshal's baton. For those with sufficient imagination to see behind the cold facts, this biography will furnish an interestig reference work and will provide a source of material for study of one of the most interesting and successful soldiers of modern history.

Of particular interest to the cavalryman are the fre-

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General H. S. Hawkins, in his review of *The Ramparts We Watch*, published in the November-December, 1938 Cavalry Journal, said, "Both army and navy officers can get from this book a clear idea of the problems which confront not only their own particular branches of the national defense but that also of their sister services, and this, every professional officer should have."

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quently repeated lessons throughout this story of many campaigns. One is that success in the field depends more upon leadership than upon any other factor. The other is that for decisive results in open warfare one must have mobile troops. If they are not in being at the beginning of a war, they must be created and trained to insure ultimate victory.

* * *

RIDING. By Benjamin Lewis. Garden City Publishing Co., New York, 1938. 141 pages. Illustrated. Price $1.95.

Reviewed by Major Kent C. Lambert.

Riding, by Benjamin Lewis, is a beautifully illustrated book. It will, without doubt, help the intelligent beginner, who has a suitable horse. It will enable him to approach some degree of proficiency in riding without the aid of an instructor. Naturally, greater proficiency would be attained with the aid of a competent instructor.

The author's explanation of the balanced seat is basically in agreement with the teachings of the Cavalry School, especially with regard to the position of the upper body at various gaits and in the application of leg and rein aids. Minor differences, such as allowing the lower leg to move forward beyond the vertical position of the stirrup straps, to move the forehand over, to turn the hands inward when applying the direct rein, and position of the hands with the back of the hand down and nails up, while turning the horse to the right or left, are noted.

The author gives repeated advice to the rider about keeping the buttocks out of the saddle, but this will result in straightening the knee and standing in the stirrups. This position may get the rider comfortably over low jumps. However, when obstacles are high, weight on the stirrups and a straight knee will upset balance on landing. The rider will go forward and require the aid of his hands on the horse's neck to maintain position.

The author employs the term "forward seat" but interprets its difficulty from the Cavalry School. Actually the correct "jumping seat" is a lowering of the center of gravity. To accomplish this, the upper body is lowered toward the base of support, furnished by the lower legs, knees, inner thigh and crotch. The rider crouches in the saddle with the spine straight. To furnish a firm support, the legs should be fixed in the same position at the take-off, over the jump, and during departure from the jump. When this position is taken, the buttocks are out of the saddle. The knees, the inner thighs, and the crotch maintain position. The angles at ankles, knees, hips, and elbows should be closed. As Colonel Chamberlin says in his book, *Riding and Schooling Horses,* "The rider sits down." This statement, incidentally, was criticized by readers who did not understand what was meant.

Jump riders and instructors would profit by looking at the pictures of Colonel Chamberlin, Major Bradford, and Captain Thomson over the tops of big jumps. The ease and relaxation of both horse and rider in this position should be noted. Angles at ankles, knees, and hips are closed and upon landing, the riders are in complete balance and accord with their horses. These riders do not receive the whip of the upper body upon their horses' necks, which always results from opening the above mentioned angles and allowing the upper body to be driven outward and upward.

To sum up, as in most books on riding, there is much to criticize. There is too, a wealth of excellent advice and the green rider who masters all that is taught in this book will profit by it. With its help he may become a fair rider with a good position. If, however, he succeeded in achieving the position shown by each "correct" picture in the book, he would still have many faults to overcome before he could be classed as an excellent rider.

* * *

ELEMENTS OF ORDNANCE. By Lieutenant Colonel Thomas J. Hayes, U.S.A. John Wiley and Sons, New York. $6.50.

Reviewed by Major Grayson C. Woodbury, Ordnance Department.

This book is a technical text designed for use by students at the Military Academy. It is an up-to-date revision of the 1929 text on the same subject by Brigadier General Earl McFarland, who in turn based his work on an earlier book by Major General Tschappat, former Chief of Ordnance.

The progress and development in arms and ammunition have made a new text on ordnance necessary, and the author in addition to providing up-to-date instruction for the Military Academy has made available to all components of the army a valuable source of information on our new weapons.

The field of design and production and functioning of our weapons to include those employed for antimechanization and antiaircraft purposes are well covered by this book. Theory, fabrication and operations of the new semi-automatic rifle are also described. The mechanized combat vehicles in use in our army today have received concise yet detailed consideration.

In the preparation of this text the author has taken advantage of opportunity to consult many of the officers of the Ordnance Department. Technical staffs of the producing establishments have also contributed. It is apparent that the latest and best professional information on the subject of this book has been secured.

The Weapons Departments of our special service schools, regimental commanders and instructors of our civilian components now have an up-to-date source of authentic information available covering the technical capabilities and limitations of our weapons and ammunition.

ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1st Cavalry—Fort Knox, Ky.

COLONEL HENRY W. BAIRD, *Commanding*

Since the return of the regiment from the Fort Riley Maneuvers great stress has been placed upon maintenance and combat firing. Most of the combat firing was at airplane and moving ground targets.

Colonel Henry W. Baird arrived November 12, 1938 and took over command of the regiment from Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Heard who had temporarily been in command since the appointment of Colonel Chaffee to Brigadier General. Colonel Baird, who previously served with the First Cavalry at Fort Knox, Kentucky as executive officer under Colonel Bruce Palmer is now carrying on the splendid work of this distinguished officer.

The following is a list of officers of the First Cavalry and duties of each:

Colonel Henry W. Baird, Commanding Officer.
Lieutenant Colonel Jack H. Heard, President 7th Cavalry Brig. Mecz. Board.
Lieutenant Colonel K. G. Eastham, Plans and Training Officer.
Lieutenant Colonel J. F. Davis, Brig. Plans and Training Officer.
Major N. M. Imboden, Asst. Plans and Training Officer.
Major L. F. Lawrence, Brig. Communications Officer.
Major S. Boon, Commanding Second Squadron.
Major B. C. Andrus, Commanding First Squadron.
Major C. Unger, Brigade Motors Officer.
Major S. Higgins, Post Exchange Officer.
Major M. E. Jones, Regimental Adjutant.
Captain F. P. Tompkins, Member of 7th Cav. Brig. Mecz. Board.
Captain W. L. Barriger, Commanding Officer Machine Gun Troop.
Captain H. Engerud, Regimental Supply Officer.
Captain C. H. Bryan, Student Motor Transport Sch. Holabird, Maryland.
Captain D. P. Buckland, Assistant Post Adjutant.
Captain J. K. Sells, Commanding Officer Troop A
Captain D. Cameron, Commanding Officer Troop B.
Captain J. L. Ballantyne, Commanding Officer Troop C.
Captain R. B. Evans, Regimental Motors Officer.
Captain R. T. Willson, Post Special Duty with Brig. Motors School.
Captain W. Blanchard, Post Special Duty with W.P.A.
Captain C. Massey, Commanding Officer Service Troop.
Captain G. A. Williams, Commanding Officer Headquarters Troop.
Captain C. J. Mansfield, Commanding Officer Troop E.
Captain T. J. Brenan, Commanding Officer Troop F.
Lieutenant D. M. Schorr, Assigned to Troop F.
Lieutenant W. J. Dunn, Assigned to Troop B.
Lieutenant C. G. Dodge, Assigned to Machine Gun Troop.
Lieutenant P. H. Bethune, Assigned to Headquarters Troop.
Lieutenant E. M. Cahill, Assigned to Troop C.
Lieutenant C. E. Leydecker, Assigned to Troop A.

* * *

1st Squadron, 3d Cavalry—Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont

LIEUTENANT COLONEL THOMAS H. REES, JR., *Commanding*

The 1st Squadron opened the winter season with a march to the Cavalry Camp on the Artillery Range at Underhill, Vermont. The temperature was just below freezing and a light snow fall about six inches deep made good footing for the horses. A hot lunch was sent out on trucks for the men as well as forage for the horses. The total distance marched was twenty-eight miles, and all men and animals made the hike in excellent condition.

A remount competition was held for the first twenty remounts on November twenty-first. Each rider was required to execute a memorized sequence of movements and then conduct his horse over a series of low obstacles. Prizes were given as follows:

1st Place, Pvt. Pfefferkuch, on *Amigo*.
2nd Place, Corp. Mercier, on *Jock*.
3rd Place, Pfc. DeMello, on *San Blas*.
4th Place, Pfc. Pouliot, on *Chopper*.

The first Winter Gymkhana was held in the Riding Hall on December 28th. With the usual packed house of close to a thousand spectators the Squadron presented an unusually good show.

A list of events and winners is given below:

Event No. 1. Musical Chairs:
1st—Cpl. Kuchko, Tr. B.
2nd—Pvt. Smith, Tr. A.
3rd—Pvt. LaBombard, Tr. A.
4th—Pvt. Savage, Tr. A.

Event No. 2. NCO Jumping:
1st—Cpl. Hazel, Tr. A, on *Lady*.
2nd—Cpl. Curran, Hq. Det., on *Socks*.

3rd—Cpl. Regnier, Tr. A, on *Banjo*.
4th—Sgt. Fardy, Tr. A, on *Mary Mary*.

Event No. 3. Equipment Race:
1st—Pfiefferkuch and Yursza, Tr. A.
2nd—Ross and Ross, Tr. A.

Event No. 4. Bucking Barrel:
1st—Pvt. Scott, Tr. B.
2nd—Pvt. Duhamel, Tr. A.
3rd—Pvt. Walker, Tr. A.

Event No. 5. Monkey Drill:
Twelve men from Troop B demonstrated bareback riding, including dismounting, mounting, vaulting, etc., one, two, and three horses, and forming pyramids.

Event No. 6. Mounted Wrestling:
1st—Cpl. Winnett, Tr. B.
2nd—Pvt. Short, Tr. B.
3rd—Pvt. Mele, Tr. B.

Event No. 7. Officers' Jumping:
1st—Capt. Wenzlaff, on *Milly Russell*.
2nd—Capt. Jadwin, on *Black Beauty*.
3rd—Lieut. McCabe, on *Elizabeth*.
4th—Capt. Rice, 3d Cav.-Res., on *Bud*.

Event No. 8. Musical Ride:
Troop A demonstrated the combined training of horses and riders in intricate formations.

A novel feature was introduced by the first appearance of the Fort Ethan Allen Hounds. Led by Colonel T. L. Ferenbaugh, M.F.H., and with Victor Constant, Jr., as Acting Whipper In, the hounds circled the hall apparently paying no attention to the audience. The scarlet coats of the riders made a pretty picture and the hunt motif was further carried out by the appearance of a "Tallyho" in which rode several of the young ladies as hunt spectators. The "Tallyho" was presented to the Squadron by Colonel Reginald W. Buzzell of Bennington, who commands the 172d Infantry (Vt. Natl. Guard). The vehicle has been in Colonel Buzzell's family for a long time and has made many a trip over Vermont roads in bygone days.

The New Year started in traditional form with another snow hike to the Artillery Range on January 4th. Starting with nearly a foot of snow and the thermometer at four below zero, the Squadron covered the fourteen miles to the Range in two hours and nineteen minutes. After caring for the horses, lunch was eaten and the Squadron returned to the Post. All personnel and animals were in excellent condition.

Instructions were received from Regimental Headquarters on January 6th with reference to the Cavalry Small Bore Championship Matches, and the troop teams are busy getting ready for the first match which is due to be fired during the week ending January 14th. Lieut. R. E. McCabe has been designated as Assistant Officer in charge of training at Fort Ethan Allen.

With the end of 1938 the 3rd Cavalry lost the services of Master Sergeant Hearld J. Carman, who retired after thirty years' service, all of which was in the 3rd Cavalry. He enlisted in Troop A in 1908, and was 1st Sergeant of that organization on October 31, 1938, when he was transferred to Headquarters Troop as Master Sergeant. Sergeant Carman was in France with Troop A from October 16, 1917, to June 30, 1919. He received a letter of commendation from the Corps Area Commander on his long service with the 3rd Cavalry, and a gold watch from Troop A, both of which were presented to him at a dinner given in his honor. The traditional review was tendered him and the good wishes of all officers and men go with him on his retirement.

* * *

5th Cavalry—Fort Clark, Texas

COLONEL CUTHBERT P. STEARNS, *Commanding*

On December 5th, the regiment reluctantly bade farewell to Colonel George S. Patton who departed for his new station at Fort Myer. The troops were lined along the drive from the commanding officer's quarters to the main gate, the officers of the regiment, Lt. Col. John A. Robenson, commanding, and the Scout Car Platoon formed the escort. The regiment felt a great loss in the departure of Colonel Patton.

Colonel Cuthbert P. Stearns arrived on the Post December 10th, to assume command of the regiment. On the following afternoon a reception and tea dance was held at the Officers' Mess to welcome Colonel and Mrs. Stearns.

For the past two months the regiment has been engaged in an extensive training period. Both the individual and the collective training carried out on the reservation, combined with the eleven weeks of field training since April of last year, have brought the regiment to a high state of efficiency.

The Christmas holiday period was observed by the cessation of all regular drill for ten days. Troops held informal horse shows and hunts which were thoroughly enjoyed by all. Colonel and Mrs. Stearns received the officers and ladies of the Post on New Year's Day at their quarters.

The regiment and Brigade Headquarters Troop turned out January 3rd, in honor of Brigadier General Kenyon A. Joyce, who left Fort Clark on that date for Fort Bliss, where he assumed command of the First Cavalry Division. Colonel Stearns commanding, the General was escorted off the Post by the officers of the regiment and the Scout Car Platoon. The entire command was lined up along the road from the General's quarters to the main gate where the band was posted. The General left the Post, taking with him the regrets of the entire garrison, to the strains of Auld Lang Syne.

On the Saturday after New Year's the Post had an informal show, the classes of which included: I—Remounts (of six weeks' training, shown at walk, trot, and gallop and over 2-foot jumps); II—Officers' Green Jumpers. III—Green Polo Ponies; IV—Open Jumping. The las:

class was notable for the large number of entries and for the close competition.

There has been no polo activity since the first week in December, with the exception of one period per week of collective training for green ponies and instruction for the inexperienced officers. Weather permitting, Major James C. Short, the team coach, contemplates starting play around the first of February.

The months of December and January up to the time of this writing have seen a great deal of hard, fast playing in the Post Basketball League. All the troops of the regiment, Brigade Headquarters, and special troops have teams which have progressed remarkably since the beginning of the season. A Post Team has just been organized to play a few games during the remainder of the season. It played its first game with the 77th F.A., Ft. D.A. Russell, on January 13th and won 42-19.

With an eye on next season, a Post football team was organized last November, there having been no activity in that sport for over two years. It played two games during December, one with the 15th F.A. team from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and the other with the Del Rio All-Stars (a team of ex-college players living in and around that town). Both games were played to a tie. 2nd Lieutenants Leonard Shea and John Carusone undertook a great job in training and coaching an entirely new team, and have done splendidly.

On the 14th of January, the Band and the Scout Car Platoon led the parade for the National Commander of the American Legion, Mr. Stephen Chadwick, in Del Rio. After a luncheon there and an excellent address by the Commander, the Scout Car Platoon returned to Fort Clark and escorted Mr. Chadwick onto the Post. At the Officers' Mess, he was received by Colonel Stearns and greeted at an informal reception by the officers of the command.

Brigadier General Jonathan M. Wainwright arrived at Fort Clark in January to command the 1st Cavalry Brigade. He and Mrs. Wainwright were met on the highway about one-half mile from the main gate and escorted on the Post by the officers of the regiment under Colonel Stearns and by the Scout Car Platoon. The regiment was formed on the South Parade, where it was presented to the General. On the following Saturday a reception and dance were held at the Post Officers' Mess in honor of General and Mrs. Wainwright.

Other than those mentioned hereinbefore, the following officers have departed from, or arrived at the Post since December 1, 1938:

Colonel John C. F. Tillson, Jr, to Baltimore, Md.
Captain Harry C. Mewshaw, to Ft. Bliss, Texas.
Captain Clifford I. Hunn, to Governors Island, N. Y.
Captain Eaton W. Bennett (MC), to Schofield Barracks.
Chaplain John F. Chalker, to Schofield Barracks.
Captain Leif Neprud (QM), from San Francisco, California.
Lieut. John R. Pugh, from Ft. Myer, Va.

7th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL WILLIAM W. WEST, *Commanding*

The Troop basketball league came to a close on December 29, 1938, when Machine Gun Troop defeated Troop A in the two game play-off for the championship thereby winning a handsome trophy. A regimental squad of fifteen basketball players had been chosen and practice started. We look forward to the best team in the regimental series starting January 23, 1939.

On December 14, 15, and 16, a Post boxing tournament was held at the Army Y.M.C.A. The 7th Cavalry won three championships out of a total of five weights. Our Post champions with weights: Private Woods, featherweight; Corp. Wooldridge, welterweight, and Private Vinson, light heavyweight.

Troop E was the winner of the first half of the Troop bowling league which ended December 22, 1938. The second half will begin to roll about January 12, 1939. Our officers' bowling team continues to show too much class for the other officers' teams at Fort Bliss. On December 3, 1938, the regimental enlisted squad of two teams made a trip to Marfa and bowled against the 77th Field Artillery team there, winning one meet and losing two. This, however, was more than made up for when the 77th Field Artillery was defeated in straight games by our team on our own alleys.

Lt. and Mrs. A. H. Wilson became the parents of a daughter on November 25, 1938. Lt. and Mrs. A. J. Boyle became the parents of a son on December 17, 1938. Capt. and Mrs. Knudsen became the parents of a son on December 29, 1938.

Colonel West had this to say at the end of our training inspection on November 26, 1938: "Upon the successful completion of the Division Commander's Training Inspection, I desire to express my appreciation to the officers, noncommissioned officers, and men for the splendid showing made. The results indicate that the training has been well planned and well executed by the officers, that the leadership and ability of the noncommissioned officers are superior, and the spirit, willingness and morale of the men are everything they should be. The deficiencies in equipment, care of animals, and training which the inspection brought out, can and will be corrected, I know, before the next inspection. You may all well be proud to belong to the 'Garry Owens,' and I assure you I am."

On December 3, 1938, the 7th Cavalry polo team without the services of its star, Harry Wilson, for the last three periods was defeated by the Stanford University polo team by a score of 8 to 5. The Stanford team was given two goals by handicap. No regular schedule of games has been conducted recently but training and exercise have gone on with a view to future schedules.

On January 7, 1939, an informal regimental tea was held at the old 7th Cavalry Officers' Mess in honor of the Silver Wedding Anniversary of our regimental commander.

Losses since last notes: Major Ray T. Maddocks, de-

tailed on the General Staff and to duty as G-3, 1st Cavalry Division. 2nd Lt. Albert B. Turner and 2nd Lt. Hilbert S. Streeter to Troop A, 1st Armored Car Squadron.

Gains: 1st Lt. Caesar F. Fiore and 1st Lt. B. J. Heckemeyer from Troop A, 1st Armored Car Squadron and assigned to Machine Gun Troop.

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Headquarters, 8th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

On November 23d the regiment celebrated its organization day. On this birthday the regiment was 72 years of age, having been formed in 1866. In the brief history which was published to all members of the command, two very interesting facts were included:

"In May, 1888, the regiment concentrated at Fort Concho, Texas, preparatory to a march to Montana and South Dakota. Regimental Headquarters, Band, Troops "A," "C." and "D" marched from Fort Davis, Texas, to Fort Meade, South Dakota—1,800 miles. Most of the other troops marched 2,000 miles—Troop "H" from Fort Davis, Texas, to Fort Keogh, Montana—a distance of 2,613 miles. The regimental history states that this stands as the longest march ever taken by a Cavalry Regiment.

"Part of the march was over the Santa Fe Trail. Marks carved on stones and trees near the trail still bear mute testimony of troops who have long since departed on the longest of all trails.

"It took approximately three months to make this march."

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Of especial interest is the fact that the 8th Cavalry, in its history, has been awarded 91 Congressional Medals of Honor, some thirty-seven more than its nearest competitor among regular Army units.

On December 1st Captain H. I. Hodes was placed on special work with the 2d Cavalry Brigade and relinquished command of Troop "E" to Captain Thomas F. Sheehan.

The regiment celebrated Thanksgiving and Christmas in the traditional manner, all organizations having sumptuous banquets and impressive decorations.

On December 30th the regiment participated in a Division Review for visitors and guests of the Sun Carnival. And on January 2d the Scout Car and transportation platoons took part in the annual Sun Carnival Parade in El Paso.

The Machine Gun Troop has been designated as the organization to test the new slate blue uniform and its members were subjects of curiosity for several days following their change into the new clothes.

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9th Cavalry—Fort Riley, Kansas

LIEUTENANT COLONEL TERRY DE LA M. ALLEN, *Commanding*

A playlet, entitled "One Arabian Night," was presented by the Girl Scout Troop No. 5, Thursday evening, December 22nd in the Post gymnasium. The playlet was directed by Miss Eva Parker. A costume ball followed the playlet. Prizes were given for the most original costumes. Mrs. Ernestine Lewis won the first prize appearing as Martha Washington. Second prize was won by Private James D. Kimbrough as a fugitive from a chain gang, and Miss Juanita Wilder won third prize dressed as a Christmas tree.

The Christmas tree exercises for the regiment were held at the Post gymnasium Friday, December 23rd, at 4 PM. Christmas carols were sung by the 9th Cavalry Sunday School and presents were given by Santa Claus to all children of the 9th Cavalry, who were 12 years of age or under.

The Christmas dinner was served in the Mess Hall, Sunday afternoon, for all the members of the regiment, their families, and friends. A souvenir menu in booklet form with photograph of the commanding officer, names of all officers and members of the regiment with two fly sheets for autographs, a cut of the regimental coat of arms, its description and a brief history relative to the organization of the regiment and its present duties was given to everyone attending the dinner.

HORSE SHOW NOTES

The 9th Cavalry Regimental Horse Show under the direction of Captain Morris H. Marcus and 1st Sergeant Charles E. Pearson, Troop A, took place on the evening of December 28th. Under the able judging of First Lieutenants E. H. J. Carns, P. D. Harkins, R. W. Porter, and F. F. Wing, Jr., 9th Cavalry, it surpassed in attendance, color and performance all preceding Regimental shows.

The show included six classes. Events were as follows:

Event No. 1—Shuttle Race: Teams of four men. Each man riding bareback the length of the hall.

1st Place was won by Troop A—(Team) Pvts. Clanton Dawson, P. J. Patterson, Lester J. Smith, and Willis B. Carter. 2nd Place: Hqrs. and Service Troop—(Team) Pvts. K. Frasier, T. Jennings, C. A. Wilkerson, and M. D. Scott. 3rd Place: Troop G—(Team) Pvts. Harry Wilson, Sandy Smith, Pfc. J. Kerr and Leon Porter. 4th Place: Troop C—(Team) Pvts. C. L. Lewis, J. J. Johnston, A. Wiggins, and E. Rann.

Event No. 2—Bareback Jumping: The course consisted of varied jumps not exceeding three feet, six inches.

1st Place was won by Pvt. Dugless Daye, Troop C, on *Til Top*. 2nd Place: Pfc. James Kerr, Troop G, on *Windsor*. 3rd Place: Pvt. Kresson B. Frasier, Hqrs. and Service Troop, on *Portland*. 4th Place: Pvt. Harry J. Wilson, Troop G, on *Shamrock*.

Event No. 3—Privates Jumping: The course consisted of ten jumps not exceeding three feet and nine inches.

1st Place was won by Pvt. Vincent Bell, Hqrs. and Service Troop, on *McBeth*. 2nd Place: Pfc. James Kerr, Troop G, on *Windsor*. 3rd Place: Pvt. Leannert Carter, Troop B, on *Fraternity*. 4th Place: Pvt. Dugless Daye, Troop C, on *Dintate*.

Event No. 4—N.C.O. Jumping (Open): The course consisted of ten jumps not exceeding four feet.

1st Place was won by Corpl. William F. Tilman, Troop E, on *Anita Mentor*. 2nd Place: Corpl. Columbus Rudisill, Troop E, on *Royal*. 3rd Place: Corpl. Charles R. King, Hqrs. and Service Troop, on *Rolling River*. 4th Place: Corpl. Henry McGill, Troop A, on *Fraternity*.

Consisted of twelve jumps not exceeding four feet. Time limit: One minute and ten seconds. F.E.I. rules governing.

Event No. 5—Inter-Unit Team Jumping: The course

1st Place was won by N.C.O's Class—(Team) Corpl. Holmes, on *Gold Seeker;* Corpl. Seney, on *Ethel D.;* Corpl. Gronin, on *Tyrol;* Corpl. Pitts, on *McBeth*. 2nd Place: U. S. Cavalry—(Team) Sgt. Hunter, on *Eagle;* Corpl. Minthorn, on *Tarzan;* Corpl. Hyde, on *Coin Collector;* Corpl. Myers, on *Colonel*. 3rd Place: 9th U. S. Cavalry—(Team) Pfc. A. Johnson, on *Adalid;* Corpl. McGill, on *Don R.;* Corpl. Rudisal, on *Craig;* Corpl. C. R. King, on *Ansonia*. 4th Place: 84th U. S. Field Artillery—(Team) Sgt. Akers, on *Jimmie Too;* Sgt. Byrd, on *Jill;* Sgt. Tubbs, on *Bail;* Corpl. Jones, on *Reno Appet*.

Event No. 6—Musical Chairs:

1st Place was won by Pfc. James Cotton, Troop E, on *Kay Boy;* 2nd Place: Pvt. Jesse Rederick, Troop A, on *Chaffinch;* 3rd Place: Pvt. Leo Leeks, Troop B, on *Lassie;* 4th Place: Pvt. Green Blassingill, Troop C, on *Padre*.

Trophies, ribbons and cash prizes were presented by Mrs. Guy V. Henry, Mrs. Terry Allen, Mrs. H. E. Tuttle, Mrs. A. A. Frierson, Mrs. J. E. Theimer, and Mrs. P. D. Harkins. Music was furnished by the 9th Cavalry Band and refreshments consisting of hot coffee and doughnuts were served.

1st Sergeant Lemual Russell, Troop E, having completed 30 years of honest and faithful service was placed upon the retired list December 31, 1938.

9th Cavalry Officers' Bowling Team composed of Major F. A. Allen, Captain James H. Phillips, Captain C. W. Bennett, 1st Lt. E. H. J. Carns, 1st Lt. Scott M. Sandford, and B. S. Cairns defeated the Advance Equitation Class Team by a score of 2282 to 2255.

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12th Cavalry (Less 2d Squadron)—Fort Brown, Texas

COLONEL DONALD A. ROBINSON, *Commanding*

Since September regimental basic training of individuals and platoons has been stressed to supplement the experience and training obtained during field service on the 1st Cavalry Division Maneuvers and the Third Army Maneuvers.

In November the Platoon Leadership Competition held the interest of the entire garrison. The contest was exceedingly close, and only until the final scores were computed was it possible to definitely select the winning platoon. This honor fell to the Platoon of Troop A led by 2nd Lieutenant McPherson LeMoyne.

A three-day proficiency test of the Machine Gun Troop was held on the Boca Chica Target Range under the supervision of Major Heywood S. Dodd from December 20th to the 22nd. All situations were based on assumed dispositions, but targets actually placed on the ground definitely outlined the opposing forces. Both types of machine guns and the 37-mm. guns were fired. The test proved that the troop training was satisfactory and that it was capable of promptly placing fire on varied targets under field conditions.

Basketball has furnished considerable interest during the past two months. The post league included five teams. Games were played on an outside court under lights at night. Troop A won the team competition and a Post Team is now training for games with teams representing Fort Clark and Fort McIntosh.

Polo has been started under the supervision of Major Harry A. Buckley. Practice games are played twice each week.

Eighty remounts are in training and promise to become better than average mounts.

Post improvements under the State W.P.A. program continues. Projects now under way include landscaping and beautification of the area known as the "island" where a National Cemetery was formerly located, and the erection of garages. Reinforcement of the Rio Grande River levee has been approved as a project and work has started. Completed projects include relaying of railroad trackage, completion of roads and regrading an area east of the Quartermaster Warehouses.

Lieutenant Colonel Harold M. Rayner having been detailed in the War Department General Staff departed on leave early in December.

Major Heywood S. Dodd has received orders for the Philippine Department to sail on the February transport.

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13th Cavalry

COLONEL CHARLES L. SCOTT, *Commanding*

The regiment completed the supplementary target season during the month of December in good time to enjoy the Christmas holidays.

The enlisted men's Motor Mechanics School and Radio School are in full swing. The Officers' Schools, both mechanical and tactical, are well under way.

The 1939 training activities were ushered in on January 3rd and a problem in reconnaissance by the Seventh Cavalry Brigade in which all units participated. This exercise dealt principally with the reconnaissance agencies of the brigade, including the 12th Observation Squadron. The exercise stopped on completion of the reconnaissance phase and will continue subsequent phases of combat at a later date.

The Regiment is now engaged in combat firing with all weapons. This firing includes firing at moving targets from stationary vehicles, at stationary targets from moving vehicles, mortar firing with base plate on the ground and in the vehicle, and antiaircraft firing at tow targets. Much of this firing is of an experimental nature with a view to

testing a standardized combat qualification course for all weapons of a mechanized cavalry regiment.

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26th Cavalry (P.S.)—Fort Stotsenburg, P. I.

COLONEL CLARENCE A. DOUGHERTY, *Commanding*

From October 8-29, 1938, inclusive, the machine gun elements of the regiment fired the yearly target practice at towed targets at Olongapo, Zambales, P. I. The intensive training of the machine gun personnel, prior to their firing, resulted in higher scores from that of previous years.

This year's continuation of field training period consisted of routine field training and numerous alerts. The main purpose of the alerts is to test the minimum time of loading and maximum loading capacities of trucks and trailers in accordance with the Loading Tables of the Regimental Alert Plan. Other purposes of the alerts, according to the regimental commander, are to enable the newly arrived assigned officers of the regiment to alert their units based on current standing orders.

From November 21-26, 1938, inclusive, Lieutenant Colonel Walter E. Buchly, 26th Cavalry (PS), with a small detachment, reconnoitered (on foot) the Zambales trails to San Marcelino via Floridablanca, Dinuluhan and Sinamal.

Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Taulbee and Captain P. A. Ridge, have received their orders for assignment in the States leaving on February boat.

The 26th Cavalry (PS), headed the 24th Field Artillery (PS), two (2) points in the last Post Boxing Tournament. The 57th Infantry (PS), copped most of the events garnering a total of 97 points against a sum of 29 points recorded for the 26th Cavalry during their dual track and field meet in December. Private 1cl. Amado Pascual of the 26th Cavalry was the outstanding contender in the meet.

The informal horse show of the 26th Cavalry was held on November 19, 1938, at which time, the remounts made an excellent showing.

Troop F, under Captain Donald H. Nelson, 26th Cavalry (PS), is preparing a musical drill exhibition for the coming annual exposition to be held at Manila, P. I., sometime in January.

The regiment left for a week in the field in the O'Donnell Area on December 9, 1938. Due to weather conditions and the nature of the terrain the regiment was supplied entirely by pack train.

A series of Sunday morning cross-country rides was initiated by the regiment in October. On October 16, 1938, General and Mrs. Grant entertained the officers and ladies at a delightful "hunt breakfast" after the ride. The officers of the 26th Cavalry were hosts to the officers and ladies of the post at a "hunt breakfast" following the November 6, Sunday morning ride. These rides are a source of much enjoyment for the entire post.

103d Cavalry—Tyrone, Pennsylvania

COLONEL BENJAMIN C. JONES, *Commanding*

The new year has started with good promise. Training inspections conducted in December disclosed a gratifying state of training and condition of equipment. Reports on small arms qualifications for the year 1938 evidenced earnest and effective effort on the part of all units. Remounts coming to the regiment toward the end of the year have brought our horse strength close to allotted strength. Tactical exercises for the 1939 field training period have all been prepared and approved.

It is a pleasure to announce the pomotion of 2nd Lieutenants Edward P. O'Kane of Troop A and Clarence P. Bryan of Troop F to be 1st Lieutenants. It is also a pleasure to announce the appointment of Staff Sergeant Charles B. Reed, Headquarters Troop, to be 2nd Lieutenant assigned to Troop A; of 1st Sergeant Harry C. Symmonds, Machine Gun Troop, to be 2nd Lieutenant assigned to Machine Gun Troop; and of Sergeant Francis Logan. Troop L, to be 2nd Lieutenant assigned to Troop L.

At the opening of this new year it is perhaps appropriate that the current roster of officers of the regiment be published. It is as follows:

Regimental Headquarters, Tyrone, Pa.: Colonel Benjamin C. Jones, commanding; Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Wolfe, executive; Major Benjamin T. Bell, surgeon; Captain Paul M. Kienzle, S-1; Captain John H. F. Bittner, S-2-3; Captain Clarence L. Bender, S-4; Captain Harry L. Saul, chaplain; 2nd Lieutenant Roy F. Baver, Jr., assistant S-1, and Warrant Officer Edward S. Calhoun, band leader.

Hq. 1st Squadron, Philadelphia, Pa.: Major Kirk Swing, commanding; 1st Lieut. Wm. J. E. Thompson, S-1.

Troop A, Philadelphia, Pa.: Captain Joseph H. Kifer. 1st Lieut. Edward P. O'Kane, 2nd Lieut. Charles B. Reed.

Troop B, Philadelphia, Pa.: Captain Lynn L. Detweiler, 1st Lieut. Joseph G. Rademan, 2nd Lt. Eugene A. Fischer.

Troop C, Philadelphia, Pa.: Captain George C. Sholl. 1st Lieut. Joseph M. Williams, 2nd Lieut. Robert E. O'Brien.

Hq. 2nd Squadron, Sunbury, Pa.: Major Geo. W. Schubert, commanding; 1st Lieut. Franklin D. Fry, S-1.

Troop E, Sunbury, Pa.: Captain Kenneth J. Hafer, 1st Lieut. Edward C. Fisher.

Troop F, Lock Haven, Pa.: Captain Foster S. McGhee. 1st Lieut. Clarence P. Bryan, 2nd Lieut. Adelbert A. Arter.

Troop G, Lewisburg, Pa.: Captain Daniel G. Snyder. 1st Lieut. Clayton H. Shunk, 2nd Lieut. Thomas G. Lewis.

Hq. 3rd Squadron, Philadelphia, Pa.: Major Edward J. Albert, commanding; 1st Lieut. Charles W. Roberts, S-1.

Troop I, Dubois, Pa.: Captain Walter N. McCreight. 1st Lieut. Robert R. Love, 2nd Lieut. Truman J. Norris.

Troop K, New Castle, Pa.: Captain George F. Seyffert.

1st Lieut. William H. Goehring, 2nd Lieut. Raymond K. Atkinson.

Troop L, Philadelphia, Pa.: Captain Joseph J. Wall, 1st Lieut. John B. McCloskey, 2nd Lieut. Francis Logan.

Headquarters Troop, Philadelphia, Pa.: Captain Charles T. Cabrera, 1st Lieut. John R. Dey, 1st Lieut. Henry L. Davisson, 2nd Lieut. Meredith Cooper.

Machine Gun Troop, Bellefonte, Pa.: Captain Herbert M. Beezer, 1st Lieut. Hall F. Achenbach, 1st Lieut. Frederick L. Shope, 2nd Lieut. Harry C. Symmonds.

Medical Detachment, Philadelphia, Pa.: Captain Cheston M. Hoskins, Captain James R. Skillen, Captain William S. Parker, 1st Lieut. Henry P. Schneider, 1st Lieut. Charles D. Coppes.

Major Maurice Rose, regular army instructor with the regiment, left on January 9th for three weeks duty at Fort Meade as one of the instructors at the III Corps Command and General Staff School. Major Edward J. Albert, commanding 3rd Squadron and Philadelphia Post of the regiment, left on January 16th for two weeks duty as a student at the same school.

The units of the regiment are anticipating visits during the current month from officers of the Brigade Staff. Close liaison is maintained between brigade and regiment at all times and these Brigade Staff visits are periodic and pleasurable affairs.

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106th Cavalry—(Illinois Component)

MAJOR RALPH G. GHER, *Commanding*

Zero weather, together with Christmas holidays, curtailed somewhat the outdoor activities of the troops at the end of 1938. Indoor instruction continued without interruption, all units adhering to the training schedule.

Major E. A. Franklin, stationed at Springfield as Instructor, is conducting lectures on defensive combat for the officers of Troop F, Machine Gun Troop and Staff, stationed in that city. Captain Mark Plaisted was designated as commander of the Blue forces and Lieutenant Charles R. Bean commands the Reds. Other officers act as Chiefs of Staff, etc., and a very interesting map problem is being conducted which promises to continue throughout the school season.

The remounts received recently by Machine Gun Troop and Troop F are progressing rapidly in their training. They are now being ridden and accustomed to the excitement of troop drill. Fortunately, every horse in the consignment was easily trained and no difficulty was encountered in preparing them for service.

The band, located in Chicago and commanded by Lieutenant William F. Hewitt, participated in the horse show presented by the Lancers of the 122nd Field Artillery. In their black and white dress uniforms of Dragoons of the period of 1812, they presented a remarkable picture as they went through the evolutions of an intricate precision drill, playing during the entire drill.

The Springfield units have been fortunate in securing the services of a commissioned officer to take complete charge of stables and animals. Until November 1, 1938, the stables were supervised by the senior officer at the station, who was handicapped by lack of time from his private business. On November 1st, Lieutenant McCarthy of the Machine Gun Troop, accepted the responsibility of Stable Officer with a full time salary paid by the State of Illinois. This arrangement has relieved the troop commanders of a burden which was rapidly becoming too great in view of their civilian interests.

Troop E of Chicago, known as the "Black Horse Troop," participated in the ceremony in connection with the commencement of work on the gigantic Chicago subway system.

Major Gher, commanding the regiment in the absence of Lieut. Colonel Kenneth Buchanan on duty with the General Staff, War Department, made his monthly inspection of the Springfield units on December 20th.

Captain Crookston, Springfield, Regimental Adjutant, made an informal inspection of the Band in Chicago on December 6th.

The personnel of the regiment is greatly interested in newspaper articles to the effect that an Armord Car Squadron of Mechanized Cavalry is proposed for the State of Illinois. Another announcement to the effect that the 22nd and 23rd Cavalry Divisions are to be consolidated is the subject of considerable discussion as to whether or not a cavalry maneuver may be substituted during the coming summer instead of the routine tour of field training with the 33rd Division and attached troops.

With work progressing rapidly on the new Armory of Troop E in Chicago, and the nearing completion of the spacious armory of Headquarters Troop in Urbana, interest is centered on the proposed quarters of the Springfield units, Troop F and Machine Gun Troop. For several years these units have been handicapped by having offices and supply rooms in a civilian club buiding with their horses and equipment at the State Fair Grounds several miles distant. In spite of the tremendous handicap occasioned by lack of suitable quarters, the troops have been able to maintain a degree of efficiency and morale equal to the more fortunate units of the regiment. It is hoped that 1939 will see some provision made for stables and riding hall for these homeless troops.

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112th Cavalry—Dallas, Texas

COLONEL CLARENCE E. PARKER, *Commanding*

On November 11th, the regiment commanded by Captain Campbell W. Newman, participated in the Armistice Day Parade held in Dallas. Captain Newman deserves great credit for the excellent manner in which he handled the regiment both during the parade and the march to initial point. This required a march of twenty miles on the part of some troops and to have all men and horses looking like "new pins," as they did in the parade, required careful inspection and supervision on the part of Captain Newman and his officers.

The horses were equipped with white bandages, saddle cloths, brow bands, and halters, and many complimentary remarks were heard from the spectators, as this fine looking mounted organization passed in review.

Troop E held its annual military circus and gymkhanna on Sunday, November 20, 1938.

Captain John A. Mann, 1st Lieut. Henry L. Phillips, and 2d Lieut. P. L. Hooper, the officers of Troop E are receiving just congratulations for the excellent, smooth, prompt manner in which the different events were run. There was no tiresome delay between events and the interest and enthusiasm of the spectators was maintained from the first to last event.

The program included: Silent Mounted Lance Drill; Jumping Classes for Noncommissioned Officers and Privates; Rescue, Equipment, Potato Races; and Musical Chair competition. The finale was Fire Jumping, in which Lieut. Hooper leading his entire platoon, jumped over and through six burning obstacles without a single refusal.

Captain W. T. Starr, who volunteered as radio announcer to help Captain Mann out with the program, made such a hit with his witty remarks and did such an excellent job in announcing and explaining the different events, that it is reported, large broadcasting companies have been endeavoring to secure the services of Captain Starr.

The Cavalry Leadership Platoon Tests for all troops, and the Squad Tests for the Medical Detachment and Band, being conducted within the regiment, are progressing most satisfactorily. These tests have awakened the keenest interest throughout the regiment and the enthusiasm and spirit being displayed by all units in this friendly regimental competition is most gratifying.

The 1st Quarterly Test for the squads in the Medical Detachment, was conducted on November 29th and 30th.

The marked improvement displayed by all squads prove the value of competitions during the Armory Training Period.

In the final ratings, for this phase of the test, the 1st Squad, led by Sgt. R. J. Halbert, stood first, with the 2d Squad, led by Sgt. J. E. Williams, a close second.

On December 10, Troop B, commanded by Captain William T. Starr, gave a most enjoyable Christmas party and dance at its Armory at Camp Tommy Tompkins. All officers and enlisted men of the troop, their wives and sweethearts were present. A delicious buffet supper was served and dancing continued into the wee small hours.

The annual Christmas Banquet of Troop F, was held on December 17th, in the banquet room of the Blackstone Hotel, Tyler, Texas.

This was the twenty-first consecutive banquet given the enlisted men by the officers of the troop.

During the ceremonies, Santa Claus appeared and presented Captain R. G. Philips, 1st Lieut. M. E. Hood, and 2d Lieut. Q. R. Tipton, the three officers of the troop, with Christmas presents from the enlisted men.

Colonel Clarence E. Parker, principal speaker of the evening, complimented the officers and men of Troop F, for their fine work during the past year and urged them to carry on.

The following listed noncommissioned officers won first places in the troop inspections and demonstrations, conducted by the regimental instructor, for the months of November and December, 1938:

Headquarters Troop

Best turned out mounted sergeant—Sgt. J. D. Sanders. Best turned out dismounted sergeant—Sgts. J. E. Lake and V. L. Walters tied for first place.

Machine Gun Troop

Best turned out mounted corporal—Corpl. F. J. Havs. Best turned out dismounted corporal—Corpl. J. P. Dobbs.

Troop A

Best turned out mounted corporal—Corpl. J. Smith. Best turned out dismounted corporal—Corpl. T. R. Wilkins.

Troop B

Best turned out mounted corporal—Corpl. J. W. McDonald. Best turned out dismounted corporal—Corpl. H. M. Bryant.

Troop E

Best turned out mounted corporal—Corpl. E. P. Blakemore. Best turned out dismounted corporal—Corpl. C. T. McHale.

Troop F

Best turned out mounted corporal—Corpl. B. F. Taylor. Best turned out dismounted corporal—Corpl. W. Willis.

The regiment presented Lieut. Allen B. Wallace, Headquarters and Staff with a beautifully engraved "tin cup" for killing the most tame ducks during the 1938 duck season.

It seems that Major Billy Cameron ordered Lieut. Wallace to kill sufficient wild ducks for a duck dinner in honor of the regimental commander.

After hunting all day without success, Lieut. Wallace spied, on the last pond of the day, 15 fat Mallards, swimming close to shore. He crawled 200 yards on his "tummy" and waited for them "to stop swimming," believing that when you are after meat for the colonel everything is fair. He then proceeded to slaughter the ducks and when his bombardment ceased, 15 Mallards lay dead on the water.

Sad to relate these ducks were tame pet Mallards with clipped wings, belonging to the children of Farmer Broundale who demanded $2.00 per from Lieut. Wallace.

As he reluctently paid the bill Lieut. Wallace remarked "A damn expensive duck-dinner even for the old man."

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62d Cavalry Division
305th Cavalry—Philadelphia, Pa.

COLONEL VINCENT A. CARROLL, *Commanding*

The winter training program of the regiment has progressed very favorably. Luncheon conferences have been

held every Wednesday at noon, while the equitation instruction has been carried on every Wednesday evening under Colonel Wilson's supervision. Early in December Captain Nolan, formerly with the British Cavalry during the World War gave an excellent talk on British Cavalry operations during that time. At the noon luncheon on December 21st, Captain Ed. Young regaled the members present with a number of amusing anecdotes concerning his experiences as a Supply Officer with the A.E.F., in France. From his talk, we learned a lot about the practical side of supply, which is not covered in the Training Regulations.

The Annual Regimental Church service was held at the Ithan Chapel on November 13th, Chaplain R. N. Gurley delivered an impressive sermon on the need of national defense in order to maintain PEACE in these troublesome times. After the service, the officers and their ladies repaired to the Merion Cricket Club for a social get-together as the guests of Colonel Vincent A. Carroll.

The Thanksgiving Turkey Shoot was won by Private Anthony J. Guida, one of the regiment's C.M.T.C. proteges.

Due to the heavy snows, which occurred late in November, the Mechanized Night Ride was postponed until March. We hope to report in a later issue, those officers who prove themselves successful in carrying out their mission under the cover of darkness.

A small Horse Show was held at the First City Troop Armory on December 21st. First place was taken by Lieutenant Iredell, with Lieutenant Gerry White coming in a close second. After the Horse Show we had a Christmas Party at the Lido Hotel. A fine time was had by all present, with thanks to Lieut. "Sam" Naftzinger our "generalissimo" of entertainment. Lieut. Naftzinger has promised us a formal dinner in January and a dance in February and judging from his past performances, these should be gala affairs.

Captain Harold G. Lacy, editor of the regimental paper, *The Stallion*, favored us with one of the best issues of that paper that has ever been published.

The following officers have been recently welcomed into the regiment: 2nd Lieutenants Douglas P. Adams, Edwin A. Hartley, George S. Iredell, Boris Y. Kutner, and Paul L. Petty.

Lieut. Adams is instructor of equitation at the Valley Forge Military Academy.

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306th Cavalry—Baltimore, Maryland

COLONEL MATTHEW F. JAMES, *Commanding*

On November 2nd, the officers of the Regiment in Baltimore and vicinity heard Major R. G. Tyndal, Infantry, lecture on the "Rôle of the Infantry." Not only was the organization of the new Infantry Division discussed but slides of the new infantry weapons were also shown. Major Vernon J. Blondell, 306th Cavalry, gave the outline of the problem for the November 16th conference. At this conference Captain Thomas H. Mundy and Lt. Graham Dukehart were the instructors and the subject was "March and Advance Guard."

On November 15th a farewell dinner was given at the Longfellow Hotel for Colonel Henry W. Baird, who left us to take command of the First Cavalry, Mechanized, at Fort Knox, Kentucky. The honor and distinction of this assignment compensated to a great extent for our loss.

On December 7th, Major Wm. S. Roumbough, Signal Corps, gave an illustrated lecture on the "Rôle of the Signal Corps." This lecture gave all who heard it an interesting insight into the progress made in communications. The outline of the problem for the following conference was given by Major W. C. Warner, 306th Cavalry. On December 21st the conference was given by Captain Henry G. Sheen and Lt. Thomas E. Jarman, Jr., and the problem was "Mounted Attack." At this conference the new Senior Unit Instructor of the Regiment, Colonel John C. F. Tillson, Jr., met the Baltimore officers. We take this opportunity to welcome Colonel Tillson to the Regiment and we hope that his stay with us will be a long and a pleasant one.

The officers of Washington and vicinity were most fortunate during November and December in having an unusually interesting and instructive program, the outstanding features of which were lectures by Major General John K. Herr, Chief of Cavalry, on the "Rôle of Cavalry," and Colonel Bruce Palmer, Chief of Staff of the 62nd Cavalry Division, on "Horse and Mechanized Cavalry." Lectures were also given by the following officers: Captain Walter Gleason spoke on "Mechanized Vehicles and Weapons," Captain Guerra Everett lectured on "Mechanized Units," Captain L. E. Smith's conference was "Advance Guard Actions," while the subject given by Captain John Goodell was "Rear Guard Actions," and Captain Paul E. Hadlick's topic was "Squadron in Defense." Captain E. H. Daniel and Captain Wm. I. Irby gave instruction to the officers of the Machine Gun Troops.

Rides at Fort Myer have been held on every other Sunday morning under the direction of Lt. Col. Edward B. Harry and Major Edward A. Kane. Mounted drill with rotation in command, and cross-country rides have been provided on each occasion. The instrucion and practice secured at these rides should prove valuable in our training of the C.M.T.C. next summer.

The Regimental Pistol Team has been showing marked improvement, and new members have replaced some of those who were on last year's team. Challenges have been received for matches which have been accepted and these matches will be fired later on during the winter.

1st Lt. Theodore A. Baldwin, III, and 2nd Lt. Everett A. Luckenbach have been assigned to the Regiment. The War Department has accepted the resignation of 1st Lt. Isadore A. Handler. Recent promotions in the Regiment were: 2nd Lieutenants Josef E. Gellerman and Rowland F. Kirks to First Lieutenants.

Polo Squad, Norwich University.

retired, former commanding general, Missouri N.G.

Reserves included: Major Edward Brown, Minneapolis; Lieutenant Gail Fitch and Lieutenant Lew Fitch, Des Moines, Iowa.

Thirty-six Reserve officers in our vicinity are assigned the 15th Cavalry.

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Norwich University

Following graduation June 6, 1938, the Junior Class started on its annual six weeks' R.O.T.C. march and camp. This detachment numbered 48 cadets, 2 regular army officers on duty here, 2 Reserve officers (a veterinarian and a doctor) and 15 enlisted men (truck drivers, cooks, etc.). The six weeks' duty was divided into phases as follows:

1st Phase. A cavalry march of 250 miles through the Green Mountains of Vermont on a big loop which started south, then west and north, ending at Fort Ethan Allen, Vt. During this march various tactical situations and war conditions were assumed and two night marches were made.

2nd Phase. Three weeks at Fort Ethan Allen where the cadets complete their known distance firing, qualifying 90%, and machine gun and combat firing. Also participation in the Fort Ethan Allen Horse Show where, in the R.O.T.C. Class, they captured first, third, and fourth place.

3rd Phase. The return march to Norwich University. This was made as a forced march, part of the distance being covered by daylight and part at night.

The University opened September 16, 1938, and found the new barracks, Cabot Hall, ready for occupancy. The Corps was 357 strong with 120 cadets in the first and second year Advanced R.O.T.C. and 230 in the Basic courses.

A vigorous fall drill schedule, including mounted and dismounted, close and extended order drill, pistol, Cal. .45 record firing, preliminary rifle instruction and equitation was successfully completed by November 26, 1938. During this practical period, extended order drill and combat exercises for small units was stressed.

The theoretical instruction period started November 28, 1938, and extends to March 25, 1939. Norwich, being a Class M.C. College, has 101 extra hours for Advanced Students and 165 extra hours for Basic Students above the War Department requirements. This enables the instruction to not only thoroughly cover the subjects prescribed by the War Department but to cover important additional theoretical subjects during the winter and additional practical instruction in the fall and spring.

Following the spring recess the units will again move outdoors on April 4, 1939, to put into practice the newly-acquired theoretical knowledge in preparation for the Annual Federal Inspection. This inspection will be conducted by the 1st Corps Area about the middle of May. All phases of the R.O.T.C. activities will be tested. It is felt that a high standard of training will again be demonstrated.

Lieutenant Colonel George S. Andrew, P.M.S.&T., has been responsible for a thorough and comprehensive design for training throughout the year. His close supervision and constructive corrections have been the springboard for high standards in the Norwich R.O.T.C. unit.

Horse shows, conducted as extra activities under Major Reinburg, are staged Carnival Week (indoors), Junior Week and Graduation (outdoors). These shows, well attended and smoothly run, are one of the highlights of cadet activities. Major Reinburg's loss next year will be keenly felt by Norwich University.

Polo, coached by Captain Ruffner, is enjoying its second year of expansion. There are now 15 complete teams participating in intra-mural polo. The varsity team has extended its schedule this year to 12 games, indoors and outdoors. To date they have won five out of the seven games played, losing to Cornell University and West Point. It is contemplated sending the team to the Indoor Intercollegiates in New York City March 26th. Polo has now been recognized by the University as a major sport.